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SUMMARY 
This thesis aims to give an account of the general movement of 
Quinet's religious and historical thought. The approach is broadly 
chronological. Biographical detail, however, is kept to a necessary 
minimum. Emphasis is placed upon the centrality of the religious 
dimension but at the same time attention is paid both to Quinet's own 
poetic production and to those publications in which he deals with 
aesthetic, political, social and more general philosophical matters. 
The underlying contention is that despite the seeming diversity of 
the topics under discussion the author remains fundamentally concerned 
with two subjects: history and religion. The major issues raised are 
those of the relationship between man and nature, between the individual 
and the collectivity and between man and God. The first three chapters 
cover the period before Quinet's departure into exile in 1851. Aspects 
of his work considered in detail include: his interpretation of the 
history of religions, his views on the contemporary condition of 
Christianity and his contribution to the debate concerning the existence 
of the historical Homer. Particular attention is given to a discussion 
of his conception of the messianic destiny of the French nation. 
Chapters four to six look at the development of Quinet's thought between 
1851 and his death in 1875. The major concerns of these chapters are 
his interpretation of the meaning of the French Revolution, his struggle 
in difficult circumstances to retain his belief in the historical 
mission of the French nation and his attempt to reconcile recent 
developments in evolutionary theory with his own faith in freedom. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout his writings Quinet attempts to impart a meaning to the unfolding 
of history. Is history the work of God or of man? Of the individual or of the 
collectivity? Of freedom or of necessity? Until the very end of his life he 
struggles to provide satisfactory answers to these questions which in turn raise 
further important issues concerning the relationship between man and nature, 
between the individual and humanity, and between man and God. 
From the outset, however, it must be realised that Quinet's search for a 
purpose in history does not exist in isolation from his general diagnosis of 
the spiritual ills of contemporary Western society. The study of the past is 
not a disinterested activity. More often the hope persists that by means of 
our understanding of history we may both foresee the future and explain the 
present. Karl Lowith remarks that the historical consciousness, despite its 
object of knowing the thought of other men and other times, "cannot but start 
with itself". (1) What is particularly significant in Quinet's case is his 
conviction that he is living at a time of transition, characterised by profound 
religious doubt and uncertainty. The present is a time of crisis but this 
itself may be a sign that a great spiritual transformation is beginning: 
"l'humanite est sourdement travaillee dans ses entrailles COmme si elle allait 
enfanter un Dieu".(2) This mood is successfully rendered in Ahasverus (1833) 
and Promethee (1838). Traditional Christianity is deemed incapable of providing 
a solution to the spiritual crisis of the nineteenth century. A new religion, 
or at very least a radical transformation of Christianity, is required. In 
this context the anguished cry of the Wandering Jew reflects the spiritual 
condition of his creator: 
Pour me rendre Ie repos, c'est une religion 
nouvelle qu'il me faudrait, ou personne n'aurait 
encore pu~se. C'est elle que je cherche. C'est 
la seulement que je pourrai abreuver la soif 
infinie qui me devore. (3) 
Many French writers, thinkers and poets of Quinet's generation would have 
accepted that their time was one of crisis and transition. The idea was 
extremely widespread and it is difficult to underestimate its importance. In 
Les Chants du crepuscuZe (1835) Hugo depicts the character of this "epoque 
livree a l'attente et a la transition". (4) Ballanche, for his part, refers to 
the present as "un age de crise pour la societe, une ere nouvelle de l'esprit 
humain".(5) The Saint-Simonian distinction between organic and critical periods 
in many ways reflects the same mood. Transition, however, only has a meaning 
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within a wider context of change and movement. The first half of the nine-
teenth century understood history as a developing, unfolding process. This 
conception of history produced a new explanation of human nature itself. The 
historicity of human existence became central. (6) E. Brehier writes that this 
attitude found its clearest expression in the philosophy of Hegel: 
C ... 1 1 'etre humain ne se de£init que charge d'histoire, 
et l'on n'atteindra pas l'humanite par une abstraction 
qui la depouille de tout son acquis, mais au contraire 
par la loi meme de cette acquisition qui 1a fait peu 
a peu ce qu'elle est. Ce trait de la pensee hegelienne 
est universel a cette epoque: toute connaissance est 
mediate; elle n'a lieu qu'en reflechissant Ie devenir 
qui l'a produit. [ ••• 1 on n'etudiera ni la nature ni 
l'homme independamment de leur devenir; ils ne sont 
reels, substantiels que grace a la suite des etats 
par ou ils ont passe. (7) 
Hegel himself, it is to be noted, provides a celebrated example of the theme of 
transition in the preface to The PhenomenoZogy of Mind (1807): 
c ... 1 it is not difficul t to see tha t our epoch is a 
birth-time, and a period of transition. The spirit 
of the age has broken with the world as it has hitherto 
existed, and with the old ways of thinking, and is in 
the mind to let them all sink into the depths of the past 
and to set about its own transformation. (8) 
Despite the differences which separated thinkers such as Hegel, Quinet, 
Michelet and Comte they all shared certain assumptions concerning the nature 
of history. History was envisaged as a dynamic process which contained a 
number of stages and progressed towards a desired goal. Many, like Buchez, 
held that ideas governed history and believed that laws could be deduced from 
the study of the past in the light of which the future evolution of mankind 
could be foreseen. For some, confidence in history combined with the belief 
in the perfectibility of man to produce the dream of continuous and inevitable 
progress which could serve as a substitute for religious faith.(9) Those who 
sought a transformation of society often constructed philosophies of history in 
accord with their vision of the future. The present took on a new meaning when 
seen within the perspective of the history of mankind. Here, for example is 
Victor Considerant writing in 1848: 
Pour quiconque sait voir les choses d'un peu haut, 
pour quiconque a une certaine intelligence du 
developpement historique de l'humanite, il est 
evident que les societes civi1isees ont atteint une 
de ces epoques pa1yngenesiques ~iC} ou une 
transformation fondamentale dans leur constitution 
est imposee par une loi absolument invincible, par 
l'action toute puis sante de leurs forces mOlecu1aires; 
en un mot, par une NECESSITE, naturel1e ou provi-
dentielle, comme on voudra dire, mais certainement 
impossible a conjurer, fatale. (10) 
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Life, however, becomes difficult to bear in a present which is experienced 
as a period of transition. It is unclear which direction the future will follow. 
At most, early signs of the coming transformation may be discovered in the 
present but the present itself remains a time of expectant waiting. "Est-ce 
que chacun n'est pas dans l'attente?" asks Lamennais in Paroles d'un croyant 
(1834). In L'Ultramontanisme (1844) the nineteenth century is described as 
"un siecle ou tout Ie monde est dans l'attente et a besoin d'un guide'~.(l2) 
In 1833 Quinet provides a particularly valuable definition of the sickness of 
the historical consciousness which he terms "Ie mal de l'avenir": 
Au fond de nos ames nous sen tons deja ce qui va 
etre. Ce rien est deja quelque chose qui palpite, 
la, sous notre main, dans notre seine Nous Ie 
voyons, nous Ie touchons. Mais dans Ie monde, il 
tarde trop, en verite. Le fardeau de ce qui n'est 
pas pese sur nos desirs. Ce n'est pas la faiblesse 
de notre pensee qui nous tue; c'est Son exces, 
crest sa disproportion avec la vie; c'est le 
poids de l'avenir a supporter dans Ie vide du 
present. (13) 
In his examination of the period from 1800 to 1850 Brehier insists upon 
"la connexite entre Ie renouveau de philosophie religieuse et la portee 
metaphysique que l 'on attribue a l 'his toire " • (14) A reading of those works 
which Quinet published before his exile gives strong support to this statement. 
These texts reveal a preoccupation with religion which is inseparable from a 
reflexion upon the meaning of history. It is religion in its historical 
development which interests Quinet. Societies 7 , institutions, laws and the 
arts are all shown to be products of religion - and not vice versa. Yet 
despite the priority which the author of Le Genie des religions (1842) assigns 
to religion in all forms of human activity he neglects to provide a definition 
of what exactly he means by the term "religion". Religion is at once a collective 
phenomenon and something deeply personal. Religion has to do both with the 
relationship between man and nature and the ethical standards according to 
which the individual lives his life in society. In view of this lack of 
definition it would be unwise to claim that Quinet was a philosopher of religion 
in the technical sense. Moreover, he leaves us uncertain as to his conception 
of God. We shall return to this point in the course of our analysis but it is 
nevertheless worthwhile pointing out at this juncture that while we find 
references to "dieu", "l'infini", "l'eternel", "l'esprit", "l'absolu", in 
Quinet's writings he never tackles the problem of the existence of God in 
isolation, from a philosophical or a theological point of view. If, however, 
we make use of the terms defined by Lovejoy in The Great Chain of Being Quinet's 
God would not seem to be the self-sufficient Absolute of otherworldliness but 
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a God whose self-realisation takes place in nature and in history and whose 
"essential nature requires the existence of other beings". (15) 
In view of the close relationship between religion and history it is 
necessary at this point to distinguish between .the philosophy of history as 
understood by Quinet and the accepted modern meaning of the term. A philosopher 
of today takes philosophy of history to designate: 
C .. J a critical enquiry into the character of 
historical thinking, an analysis of some of the 
procedures of the historian and a comparison of 
them with those followed in other disciplines, 
the natural sciences in particular. Thus under-
stood, philosophy of history forms part of the 
branch of philosophy known as theory of knowledge 
or epistemology. (16) 
Quinet and his contemporaries were, however, more concerned with attaining 
as complete as possible an understanding of events and their causes than with 
determining the conditions of historical thinking. Their common, although 
unjust, criticism of their predecessors in the Enlightenment was that the latter 
had restricted their task of historical enquiry to providing a bare relation 
of the facts. (17) The nineteenth century wished to go beyond what it con-
sidered an empirical analysis of historical data and substitute a wider ex-
planation according to which events were understood in relation to a greater 
purpose. Hegel's celebrated distinction between original, reflective and 
philosophical history i~ indicative of this desire to look at history from a 
new point of view. As Sismondi pointedly remarked, however, the more speculative 
philosophy of history could not be carried out satisfactorily were it divorced 
from the conscientious study of detailed historical data. The two approaches 
were interdependent. (18) Many, nevertheless, found the attraction of a 
priori speculation in the field of history too strong to be resisted. 
The advocates of the Romantic philosophies of history were in many respects 
proposing a secularisation of the Christian notion of Providence. In his early 
essays Quinet significantly points to the author of the Discoups sur Z'histoire 
universeZZe (1681) as the great precursor in the field. Here once again we 
find that the dividing line between religion and history is becoming blurred. 
A writer such as Quinet who believes that history is divine revelation can 
without much difficulty conclude that religion and history are one. Hence the 
pre-eminent role played by the philosopher of history who, as the priest of the 
new religion, reveals to men God's purpose in the unfolding of history. In 
the lectures delivered at the College de France during the 1840's Quinet pro-
claims his faith in the destiny of the French people and declares his belief 
that the French Revolution marked the realisation of Christian principles in 
society. He argues that France and not Catholicism truly represents the 
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Christian spirit in the modern world. Nationhood is sacred, France has a 
mission to fulfil, mankind has become the new Church. Quinet thus transfers 
a number of traditional religious attributes from the Church to collective 
entities living in history. The struggle to keep religion and history apart 
in any discussion of Quinet's thought is doomed to failure. The one can only 
be adequately analysed in relation to the other. Thus the present time may 
well be presented as a period of transition between two religions, between 
two ideas of God, yet at the same time it is also seen as a time of crisis in 
the life of the French nation which is still suffering from the consequences 
of the humiliating defeat of 1815. Quinet seeks the resurrection of France as 
well as a rebirth of religion. 
At this point it is necessary to outline Quinet's religious origins. 
"Fils de bourgeois de fortune mediocre", he was baptised and brought up within 
the Catholic faith. (19) The strongest influence on the young Quinet was, however, 
his mother who was a Protestant. According to Vales her Protestantism was 
"largement rationnel et s'accommodait fort bien de l'esprit d'examen".(20) She 
was probably responsible for developing in her son an attitude towards religion 
which gave priority to conscience and paid little attention to dogma. Her 
faith rested upon a direct communication between the individual and God. In 
Histoire de mes idees~ which appeared in 1858, Quinet writes as follows: 
c.. J ma mere, qui m'enseigna seule ses croyances, ne 
me parla jamais d'aucun dogme particulier a une Eglise. 
Je re~us d'elle, je ne sais comment, l'idee d'un Pere 
tout-puissant qui nous voyait a toute heure, qui 
veillait sur nous. II fallait Ie prier pour obtenir 
la sagesse, et nous Ie priions ensemble, partout ou 
l'occasion se presentait, dans les champs, dans les 
bois, dans Ie jardin, dans Ie verger, jamais a des 
moments fixes d'avance C .. J Moi, catholique, je 
me trouvais ainsi engage dans une conversation 
perpetuelle avec Dieu et je n'avais jamais entendu 
parler d'ange, ni d'Eglise, a peine du Crhist.(21) 
In this autobiographical work Quinet paints a picture of his childhood 
and youth which throws a critical light upon organised religion. It was 
evidently not in church that the young Quinet felt closest to God. Nevertheless 
he does admit that his first communion in 1816 was marked by great emotion and 
fervour. He claims, however, that this was a unique moment of ecstasy which 
once passed never returned. (22) 
If we consult Quinet's correspondence of the early 1820's we discover a 
number of references which suggest a fidelity to the religious ideas of his 
mother. In a letter addressed to her from Paris in 1821 he remarks: "J'ai 
ete trois fois dans ton temple. J'aime mieux prier Dieu dans ton eglise, je 
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m'y sens moins indigne de toi".(23) None the less it would appear that by 
1823 Quinet's faith had been lost in the intellectual environment of Paris: 
Helas! ma chere mere, qu'est devenue la foi simple 
que vous m'aviez incluquee vous-meme, dans mon 
enfance? Lorsqu'au milieu d'une solitude profonde 
et eternellement regrettee, vous m'expliquiez ces 
symboles, et que vous me les faisiez aimer, en les 
rattachant par mille liens au spectacle attendrissant 
de la nature que nous avions incessamment sous les 
yeux~ Car sans trop vous arreter a la partie des 
mysteres qui pouvait provoquer plus tard la discussion 
ou l'examen, vouS m'en enseigniez surtout la partie 
immortelle, et vous me nourrissiez du pain Ie plus 
pur de la tradition. Quoique vous fussiez d'un culte 
different de ceJ.ui dans lequel vous me laissiez Hever, 
vouS aviez si bien su entrer dans Ie coeur meme du 
christianisme, qu'il me fallut de longues annees 
avant de comprendre quelle difference pouvait exister 
entre votre culte et celui que les pretres m'enseignaient. 
Qui n'eut pense qu'une foi aussi bien dirigee, preparee 
avec tant de soin, dut etre inebranlable? Et pourtant, 
a peine vous eus-je quittee, par combien d'influences 
opposees Ie siecle ne s'empara-t-il de moi? J'abandonnai 
promptement votre foi, dans laquelle j'avais trouve Ie 
repose II n'eut tenu qu'a moi de m'estimer croyant, 
parce que, dans Ie contact du monde, j'avais appris a 
deguiser Ie manque de foi sous d'ingenieusese transfor-
mations; mais ce masque me semble honteux, et cette 
pretendue foi ainsi travaillee par l'art, par la 
philosophie, c'est-a-dire par tout excepte par la piete 
veritable, me semble, je Ie repete plus impie que Ie 
blaspheme. (24) 
"La societe est aujourd'hui tourmentee d'un besoin de croyance qui se 
manifeste de toutes parts." Thus wrote Chateaubriand in his Etudes historiques 
(1831).(25) Many members of Quinet's generation were afflicted with doubts: 
concerning the truth of traditional forms of Christianity. Yet this dissatis-
faction did not result in a hostility towards religion per see There was a 
widespread recognition of the decisive role played by religious ideas in the 
unfolding of history. Rather than turn against religion many critics of 
Catholicism in France embarked upon the quest for a new faith better suited, 
in their eyes, to the needs of the nineteenth century. Michelet, for example, 
having declared that mankind is gradually moving away from the altar of 
Christianity, is, nevertheless, led to exclaim: "mais, je vous en prie, oh! 
dites-Ie-moi, si vous Ie savez, s'est-il eleve un autre autel?"(26) Often the 
choice remained as described by de Maistre in his Considerations sur La 
Frame (1797): 
c ... ) i1 me semble que tout vrai philosophe doi t opter 
entre les deux hypotheses, ou qu'il va se former une 
religion nouvelle, ou que Ie christianisme sera 
rajeuni de quelque maniere extraordinaire.(27) 
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But whether men believed that hope for the future lay in a "new" 
Christianity or in a new religion their prime concern was generally for the 
realisation of religious principles within the organisation of society. On. 
the one hand we have the example of L'Avenir; on the other, the saga of the 
Saint-Simonian movement under the leadership of Enfantin. The following 
statement, taken from the correspondence of the young Ozanam, illustrates how, 
particularly after the July Revolution, the desire for spiritual rebirth went 
hand in hand with the desire to reform society: 
La societe doit-elle rester ensevelie sous les decombres 
des trones renverses, ou bien doit-elle reparaitre 
plus brillante, plus jeune et plus belle? Verrons-
nous 'novos coelos et novam terram'?(28) 
Many thinkers believed that it was the idea of God which determined the 
way in which men looked at the world. They held that man's attitude to nature, 
to his fellows and indeed to his own personality reflected - albeit on an 
unconscious level - a certain idea of the deity. It would be hard to under-
estimate the significance of this notion as far as Quinet's thought is con-
cerned. For the moment, however, let us concentrate upon some of his 
contemporaries. Here is Alexandre Weill writing in his MO~Be et le Talmud 
(1854) : 
c'est d'apres l'idee que l'homme a de Dieu 
qu'i1 marche vers la 1iberte ou l'esclavage, 
vers la bonheur ou 1e malheur, vers la 
fraternite ou la barharie, vers la justice 
ou 1e droit du plus fort.(29) 
But will it not. become necessary for nineteenth-century man to redefine 
his concept of God? This question was fraught with difficulties and it 
exercised a number of the most intelligent minds of the time. During the 
1830's and 1840's we find men such as Secretan, Lebre and Saisset asking 
whether human freedom is dependent upon a theistic faith in a free personal 
creator. Was the value of the individual under threat if the idea of God was 
conceived in pantheistic terms? Writing to Mazzini in 1841, Lamennais under-
lined the importance of the issues which were at stake: 
Tout l'avenir de l'humanite depend de sa conception 
future de Dieu et jusqu'a ce qu'e11e se soit formee, 
Ie monde, prive de direction, continuera de flotter 
au hasard, incapable de se fixer, incapable de sortir 
de la confusion presente.(30) 
But perhaps no-one captured the gravity of the situation quite as well as did 
Adolphe Lebre: 
Nous avons Ie sentiment profond de l'immanence de 
Dieu. Or, l'idee d'un Dieu personnel a toujours, 
jusqu'ici, ete melee de deisme. 11 etait donc 
naturel de n'en plus vouloir dans Ie premier effet 
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de la reaction, et de se jeter dans l'exces 
contraire. Nous ne pouvons y demeurerj nous 
cherchons un Dieu personnel et distinct du 
monde comme celui du deisme, et a la fois 
universel et immanent comme celui du pantheisme. 
Cette transformation des idees de Dieu, du monde 
et de leur rapport remue toutes les questions: 
elle est la crise qui agite et trouble aujourd'hui 
l'esprit europeen.(3l) 
Quinet's early writings in general and Ahasverus in particular contain 
many of the elements characteristic of the 'mal du siecle": discontent with 
the present, doubt, inner emptiness, religious yearnings. Quinet, however, 
belongs to the generation of Sainte-Beuve and Balzac and not to that of 
Chateaubriand and Senancour. His origins, environment and experience of 
life differ greatly from those of his illustrious literary forebears. In this 
context it is helpful to make use of the distinction drawn by Pierre Barberis 
between "Ie mal du siecle aristocratique" (Le. Chateaubriand) and "Ie mal 
du siecle bourgeois" (i.e. the generation of Balzac).(32) Barberis does not 
I 
deny that there was much common ground between the two phenomena. (33) He 
does, however, suggest that the former is "plus tourne vers la contemplation, 
plus installe dans un noble decor". "Le mal du siecle bourgeois", on the other 
hand, reflects the experience of living as an "enfant du siecle" growing up 
during the Empire and the Restoration. This condition was not so much marked 
by aristocratic "ennui" as by an "impatience d' avenir". (34) In his Histoire 
de mes Idees Quinet himself contrasts the sickness of his generation with that 
of Rene: 
Quoique cette souffrance allat souvent jusqu'au 
desespoir, il n'y avait la pourtant rien la qui 
ressemblat au spleen, aI' ennui de la vie, a tout 
ce qu'on a appele Ie vague des passions, vers la fin 
du dernier siecle. C'etait, il me semble, a bien 
des egards, Ie contraire de la lassitude, de la 
satiete. C'etait plut6t une aveugle impatience de 
vivre, une attente fievreuse, une ambition prematuree 
d'avenir, une sorte d'enivrement de la pensee 
renaissante, une soif effrenee de l'ame apres Ie 
desert de l'Empire. Tout cela, joint a un desir 
consumant de produire, de creer, de faire quelque 
chose, au milieu d'un monde vide encore. (35) 
The fall of Napoleon and the advent of the Restoration had a profound effect 
on Quinet. These events prompted him to develop his own reflexions on the 
meaning of historical change: 
[ ••• ] les grandes invasions de 1814 et de 1815 avaient 
laisse dans ma memoire un fond d'impressions, d'images 
a travers lesquelles j'entrevoyais toutes choses. 
L'ecroulement d'un monde avait ete ma premiere 
education. Je m'interessais dans Ie passe a tout ce 
- 9 -
qui pouvait me presenter quelque ressemblance 
avec ces immenses boulversements d'hommes qui 
avaient d'abord frappe mes yeux. Grace a cette 
analogie, l'histoire que je ne pouvais souffrir 
devenait une chose vivante, de morte qu'elle 
etait auparavant. Le passe etait a bien des 
egards Ie present qui m'agitait encore. (36) 
There can be no doubt that Quinet' s political pamphlets, his attack on 
the July Monarchy, his participation in the 1848 Revolution, his exile and his 
political activity after 1870 are all factors which shape his understanding of 
history. In fact throughout his life he wrote from what we might term a 
standpoint of political commitment. (37) This, however, is not to say that he 
can be described as simply expressing the views of a particular political 
grouping. Neither for that matter can he readily be classified as the spokesman 
for identifiable interests in contemporary French society. His thought is 
intensely personal and defies simple definition. What must be remembered at 
all times, however, is that his understanding of religion and history does 
not exist in a vacuum but reflects his preoccupation with the social and 
political problems of the time. (38) 
But if in order to understand Quinet's religious and historical 
thought we need to attend to his more politically oriented writings we must 
also pay some attention to those works which are concerned with nature and the 
natural sciences. This was an interest which came to the fore in his later 
years and we find it primarily in two works: La Creation (1870) and L'Esprit 
nouveau (1875). Here we learn how the meaning of history is inextricably bound 
up with the meaning of nature. Neither nature nor history is explicable without 
reference to a guiding principle which is ultimately responsible for the under-
lying harmony of the universe. In these later works Quinet identifies the 
cosmic force which is active in nature and history with Love. In the course 
of our analysis we shall endeavour to assess the implications of this theory 
as far as his religious thought is concerned. 
Quinet's thought poses immediate problems on account of the many different 
areas which are involved: history, philosophy, religion, politics, aesthetics, 
poetry, literary criticism, natural history. Yet it rapidly becomes apparent 
to the student that to omit one or a number of these is to produce an unbalanced 
picture. The reader swiftly becomes aware that despite the seeming diversity 
of topics under discussion Quinet remains concerned with two subjects -
religion and history. It is our intention, therefore, to concentrate upon these 
elements while paying due attention to other aspects of his thought. Our 
approach will be broadly historical. Biographical detail will, however, be 
kept to a necessary minimum. (39) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
In this chapter we shall examine the main elements of Quinet's thought 
presented in a number of his early publications: the essays which accompany 
his translation of Herder's Ideen, an essay on mythology, an article dealing 
with the future of religion and the long epic poem in prose, Ahasverus. The 
publication of these works extends over the years 1827 to 1833.(1) 
The appearance in 1827-28 of Quinet's translation of the Ideen is 
generally considered to mark a highly significant date in the development 
of the philosophy of history in France. He had begun work upon the trans-
lation in 1824 and had made use of an earlier English version by T. o. 
Churchill. (2) The German thinker's emphasis upon organic development, his 
conception of the nation, his reflections upon the role of religion in his-
tory and his understanding of the relationship between man and nature were 
all to leave a lasting impression upon the mind of the young translator. 
Other influences, however, were also at work. Quinet's friendship with 
Michelet and his association with Cousin date from 1825. Miche1et, whose 
abridged translation of the Scienza nuova also appeared in 1827, could bring 
to Quinet his enthusiasm for Vico and in Cousin Quinet could find a mentor 
with a wide knowledge of contemporary German thought. In December 1826 he left 
France for Heidelberg with the image of Germany created by Mme de Stae1 firmly 
fixed in his mind. At Heidelberg he studied under Daub and Creuzer and 
discovered at first hand the riches of German philosophy. His works and 
correspondence of these years contain references to, among others, GOrres, 
Oken, Fr. Schlegel, Jacobi, Kant, Fichte and Schelling. At the close of 1828, 
however, Quinet left Germany in order to take part in the French archeological 
expedition to Greece. In 1832-33 he visited Italy and in 1834 he married 
Minna More, a German. (3) 
The two essays which accompany Quinet's trans1ation1are his Introduction 
and his Etude sur Ze caractere et Zes ecrits de Herder. (4) These are to be 
found in the first and third volumes respectively. At the centre of the 
writer's argument is the notion that self-knowledge is inseparable from 
historical knowledge. Since the individual remains to a large extent the 
product of the history of mankind it follows that in order to know himself 
he must first study universal history. Within the individual self all the 
past of humanity lies buried: 
C .. ] pour comprendre Ie secret de mon etre, i1 me 
fallait aller interroger les debris de l'Orient, 
1es oracles muets de la Grece, les bruyeres des 
Gau1es, les forets silencieuses de 1a Germanie.(S) 
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It is man's consciousness of time which separates him from the rest 
of creation which is dondemned to live in an eternal present. This historical 
sense is moreover coexistent with human freedom itself. Man alone struggles 
to understand the past, to create a future in accordance with his highest 
aspirations and to impart an element of duration and continuity to the 
spectacle of flux and transience • 
. According to Quinet the philosophy of history represents an attempt 
to bring order to historical phenomena by the introduction of what are 
termed elements of fixity. (6) The events of the past can only be properly 
understood in relation to a transcendent purpose. Only then can the un-
folding of history be interpreted as an ordered, meaningful movement which 
progresses in accordance with certain laws. Upon closer examination, 
however, it is possible to discern within these essays two differing but 
nevertheless closely interrelated interpretations of the historical process. 
These we shall term respectively anthropocentric and theocentric. (7) 
According to the man-centred interpretation, history is understood as the 
creation of free individuals and man is judged to be responsible for progress. 
According to the God-centred interpretation, On the other hand, the free 
activity of the individual is in varying degrees subordinated to the 
realisation of a higher purpose. The term theocentric is applied because 
in its most acute form this conception of history reduces the individual 
to a mere expression of the life of the Absolute thus calling into question 
the reality of his freedom. The use of these terms does not however 
signify either that God is absent from the former or that man is absent 
from the latter. It is above all a question of emphasis - but a change in 
emphasis is sufficient to deprive the individual of responsibility for 
his actions. 
The character of Quinet's philosophy of history emerges in the COn-
text of the criticisms which he makes of Herder. He maintains that Herder 
had gone so far in considering man as a part of the natural universe that 
all change and movement were rendered impossible. In order to explain the 
act of emancipation by which man separated himself from nature and attained 
self-consciousness and consciousness of time the German thinker had nO 
choice but to have recourse to the theory of a direct divine intervention. 
Quinet, on the other hand, declares that this act was neither unique nor 
mysterious. At all times and regardless of the dangers involved men have 
chosen to modify, change or overthrow prevailing conditions in order to 
create for themselves a new destiny. Freedom is the content, the very 
stuff of history: 
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En un mot, l'histoire, dans son commencement comme 
dans sa fin, est Ie spectacle de la liberte, la 
protestation du genre humain contre Ie monde qui 
l'enchaine, Ie triomphe de l'infini sur Ie fini, 
l'affranchissement de l'esprit, Ie regne de l'ame: 
Ie jour ou la liberte manquerait au monde serait 
celui o~ l'histoire s'arreterait.(8) 
What is more, the growth of freedom is inseparable from an accompanying 
development of the self, of man's individuality and personality. History 
may also therefore be envisaged as: 
C .. ;j une vaste et eternelle deduction du general 
au particulier: c'est Ie travail du moi qui se 
fait jour peu a peu, se degage par degres de ce 
qui lui est etranger, et aspir~ a se produire 
sous sa forme la plus libre. t9 ) 
Quinet proceeds to divide universal history into a number of periods 
which correspond to the progressive emancipation of the personality and 
the growth of individual freedom. Rapidly the reader notices that no 
clear line of separation distinguishes the philosophy of history from the 
history of religion. Quinet's analysis begins with Oriental pantheism, 
the earliest form of religion, which he associates with India. At this 
point in his development man did not clearly differentiate between past, 
present and future: he possessed a cosmogony and a theogony but no history; 
his powers of reflection remained undeveloped. The personality did not 
possess an independent existence since the individual was, as it were, 
absorbed into divine nature. The next period comprises the empires of 
the Medes, the Persians, the Egyptians and the Assyrians. Here the in-
dividual remained unfree, essentially dependent upon the society to which 
he belonged. A greater degree of freedom was attained in Greece and Rome 
but the personality was still not free since the self remained l1encore a 
demi confondu avec la cite l1 .(lO) The coming of Christianity signalled 
the birth of true individuality. This was not, however, the end of the 
process since Quinet considers that it was carried further by the Refor-
mation and by Cartesian philosophy. 
Quinet casts no doubt upon the reality of intellectual and moral 
progress but he places the responsibility for progress upon the shoulders 
of mankind. Humanity may be "pousse par une main invisible" but the 
existence of a wider providential plan does not imply a severe restriction 
of individual freedom. (11) History is above all the struggle between 
free men on the one hand and the resistance and inherent fatalism of the 
universe on the other. (12) Yet at the same time we must ask whether the 
anthropocentric interpretation is sufficient of itself to give meaning to 
history? This would not appear to be the case. In order to give meaning 
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to the exercise of human freedom history must be understood in terms of 
the realisation of a divine purpose. Otherwise events take on a character 
of confusion and instability, especially when they are contrasted with the 
seeming permanence and immutability of the universe. An inadequate 
impression of the complexity of Quinet's thought is conveyed if we con-
centrate exclusively upon the anthropocentric aspect. Quinet is not a 
modern existentialist creating his own values in the face of the blind 
indifference of an absurd universe. On the contrary he remains convinced 
that a divine purpose is at work in both nature and history and he aspires 
to a greater unity capable of reconciling in a higher synthesis man and 
nature, freedom and necessity. 
According to the anthropocentric interpretation of history it is the 
exercise of freedom which gives coherence and direction to history. This 
viewpoint requires that there exists opposition between the individual 
and the external world and also implies a degree of opposition between 
the individual and his fellows. Only by virtue of such an opposition 
can the individual assert his freedom. The theocentric interpretation, on 
the other hand, tends to move the centre of gravity away from the individual 
in the direction of the divine. Nature and history are considered primarily 
as expressions of the Asbolute. Contradictions and oppositions are 
transcended. Tensions are dissipated. Although this idea is not yet fully 
developed in the essays on Herder we nevertheless find Quinet pointing to 
analogies, to correspondences between nature and history. He seeks to 
convince us that the actions of humanity are really in harmony with the 
natural universe: 
( ... J en passant de la science des choses a la 
science des volontes, vous ne faites que revoir 
sous des formes analogues et plus epurees Ie 
meme ordre, la meme stabilite qui s'etait 
offerts a vous dans la contemplation du monde 
physique. (13) 
When looked at from this point of view the vicissitudes of history no 
longer appear as the result of "un vain caprice des volontes". History 
too has its harmony since like nature, it moves in accordance with laws 
which have "leurs fondements dans les entrai lles memes de l' uni vers" • (14) 
Nature and history are "la figure changeante d'une indivisible unite" and 
history itself may be described as "la plus haute puissance de la nature'~. (15) 
A similar harmony exists between the individual and mankind in general. 
All the past of humanity lives on in the soul of the individual and for 
this reason mankind and the individual cannot be said to exist in isolation. 
Moreover, an underlying harmony unites the individual, the people of which 
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he forms a part and mankind in general. Although the lifespan of the 
individual is much shorter than the historical existence of an entire 
people, each within its own sphere progresses in an identical fashion and 
possesses equal value. At the same time, however, mankind as a totality 
appears to take precedence over the individual. We are told that 
humanity should arouse in us "un respect profond et pour ainsi dire 
religieux".(16) The orderly unfolding of history possesses a quasi~ 
religious authority which consoles and reassures Quinet: "C.:) travaillons 
C .. Jl selon nos forces a vivre et a mourir dans la place que Ie genre 
humain nous a confieel~. (17) 
Quinet can develop these ideas because he searches for a transcendent 
element and seeks evidence of the presence of a divine order in nature and 
in history. History is to be understood in terms of appearance and reality; 
events take on true being only insofar as they can be shown to constitute a 
stage in a progression towards a specified goal. "Le chaos apparent des 
ages", must be made to reveal "la pensee divine.,,(18) In the final 
analysis, however, Quinet's assertions that mankind, the individual and 
nature all develop in harmony would seem to rest upon the belief that God, 
"1' Eternel", "1' Absolu", is responsible for imparting to them a direction, 
an element of finality. "L'ombre suppose l'objet", declares Quinet, 
"l'accident suppose la substance.,,(19) His argument recalls that put 
forward by Victor Cousin. According to Cousin a mere knowledge of events 
is unsatisfactory; it is necessary to discover the order which lies hidden 
behind what at first sight appears to be "des evenements insignifiants et 
les jeux accidentels d'une destinee capricieuse". The world of contingency 
must be understood in relation to the world of ideas: 
Mais cet accidentel, dira-t-on, c'est precisement 
Ie reel? Assurement; mais 1e reel nest pas 1e 
vrai. Le reel ne tombe sous la connaissance que 
par son rapport a la verite qu'il reflechit, a 
laquelle il est conforme. C'est dans cette con-
formite que Ie reel a sa verite C. J Au-dessus 
du reel est sa raison d'etre; ce monde qui 
passe en contient un qui ne passe point, qui 
constitue l'essence, la verite et la dignite 
de l' autre. (20) 
But this world of ideas is not really that of immutable Platonic essences 
since its realisation takes place within history: 
Ce monde @es ideeU plane sur Ie premier Oe 
monde exterieu~, il sly reflechit et sly 
realise; il Ie suit dans tous ses developpe-
ments et dans toutes ses revolutions; leur 
marche est relative et para11ele t· ils se touchent et se penetrent par tous points. 21) 
- 18 -
Quinet's position is similar when he refers to the goals of mankind in 
history. These are reason, justice and liberty which he identifies 
with revelation: 
( . . J au-dessus des formes qui passent s' eleve la 
puissance de la raison, de la justice et de la 
liberte, qui vont se grossissant de chaque annee 
qui s'ecoule, de chaque vertu qui s'exerce en 
silence G .. J Les royaumes se brisent, mais la 
justice et la raison s'enrichissent de leurs 
debris et dominent leurs formes passageres.(22) 
Insofar as the Deity is transcendent and allows men freedom of choice 
the moral autonomy of the self is not threatened. Neither is mankind's 
capacity to create its own destiny in history in danger if God is a meta-
physical abstraction, "une cause premiere, innnuable autant que superieure 
a 1a duree".(23) However, as we have already seen, Quinet's God is more 
akin to infinite life expressing itself through the finite. At the 
conclusion of his Introduation he writes lyrically of the harmonies of nature 
and of history but in such a manner as to suggest that history is as much 
an expression of universal life as the creation of the free acts of 
individuals. For Quinet, as for Cousin and Schelli~g, history is transformed 
into a poem: 
S'il tpie~ a penche selon de justes lois l'urne des 
fleuves, . ( • • :) s' i1 a varie j usqu' a I' infini les 
attitudes des p1antes,la voix des animaux et les 
harmonies qui en resultent, i1 a de meme repandu avec 
sagesse, dans Ie temps, 1es generations et les 
familIes, 1es nations et les 1angues; chaque cite 
apparait quand son jour est venu, sous la forme que 
Ie monde reclame. A toutes il a donne une forme 
particu1iere, une physionomie propre; et certes, si 
l'on a pu dire, sans paraitre insense, que 1a vonte 
des cieux, que l'echo des montagnes, que ce bassin 
des mers t ... J sont les expressions de seS idees; 
c'est, je Ie jure, une autre poesie, une autre 
eloquence qui s'echappent toutes vivantes des har-
monies des ages ,-,.:] Chaque peuple qui tombe dans 
l'abime est un accent de savoix; chaque cite n'est 
elle-meme qu'un mot interrompu~ qu'une image brisee, 
qu'un vers inacheve de cet eternel poeme que Ie temps 
est charge de derouler. Entendez-vous cet immense 
discours qui rou1e et s'accroit avec les siecles, et 
qui, toujours repris et toujours suspendu, laisse 
chaque generation incertaine de la parole qui va 
suivre? 11 a, connne les discours humains, ses cir-
conlocutions, ses exclamations de colere, ses 
mouvements et ses repos, pendant lesquels on n'entend 
que les soupirs des peuples haletants, et Ie sourd 
craquement des empires vieillis.(24) 
Quinet might have replied that freedom was not threatened since the 
ultimate creative principle realising itself in the world was liberty 
- 19 -
itself. (25) But would such an explanation be sufficient? Could not these 
lines be interpreted as signifying that the existence of suffering, and 
ultimately of evil, can be adequately explained in terms of the circum-
locutions of the divine "discours"?(26) 
The problems faced by Quinet had already been encountered by Herder 
who while defending the significance and the reality of human freedom 
nevertheless continued to point to the action of final causes. The 
exercise of freedom by mankind is used to further the realisation of a 
divine intention or goal. M. Rouche sums up Herder's achievement as 
follows: 
L'humanisme de Herder realise ce tour de force: 
proclamer l'autonomie morale du genre humain, 
conformement a l'exigence no. 1 de tout humanisme, 
sans pour autant ceder a l'exigence no. 2, qui est 
l'anthropocentrisme absolu. L'humanisme chez 
Herder demeure lie a la theologie ou il puise son 
optimisme, qui est a la fois confiance en l'homme 
et confiance en Dieu.(27) 
Quinet, however, cannot follow without some difficulty the optimistic path 
of Herder. This is suggested by the very emphasis which he places upon 
the inner peace which came to him as a resul t of reading the Ideen: (. .. J 
"ce livre a ete pour moi une source intarissable de consolations et de 
joie".(28) Quinet perceptively points to the rock of certainty upon 
which Herder's philosophy is based when he remarks that in the writings of 
the German thinker: 
La conscience de l'etre, Ie sentiment religieux, 
pur, universel comme la conviction spontanee du 
genie, sont C .. ] tellement inherents a toute -
connaissance C .. ;:] qu' ils suppleent partout au 
point de depart du moi philosophique qui se 
proclame par eux.(29) 
At this point we should remember that Lessing was the forerunner of 
Herder and the precursor of much of the philosophy of history of the 
nineteenth century. (30) The understanding of history which was proposed 
by The Education of the Human Race (1780) pointed in the direction of a 
denial of transcendence. (31) Such was the real importance of the famous 
analogy between revelation for mankind and education for the individual: 
A l'individu l'education ne donne rien qu'il 
n'aurait pu tirer de lui-meme C .. 1 De meme, 
la revelation n'enseigne au genre humain rien 
que la raison humaine laissee a elle-meme 
n'aurait pu trouver, mais par ce moyen l'humanite 
a re~u et continue a recevoir l'enseignement des 
verites essentielles plus tot qu'elle n'aurait 
pu l'avoir par elle-meme.(32) 
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Lessing's short work was to exert a considerable influence in France 
during the Romantic period and notably among the Saint Simonians. Quinet 
for his part pays tribu~ to The Education of the Human Race in the course 
of his Introduction, describing it as: 
( .• :) un petit ecrit etincelant de verve et d'une 
rare importance lorsqu'on y voit un essai dans lequel 
la pensee humaine, tout en cessant de considerer la 
revelation comme Ie dernier terme de la progression 
universelle, ne va point encore jusqu'a la ranger 
dans la classe des phenomenes purement historiques, 
et cherche un milieu qui satisfasse egalement, et au 
be~oin d13§foire, et aux exigeances de la nouvelle 
SC1ence. 
Karl Barth remarks that Lessing brought to German theology of the 
eighteenth century the discovery that there was an active, dramatic 
element in history. But, continues Barth, does it make any difference to 
Lessing's interpretation of the course of history: 
(..:] whether we say. 'God' or whether we say 
'human understanding' in the significant places, 
and whether we interpret revelation as being 
education by an educator or self-education or 
even more simply development, and thus allow the 
Lord of history to coincide with history itself, 
or alternatively with its subject, with the 
humanity educating, or alternatively, developing 
itself. (34) 
Herder's view of revelation is an extension of that of Lessing. Herder, 
although not a pantheist in the strict sense of the term, did not hesitate 
to see the presence of God revealed directly in nature and in history. Karl 
Barth contrasts Herder with Kant stating that the latter recognise~much 
more than did the former, the problem of a realm beyond the human: 
In the theology of Herder, the saviour of theology 
and prophet of the religion of God, C .. :) with its 
impetuous equation of human experience, religion 
and revelation, of the quality of being in the image 
of God and the quality of the Divine, that problem 
of a realm beyond the human, continually threatens, 
in spite of several starts in another direction, to 
founder completely inside this human world. (35) 
The extent to which Quinet adopts the views of Herder on these important 
matters is expressed in the Etude: 
Admettre (et comment s'en defendre?) que, s'il y 
a eu une revelation, elle a ete faite pour la 
raison humaine, crest prononcer en d'autres termes 
que pour savoir ce qu'elle fut, il faut savoir ce 
qu'elle dut etre, ou ce que l'homme a pu comprendre. 
Nous ne connaitrons les limites de la parole qu'en 
connaissant les limi tes de I' intelligence C·. J 
toute question de theologie se resoudra dans une 
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question d'histoire. Notre polemique sera de 
l'archeologie, et nous ne saurons sur les dogmes 
que ce que nous en apprendra l'etude comparee 
des 1angues et des traditions populaires.(36) 
Quinet does, however, criticise Herder on two counts: firstly, on 
the grounds of his alleged pantheism and secondly for having allowed the 
possibility of a direct divine intervention into history. Like his friend 
Michelet Quinet understands history in terms of a movement of peoples, 
ideas and religions in which the conflict between freedom and necessity 
is the driving force. (37) The two thinkers share a common concern for 
the cause of justice. In his Introduction a Z'histoire universelle 
(1831) Michelet emphasises the Promethean character of mankind struggling. 
to create its own world in history. He refuses to allow man to become 
merely the instrument of Providence. According to P. Viallaneix, Michelet 
remains loyal to the French voluntaristic tradition from Descartes to 
Maine de Biran and this explains why he is suspicious of any belief in 
the presence of an ideal or supernatural force in history. Miche1et is 
very conscious of the fragility of the victories won by freedom in the 
course of history and he is wary of the Hegelianism which produced the 
historical optimism and fatalism defended by Cousin. The insistence upon 
freedom and responsibility prevents Michelet from whole-hearted1y accepting 
the conclusions of the German philosophies of history, including that 
of Herder. (38) 
Despite the many similarities between the two men Quinet is perhaps 
more inclined than his friend to seek the presence of a providential 
element in history. Like Cousin he praises Bossuet's Discours sur 
Z'histoire universelle (1681) and recognises in its author a great 
precursor in the field of the philosophy of history. Michelet, on the 
other hand, believes that Bossuet sacrificed freedom to Providence, man-
kind to God. Should we discern here a continuing attachment On Quinet's 
behalf for the "theological" history disliked by his friend? (39) 
Furthermore, what interpretation should be placed upon the brief 
section of Quinet's Introduction which is devoted to Vico? Here the 
idealism of the Neapolitan thinker is contrasted with the sensualism of 
Herder but what is emphasised is Vico's theory of ideas, that is the 
metaphysical side of his thought rather than his understanding of the 
development of mankind in history. Gabriel Monod comments: 
Mais s'il y a dans Vico ce qu'y voit Quinet, ce 
fonds de platonisme qui annonce Schelling, ce 
n'est que l'enve1oppe philosophique d'un systeme 
de l'histoire tres concret, ou Ie relatif et Ie 
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contingent non seulement ontleur place, mais 
la premiere. Quinet n'a oublie qu'une chose 
dans Vico: l'humanite creant elle-meme Ie 
monde civil a travers les peripeties des trois 
ages. (40) 
In MOnod's opinion the explanation lies in the fact that Quinet com-
posed his Introduction before Michelet had completed his translation or 
his Vie et systeme de Vico. At the same time. however, could not Quinet's 
interpretation of Vico be seen to reflect a desire to retain a more meta-
physical frame of reference which would make history something much more 
than the creation of man? 
The real danger for the moral integrity of the individual arises, 
however, when, as described above, Quinet brings together nature and 
history and speaks of history as divine discourse. If, instead of the divine 
realm collapsing into the human, the human realm is itself identified with 
an ideal or divine power realising itself in history then the danger exists 
that the free activity of the individual may to a greater or lesser extent 
be subordinated to the unfolding of a higher purpose. In this context 
we must now turn to an essay which appeared in 1830 entitled De la Nature 
et de l'histoire dans leurs rapports avec les traditions religieuses et 
epiques.(4l) Despite the fact that admirers of Quinet have tended to view 
this essay as an isolated aberration its importance should not be under-
rated. (42) Far from being isolated from the general movement of his 
thought, it represents a development of the theocentric tendencies of the 
earlier essays. MOreover, the ideas put forward here are not without 
their importance for a correct understanding of Quinet's writings of 
this period, notably De Za Grece moderne et de ses rapports avec Z'antiquite 
(1830), "De l'Avenir des religions" (1831) and Ahasverus (1833). 
The general philosophical standpoint adopted in De la Nature et de 
l'histoire is strongly reminiscent of the thought of Schelling and Hegel.(43) 
Nature and history are both directly associated with the Absolute which 
objectifies itself as unconscious nature and attains self-consciousness 
in the history of mankind: 
L'histoire est la conscience de l'univers ou 
l'organe par lequel il se revele a son auteur (. .. J Quand Ie temps aura developpe sous des 
formes analogues, tout ce que l'espace renferme, 
quand Ie monde de reflexion aura reproduit Ie 
mo?de ~ntier.de l~ spontaneite, et qu:a ch~que 
fa1t necessa1re repondra un fait de l1berte, Ie 
sens de l'univers sera accompli; l'absolu se 
connaltra lui-meme. (44) 
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It does not necessarily follow, however, that we should describe 
these statements as pantheistic. Quinet is writing in the tradition of 
the German idealists who conceived of the infinite "not as something set 
over against the finite but as infinite life or activity which expresses 
itself in and through the finite~ God is not identified with the visible 
universe as such in De Za NatuPe et de Z'histoire; the objects of nature 
remain symbols. It would seem that for Quinet as for Schelling, nature 
is the "consequence of the first principle, not the first principle 
itself'!. (45) 
Quine~ unfortunately, devotes very little space to speculations of 
this kind despite their obvious importance for an understanding of his 
philosophy of history. H. J. Hunt remarks that "the Hegelian note rings 
loudly" in the lines quoted above. (46) Similarities also exist between 
this essay and the thought of Schelling. The German philosopher writes 
in the following manner of the relationship between nature and history: 
History is the higher potency of nature, 
in so far as it expresses in the ideal what 
the latter expresses in the real; but in 
essence the same thing is in both, only 
altered by the determination or potency 
under which it is placed. If the pure 
essence could be seen in both, we would recog-
nise the. same thing w~ich i~ represented in hi~-) 
tory as ~deal, represented ~n nature as real. t 7 
In fact a very similar impression is produced by reading De Za Nature et 
de Z 'histoire. Schelling believes in the absolute identity of nature 
and history, freedom and necessity, the ideal and the real. Quinet for 
his part refers to the ideal identity of nature and history and in the 
first paragraph of his essay he writes as follows: 
L'homme n'est ni 1e maitre ni l'esclave de la 
nature; i1 est son interprete et sa parole 
vivante (..:) (1 'homme) acheve ses pensees 
imparfaites; il donne une voix a ses symboles 
muets. Le secret qu'el1e cache aux entrai1les 
du globe, il Ie proclame a travers les siecles. 
De la l'idee cosmogonique qui, sans se savoir 
elle-meme, se cristallise avec Ie regne inor-
ganique, rampe avec Ie cryptograme, court avec 1es 
fleuves, gravite avec les cieux, venant a se 
connaitre,.s:apg~8~it a elle-meme so us la figure 
du mande c~v~l. \ ) 
The philosophical considerations of the opening pages of De Za 
Nat;ure et de Z 'histoire determine the interpretation of myth and religion· 
which follows. We learn that all myths contain elements derived from 
nature and from history but that the relative proportion of these elements 
varies. (49) In the earliest form of religion, Oriental pantheism, man 
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was unfree, the slave of nature and this explains why "l'element 
cosmogonique G.:] la formation primitive de la nature" predominated in 
the myths of that period. Subsequently, as man became less subservient 
to nature, the historical aspect or "l'element humain" began to playa 
part. (50) This historical element is related to the moment when the 
collectivity attains self-consciousness: 
c .. :') elle time nation') se devient a elle-meme un objet 
d'etonnement et d'adoration. Ses migrations, ses 
conquetes, ou plut6t la pensee qu'elle accomplit dans 
Ie monde, se concentre dans un etre divin ou toutes les 
generations s'evanouissent.(5l) 
Mythology develops organically and possesses a life of its own. In the 
course of time the historical element may come to obscure completely the 
earlier cosmogonic aspect. In Greek mythology these two elements (the 
cosmogonic or "l'infini sanctifie dans l'espaae et la dUl'ee" and the 
historical or "l'apotheose de la force divine dans Ie temps et dans 
l'histoil'e" combine.(52) Dionysc>s, for example, is at one and the same 
time "Ie symbole de l'ame du monde" and the symbol of the migrations from 
Bactra to the Mediterranean. These reflexions lead Quinet to conclude 
that: 
( ••• ) partout ou je regarde, les religions antiques 
n'expriment rien autre que la similitude, et je 
voudrais presque dire, l'identite ideale de la 
nature et de l'histoire.(53) 
This notion of ideal identity evidently rests upon the belief that nature 
and history share a common origin in the Absolute. 
Quinet believes that a divine thought or idea is present in the 
genius of a particular people or race. The idea, however, is not only 
history, it is also nature. Going far beyond the theories of MOntesquieu 
and Herder concerning the influence of environment on man, Quinet believes 
that a harmony exists between the national genius and its creations on the 
one hand and its natural surroundings on the other. (54) A network of 
correspondences exists linking all these different aspects since they are 
all expressions of the same divine idea. A civilisation is a totality 
including both man and nature: 
Une civilisation est une pensee de l'ame du monde 
ou la gloire du conquerant, Ie chant du poete, les 
souvenirs des generations, l'instinct naissant de 
la fleur, la voix inarticulee du fleuve, l'harmonie 
silencieuse du regne inorganique, meles, confondus, 
s'expliquant et s'achevant l'un par l'autre, ne 
forment plus qu'une idee, qu'une vie, qu'une parole 
prononcee dans l'infini.(55) 
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The influence of these theories is strongly felt in De la Grece 
moderne which contains numerous comparisons between nature and history. 
Human societies are not simply influenced by nature; nature and man 
both give expression to the same thought: 
Assurement l' arbre du Gange C ... 1 cache, sous ses 
profondes ombres, la meme pensee que ces poemes dont 
chaque fragment est une epopee~ que ces dieux dont 
chaque parole est un monde.(56) 
"Dirai-je ce voyage ou ce poeme?" asked Michelet when he referred to 
De la Grece moderne in the course of his own Histoire romaine. (57) Many 
a reader might well ask the same question when he encounters the numerous 
comparisons between nature and history in the pages of Quinet's "voyage". 
Such comparisons are not however flights of fancy or examples of poetic 
licence; they are founded on the philosophical premises which we have 
described. Thus it becomes possible for Quinet to see analogies between 
societies and religions on the basis of botanical similarities: 
C .. :) Ie peplidium du Delta res semble au gratiola du 
Mexique, autant que les pyramides et les hieroglyphes 
de Memphis aux monuments de Cholula et des nations 
Azteques. (58) 
The relationship between religion and nature is such that Greece as the 
home of polytheism can never be fully won over to Christianity. 
This theory also determines Quinet's understanding of the migrations 
of nations and races. He believes that the birth of a nation inevitably 
results in a migration since the new idea represented by the people 
concerned does not find its analogue in the environment in which it first 
finds itself. For this reason a migration in search of new natural 
surroundings ensues. In this manner the Dorians continued their migration-
invasion until they reached the land which corresponded to their national 
genius. A similar result is produced by the birth of a new religion which 
also seeks a new natural environment in which to develop. 
In "De I' Avenir des religions" (1831) Quinet emphasises the role 
played by nature in the development of religion and by so doing he modifies 
somewhat the ideas put forward in the essays on Herder. Then, like 
Lessing, he considered revelation in terms of the education of mankind; 
revelation was closely bound to the development of the human intelligence. 
As a result, Quinet's understanding of the history of religion in terms 
of the progressive emancipation of the individual tended to make the 
history of religions synonymous with the history of the human spirit. In 
this situation nature had stood in opposition to man, limiting his freedom 
and restricting his personality. In "De l'Avenir des religions" on the 
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other hand the role played by nature in religion is quite different: 
( .. :J une religion n'est pas un fait social, mais une 
idee cosmogonique, Ie cri tout entier de l'univers, 
une parole depuis long-temps contenue dans la 
creation, et que chaque objet vient a prononcer par 
la bouche d'un peuple.(59) 
This conception of religion reflects the theories of De La Nature et de 
L'histoire. The Absolute objectifies itself as nature and comes to self-
awareness in history, which implies that it comes to know itself in its 
two manifestations as history and as nature, freedom and necessity, con-
sciousness and unconsciousness, subjectivity and objectivity. As we have 
already seen, mythology by reconciling the two worlds of nature and 
history, realises their ideal identity. (60) The religious consciousness 
of humanity would therefore seem to be the point where the Absolute 
apprehends itself. Quinet envisages the history of religion as a westward 
movement of peoples; different natural environments are unconscious 
objective representations of divine thoughts or ideas which are then 
given conscious, subjective expression by certain collectivities (nations, 
peoples, races). In religion nature and history are reconciled which 
implies that the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity is transcended. 
The idea of God produced by each religion is the fullest realisation possible 
of the divine present in nature at that point. The history of religion is 
above all the history of these ideas of God, each of which represents a 
moment in the Absolute's own journey to self-knowledge: 
c: .. J l' idee de Dieu, telle que la terre peut 1a 
produire, ne sera pleinement achevee que lorsque 
toutes les traditions humaines sty etant peu a 
peu amassees, et Ie type eternel de tous les points 
de l'univers sty trouvant depose, chaque ile dans 
ses flots, chaque climat dans sa zone, chaque 
mont dans sa chaine pourra dire de lui, par l'organe 
d'un peuple: II est ne dans l'Orient; il a grandi en 
Perse; il est venu dans la Judee, dans Ie Caucase, 
dans les Alpes; il a passe par mon chemin; i1 a bu 
de mes sources et dormi sous mes ombres; et maintenant 
la terre a enfante son Dieu.(61) 
At this point we may look in more detail at the manner in which Quinet 
at this period envisages the unfolding of the history of religions. The 
general division remains as before: Oriental pantheism, classical Greek 
civilisation, Christianity. 
The earliest form of religion was neither mO~lheism nor polytheism 
but Oriental pantheism which contained within itself the notion of unity 
and that of variety. This pantheism resulted directly from man's 
"premiere intuition de l' univers". (62) The theory of a primordial revelation 
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as advocated by many thinkers of the period including Bonald, de Maistre 
and Ozanam is absent from Quinet's work. (63) Neither, for that matter, 
does he follow Creuzer in attributing to a caste of priests a decisive 
role in the myth-making process; mythology is rather the creation of 
the activity of the collective consciousness. Cn the other hand Quinet 
does accept that there once existed a primitive religious unity of man-
kind the disintegration of which brought about the great movement of the 
migrations of races. The causes of this event, however, remain obscure. 
Despite their varied forms the different mythologies spring from a common 
source. From the banks of the Ganges to the shores of Iceland "un my the 
unique etend ses voiles d'or sur les berceaux des peuples".(64) According 
to Quinet the religious systems of the Orient - a wide-embracing term inclu-
ding religions/civilisations as diverse as those of Egypt and India -
have in common a symbolic and sacerdotal character and, whilst marking a 
certain progress with regard to one another, they all have pantheism as 
their common denominator. Human freedom and individuality are barely 
developed at this stage and man, far from imposing his will upon nature, 
is content simply to imitate and reproduce the harmony of the universe. 
This world of Oriental pantheism forms the subject of tbefirst act 
of Ahasverus. Here the creation, the early migrations which colonise 
India, Persia and Egypt, the great empires and finally the scene of 
Christ's nativity unfold before the reader's eyes. Perhaps rather 
surprisingly, Greek civilisation does not have an important part to play 
in Quinet's epic. De La Grece moderne, however, makes it plain that Greece 
marks the emanicipation of mankind from the bonds of Oriental pantheism: 
the battle of Salamis signals "l'emancipation de l'adolescence du genre 
humain".(65) In Greece the human personality frees itself from nature 
and creates for itself "un type ideal d'humanite" in Greek mythology; 
here the "inertie sacerdotale" of the East is replaced by a "vie active". 
As we shall demonstrate below, Greek religion and Greek art are one and 
together form for Quinet a unique moment of serenity in the history of man-
kind. Within the field of myth and religion it is necessary to note that 
Quinet emphasises the Oriental element in Greek mythology. At a time when 
the followers of Otfied Muller and those of Creuzer disagreed as to what 
extent the Greek myths were indigenous in origin, Quinet states that: 
"L'Olympe hellenique est ( •• ::] Ie reflet de l'existence universelle 
developpee dans l'Orient".(~6) Many different peoples' contrasting religious 
traditions came together in Greece where they finally achieved unity. The 
fusion of the different traditions formed the Greek idea of God: 
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Des sommets de I'Himalaya, des plaines de l'Euphrate, 
des oasis de l'Ethiopie, des gorges de la Colchide, 
des bords du Tanais, toutes les sources religieuses 
deborderent dans la Grece, et l'idee de Dieu, jusque 
1.~ repandle et divisee par fragments entre les races, 
se concentra et rayonna tout entiere dans la 
merveille de la theologie orphique.(67) 
What then is the status of Christianity in the unfolding of the history 
of religion? Is the Christian revelation true and valid for all periods? 
Or is relativism inevitable once it is accepted that the idea of God 
apprehended by different religions in different ways nevertheless always 
refers ultimately to the same reality? Relativism may easily lead to 
scepticism, as Quinet realised. 
The evidence provided by De Za Narnre et de Z 'histoire and by "De 
l'Avenir des religions" does not support the view that the Christian 
religion alone corresponds to the truth. Here, as a reading of the 
earlier essays would lead us to expect, Christianity stands within the 
general continuity of the "traditions religieuses": 
C. .;] I' Orient tout entier, vaincu et expirant, con-
centre sa pensee dans la foi de Jerusalem. Jerusalem, 
pres de sa fin, eclate dans la parole du Christ. Lui-
meme il faut qu'il meure, comme l'Egypte et la 
Chaldee, pour que Ie genie de tout Ie passe, les 
mysteres des pretres du Gange, Ie verbe etincelant 
de Zoroastre, la sagesse de Thebes, la tristesse 
de Palmyre, sortis avec lui du sepulcre, se trans-
mettent en son nom a toutes 163 generations futures. (68) 
Furthermore, "De l'Avenir des religions" implies that Christianity - rather 
than just Catholicism - is a spent force, falling into decline together 
with the peoples which gave it expression. Christianity marks a stage in 
the history of religions interpreted in terms of the relationship between 
nature and history and there seems no reason to expect that it should not 
in turn be replaced by a new religion. Some expressions from the text, 
which disappear in later versions, support this view. For example we are 
told that in the Middle Ages "1'Eternel etait la, sous la forme du Christ" 
and later we find Quinet including Jesus together with Moses and Mahomet in 
a list of the prophets of past religions. (69) 
"De l'Avenir des religions" is naturally concerned with the future as 
well as with the past. According to Quinet, the East-West movement of 
World history and religion indicates that America will be the birthplace of 
a new religious transformation. Whereas elsewhere Quinet frequently 
defends democracy on the North American model, in this article he is 
interested in the religious and the historical meaning of America. 
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We have already described how Quinet defines a religion not only in 
human terms but also in relation to nature. In "De l' Avenir des religions" 
the role played by nature is central to his thesis. He argues that each 
religion needs to "s' assimiler un monde physique, aussi nouveau que lui". (70) 
Thus Christianity journeyed to Western Europe in order to find a suitable 
environment: 
Alors, au sein d'une nature jeune comme lui, inspiree 
comme lui, il s'incorpore a elle; et, jusque la flottant 
et denue, il acheve de s'organiser dans Ie 
catholicisme.(7l) 
In this manner the birth of a religion explains the migrations of races 
and peoples: 
G .. ] a mesure qu'une face nouvelle de sa propre 
pensee se decouvre a l'humanite, elle va chercher, 
pour l'y developper, un univers nouveau comme elle ( ... 1 toute idee religieuse, si tot qu' elle es t 
eclose dans Ie genie d'un peuple, se leve, et va 
chercher a travers la nature Ie type qui la doit 
arreter. (72) 
When applied to the present this theory points to a movement from Europe 
to America. It is the destiny of mankind in general to repeat Chateau-
briand's Voyage en Amerique: 
Ce qu'un homme a fait a l'aventure, l'humanite Ie fera 
apres lui quand elle sentira en elle la venue d'une 
ere religieuse, elle ira se reconstruire sur Ie plan 
des Cordilleres Co. J Je ne sais quel prophete, mais 
il y aura un prophete C:. J qui se levera avant Ie 
jour pour surprendre Ie secret de ce monde endormi; 
en Ie melant avec Ie secret de l'homme t il composera 
Ie nouvel Evangile du nouvel univers.(/3) 
Quinet is not alone in developing these ideas. K. Lowith writes 
that from the beginning of the nineteenth century thinkers in Germany ad-
mitted the possibility "that the world spirit might emigrate from Europe". (74) 
In this context America became for Hegel the land of the future: 
America is C.::l the land of the future, whe re, in 
the ages that lie before us, the burden of the World's 
History shall reveal itself - perhaps in a contest 
between North and South America. It is a land of 
desire for all those who are weary of the historical 
lumber-room of old Europe. Napoleon is reported to 
have said: "Cette vieiUe Europe m'ennuie". It is 
for America to abandon the ground on which hitherto 
the History of the World has developed itself.(75) 
In France we find Hugo in 1829 developing views similar to those 
which Quinet will propose in 1831. According to Hugo, world history 
comprises three main periods: q (les) trois theocraties Successi Ves d 'As ie, 
d'Afrique et d'Europe". Europe is in decline; America is the land of 
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of the future: 
Ne semble-t-elle pas ([a civilisatioU) deja se 
pencher vers l' Amerique? C. J Est-il si hasarde 
de supposer qu'usee et denaturee dans l'ancien 
continent, elle aille chercher une terre neuve 
et vierge, pour se rajeunir et la feconder?(76) 
America is the continent where a new principle will be applied: "(Ie) 
principe d'emancipation, de progres et de liberte, qui semble devoir 
etre desormais la loi de l'humanite".(77) 
Two pamphlets of 1833 by the Saint-Simonian Charles Duguet again 
illustrate how America is associated with hopes for a new religion, a 
new revelation. (78) In America, writes Duguet, the Saint-Simonian 
"pontificat humani taire" will be realised: 
(.. J je vais en AMERIQUE preparer un GITE a cette 
REVELATION qu'en Europe ebaucha Ie PERE, et qu'aux 
limites de l'Afrique et de l'Asie pourra tres bien 
polir la MERE ( ••• ) Or les reves que l'EUROPE 
discute, MERE des Bolivar et des Washington, 
l'AMERIQUE impatiente les realise. (79) 
In the virgin land of America the opposition between East and West will 
be replaced by a new harmony: 
A ce nouveau monde est promis l'heritage de la 
revelation nouvelle. La, 1a seulement, au centre 
de nos continents et de nos mers, peut s'elever 
la couche nuptiale de l'Orient et de l'Occident 
amoureusement unis. La doivent etre jetes 1es 
fondements d'une autre Jerusalem, d'une autre 
Rome. (80) 
This theme of the reconciliation between East and West naturally 
reappears in Emile Barrault's Occident et Orient (1835). Unlike Duguet, 
however, Barrault's main hope is that this reconciliation, understood as 
a fusion between Christianity and Islam, will take place in the East. 
Barrault, nevertheless, cannot ignore America since it is the conclusion 
of the East-West movement of mankind. Barrault, however, sees 
America as dominated by Christianity. In America, Christ "(Ie) maitre 
jaloux r .. . -1 se promene connne 1e Seigneur dans 1a paradis terrestre". (81) 
." -" 
But Barrault still hopes that a further transformation will occur. 
America is described as "une divinite sans nom, plus forte, plus gracieuse, 
plus imposante que Cybele, Isis ou Pan". The new world has welcomed 
"l'esprit austere, libre et viril de l'humanite" with "la ferveur d'un 
amour vierge, et la vigueur d'une fecondite neuve". It is Barrau1t's 
wish that the conflict between these two principles will ultimately lead 
to their reconciliation: "G. J seul a, seul, Ie Verbe divin de 1 'humani te et 
Ie Verbe divin des mondes vont s'ecouter, se repondre, s'aimer!"(82) 
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As a final example we may cite Victor Considerant. In his book 
Au Texas Considerant urges the followers of the ideas of Fourier to 
leave Europe and emigrate to America. Once again, however, a justi-
fication of this is seen to lie in humanity's general movement from 
East to West: 
L'Amerique est, aujourd'hui deja et dans 1a plus 
grande signification du mot, l'Occident du Monde 
c .. ;:) Quand on observe la marche generale de 
l'humanite, on reconnait facilement que Ie progres, 
en se faisant dans le temps, se depla~ait dans 
l'espace, et que Ie foyer de lumiere et d'impulson 
sociale a toujours procede d'Orient en Occident, 
comme 1e solei1.(83) 
Other writers could be quoted to illustrate the theme of America. (84) 
The examples referred to above are, however, sufficient to place Quinet's 
speculations in a wider context. A number of common elements emerged 
from these texts: the importance attributed to the Westward movement of 
mankind, the desire for a reconciliation between East and West and the 
wish to restore harmony between man and nature. In 1831 Quinet's 
hopes for a religious renewal are based upon his interpretation of the 
relationship between man and nature in America. The extent to which this 
implies the decline of Western European civilisation and, what is more 
important, the decline of Christianity itself is a question which Comes 
to the fore in Ahasverus. 
Ahasverus portrays the victory of Christianity over Oriental pan-
theism but above all it is concerned with'Quinet's yearning far a great 
religious renewal in the present. Is Christianity dying? What new 
religion can replace it? These are the questions which haunt Quinet in 
this poem where the mood is often one of doubt and despair. Does Mob, 
the spirit of negation, speak the truth about the present when she 
declares that it often happens "qu'un dieu est mort et enterre dans 1e 
del, et que nous l'adorons encore sur 1a terre"?(85) Often in Ahasverus 
the cry is one of doubt: "0 Christ! 0 Christ! pourquoi nous as-tu 
trompes?,,(86) In the scene in Strasbourg cathedral a clear statement 
of this doubt is provided by Pope Gregory VII: 
Malheur! le paradis, l'enfer, Ie purgatoire, 
n'etaient que dans mon ame; la poignee et la 
lame de l'epee des archanges ne f1amboyaient 
que dans mon sein; i1 n'y avait de cieux infinis 
que ceux que mon genie pliait et dep1iait lui-
meme pour s'abriter dans son desertG.j(87) 
The words spoken by the choir of devils between the first and second 
"journees" point more directly still to the mood of underlying metaphysical 
unease which is present in so many pages of Ahasverus. Is there really a 
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divine purpose at work in the universe? Is the world appearance or 
reality? Is life a dream? Even the philosophy of history which Quinet 
had found in Germany seems incapable of providing a solution or an 
explanation. Thus the Devil asks: 
G .• J n' avons-nous pas cru tous, mes freres, que 
l'Eternel, devenu fou, jouait une divine comedie, 
dont il etait l'unique personnage?(88) 
What is more, does Ahasverus imply that God himself is responsible 
for evil and suffering? Such was Eckstein's interpretation of the 
Prologue: 
Dans l' Ahasverus C ••. J c' est (QieUl lui-meme qui 
s'est servi d'une mauvaise argile; c'est donc sa 
faute si l'homme n'a pas mieux reussi; en accusant 
l'humanite ses reproches retombent sur lui-meme; 
scepticisrne fataliste qui prive l'homme de sa 
liberte. (89) 
Quinet is preoccupied by the spectacle of the rise and fall of religions 
none of which is able to resist the forces of time. Such change may 
signify progress. On the other hand, the words spoken by the figure 
of "l'Enfer" are disturbing and echo in the reader's mind: "Plus tard, 
Ie jugement dernier sera refait, et Ie juge sera juge".(90) Some 
contemporary critics accused Quinet of proclaiming the death of 
Christianity. A. Vinet, for example, detected in Ahasverus an atheistic 
note. (91) How else could be interpreted the epilogue where Christ 
himself is assailed by doubt before returning a second time to the 
sepulchre? In reply, Quinet contended that the last act and epilogue 
of his poem should really be interpreted as an allegory of the contemporary 
condition of Christianity which, although suffering from doubt, was not 
dying: 
Cet epilogue a pour but de montrer que Ie Christ, 
c'est-a-dire tout Ie systeme chretien, est descendu 
aujourd'hui avec Ie doute des temps modernes, dans un 
tombeau moral comme autrefois dans son tombeau de 
pierre. Mais de ce sepulcre il doit ressusciter 
une seconde fois et se transfigurer dans un nouvel 
avenir. Ce sera Ie meme Christ, Ie meme Dieu, mais 
agrandi et monte au niveau de I' intelligence humaine [ •• ~(92) 
But if traditional Christianity (i.e. Catholicism) is judged insufficient 
to serve contemporary needs what precisely is this new form which Quinet 
considers to be capable of taking its place and rejuvenating the Christian 
spirit? Charles Magnin envisaged Quinet's poem as part of a wider move-
ment of spiritual change and renewal where Christianity was developing 
in a pantheistic direction. (93) Quinet himself defines his position thus: 
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Comme Ie paganisme alexandrin portait en lui un 
germe de christianisme, Ie christianisme contient 
un nouveau mande qui commence a poindre. Dans le 
calice de l'evangile litteral est cache un 
evangile cosmogonique, qui brise deja son enveloppe. 
A present, Ie livre c'est la vie, l'homme c'est Ie 
genre humain, l'Eglise c'est Ie monde, Ie Christ 
c'est l'infini. Tout se meut, tout gravite, tout 
est emporte dans ce progreso Ce qui etait personnel 
est devenu social, ce qui etait social est devenu 
cosmogonique. Dans cette transformation, le 
disciple se fait peuple, Ie peuple humanite, 
l:hu~nit~4ynivers, l'univers eternite, l'eternite 
D1eu l:. 3 
In the Revue de Paris A. de Saint- Cheron raised the vital question 
of the meaning of Christ's mission according to Ahasverus: "Si le Christ 
n' est pas venu racheter I 'homme de sa chute, que devient Ie christianisme?"(95) 
The scene of the fall of man is indeed absent from Ahasverus and Christ 
appears more as the representative of a vital stage in the development of 
individuality than as the redeemer of the sins of mankind. Quinet 
repudiates all belief in original sin and professes his faith in the 
doctrine of infinite progress. At the same time we should not forget 
that Ahasverus is described as the new or second Adam and that the historical 
process itself is considered in terms of mankind's journey through division 
and suffering to its final reintegration in God. 
Quinet's critics also seized upon the ambiguity of the figure of 
Eternity in the epilogue in order to cast doubt upon the genuineness of 
Quinet's Christainity. In his reply Quinet claims that Eternity is 
identical with the "Pere Eternel" of the earlier scenes once the latter 
is no longer seen through the anthropomorphic eyes of the Middle Ages 
and has been "ressuscite dans son idee pure et eternelle".(96) This 
pantheistic Eternity is much closer to the Absolute of De Za Nature et 
de Z'histoire than to the Christian conception of the God of love. 
Quinet's Eternity seems more to take the form of a life-force beyond good 
and evil: "Dans mon sein, je n'ai ni amour, ni haine".(97) For Vinet 
the meaning of the epilogue was clear: 
Qu'est-ce que l'Eternite succedant au Pere Eternel, 
sinon l'expulsion du Dieu personnel et vivant, et 
l'abandon de l'univers aux mains de fer de la 
necessite. (98) 
Vinet, moreover, saw no reason to modify his opinion in the light of 
Quinet's reply to Saint-Cheron's article in the Revue de Paris. 
Quinet's understanding of Christianity cannot be dissociated from 
the theory of the development of the awareness of individuality: 
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~. J 1e Christ arrive; i1 apporte 1e glaive, et 
encore que1que chose; il apporte 1a 1utte, i1 
apporte l' individuali te G.::] La personnalite 
des nations s'engage, plus tard ce sera celIe de 
l' individu. (99) 
The development of individuality forms the framework upon which Ahasverus 
is built and provides the key to Quinet's understanding of the contem-
porary religious crisis. The fourth act of Ahasverus is an allegory of 
the spiritual ills of modern times. A crumbling, dying world is por-
trayed where from all sides the cry resounds that God is dead. These 
pages which echo the arglUllent of HDe l'Avenir des religions" show the 
extent to which Quinet is no longer satisfied with the man-centred inter-
pretation of history. The development of individuality has been carried 
to excess and has resulted in an acute state of disharmony where the 
individual finds himself in conflict with nature and with mankind: 
Au troisieme acte (au moyen-age et dans 1e monde 
moderne), 1e drame est tout ha1etant; i1 pleure, 
il palpite, il sanglotte; il s'est individua1ise; 
i1 est arrive a sa derniere peripetie C. J c' est 
l'homme, lui, tout seul d'un cote, une fois 
Hamlet, une fois Pascal, une fois Byron, u~fois 
un autre; - et contre lui 1e peup1e, 1e genre 
hlUllain, 1e monde.(100) 
In "De l'Avenir des religions" Quinet speaks of the Middle Ages as a 
religious, sacerdotal epoch brought to an end by the Reformation which 
in turn led to the French Revolution. The subject matter of in particular 
the fourth act of Ahasverus is the spiritual climate produced by the 
Revolution as it is described in the article of 1831. Here we learn 
that the French Revolution marked the beginning of an exclusive 
preoccupation with man: 
Sa loi ~e la Revolutioij), sa loi terrible est de 
dire adieu au monde re1igieux. On Ie lui a reproche, 
et c'est en effet sa mission prochaine; car i1 est 
des temps au i1 faut que l'homme marche seu1 et 
montre ce qu' i1 sai t faire sans Dieu G.::J Que 
chacun acheve donc son oeuvre; mais que nul 
n'attende la visite du maitre; il ne viendra que 
lorsque, la tache se trouvant accomplie, il faudra 
en donner une nouvelle au monde.(lOl) 
In "De l' Avenir des religions" Quinet, dissatisfied with this state 
of affairs, longs for a return to religion which would overcome the 
individual's estrangement from nature and from mankind. This desire takes 
the form of his vision of America as the land of a great religious 
transformation, of a new harmony between man and nature. This theme is 
echoed in Ahasverus where Quinet goes one step further and suggests that 
- 35 -
the islands of the Pacific may one day produce "un Christ nouveau". (102) 
History is again a westward movement circling the globe expressing the 
divine thoughts unconsciously present in nature. Once this process is 
completed "l'universelle harmonie" is restored. Estrangement, alienation 
and conflict cease at the conclusion of the fourth act of Ahasverus: 
La nature, le genre humain, l'individualite ont 
epuise la lutte. En grandissant, chacun d'eux 
est devenu infini; et a ce sommet de l'etre, leur 
harmonie se retrouve. Une meme parole les 
explique l'un a l'autre. Le meme mot qui juge le 
passe cree l'avenir. Tout se raproche, tout se 
confond; tout se comprend, tout est consomme. (103) 
Despite this return to harmony we should not aSSume that the recon-
ciliation of man with the universe in the divine reason is close at hand. 
The Wandering Jew is the symbol of humanity journeying through history 
in search of God. In history no return to the past is possible; all 
action is directed towards the future. Having successfully borne the 
burden of Christ's cross in history Ahasverus-humanity becomes "Ie 
pelerin des mondes a venir et Ie second Adam". (104) Ahasverus and Rachel, 
doubt and faith, earth and heaven finally fuse to become the androgynous 
angel of mankind. Mankind's destiny is to be never satisfied but always 
to march onward in search of the Infinite even if in this quest Christianity 
- or at least Catholicism - no longer satisfies man's needs: 
Ni Dieu, ni fils de Dieu, ni Christ, ni Ange, ni 
Createur, ni mondes ne l'ont {le vide dans mon 
coeui} pas encore rempli. Demain peut-etre! 
C'est la tout Ie mystere.(105) 
Mankind is a collective being whose historical existence is conceived 
as a journey and a quest. In history mankind abandons the world of nature, 
of spontaneity, of necessity in order to enter into a world of suffering 
and conflict which however is also the world of freedom and aspiration. 
History is a drama, a struggle between men, and between man and nature. 
In Ahasverus Quinet presents God, le Pere Eternel, as a spectator of the 
"play" of history performed by the seraphim. He is spectator rather than 
actor: 
Dans ce drame, il y a trois personnages, Dieu, l'homme 
et l'univers; mais l'action et la peripetie ne se 
passent, a veritablement parler, qu'entre les deux 
derniers. (106) 
De ta Natw'e et de Z'histoire had, however, presented the reader with an 
Asbolute active in the nature and history, far removed from a personal 
transcendent God. From the standpoint of the Absolute the conflict between 
man and nature becomes merely "une lutte apparente". (107) Once nature 
and history are understood in this manner the opposition between them 
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which had been essential to the anthropocentric conception of history 
disappears. History is not so much the story of mankind as the story of 
God. As was the case with Schelling time "becomes part of the eternal 
history of God". (108) 
History may still take the form of the development of individuality 
but the meaning of history has ceased to be directly dependent upon the 
free activity of the individual and aq a result the life of the individual 
has become dangerously close to being merely an instrument of the Asbolute 
expressing itself in and through the finite. Do we expect a thinker who 
has placed so much emphasis on individual freedom to speak of the events 
of history in the following manner?: 
La suite entiere du monde civil n'est qu'une suite 
de symbo1es que l'Eternel evoque de son sein, comme 
l'ame de l'humanite se peint toute idea Ie dans sa 
Psyche de Thespie et son Promethee de Samothrace.(109) 
Other similarities exist between Quinet and Schelling. In The Ages of the 
World (1810) the German philosopher awaits the coming of the new Homer 
who "speaking once again in the undivided language of mythology, but of 
a higher mythology which has incorporated the discoveries of modern 
philosophy, will sing the new epic of a reunified age". The theme of this 
epic will be "the restoration of a lost unity of the human intellect with 
itself and with nature'~.(110) At the conclusion of De la Nature et de 
l'Histoire Quinet, too, calls for a new Homer and defines his task thus: 
Et maintenant, qu'un homme dispose des anna1es 
de l'humanite comme Homere de cel1es du peuple 
grec, que pour unite il choisisse l'unite de 
l'histoire et de 1a nature, qu'i1 rapproche des 
etre reels a travers 1es siecles dans 1a voie 
merveilleuse de l'infini C ... J Moins acheve 
dans ses contours que les poemes homeriques, 
il les surpassera en grandeur et en elevation. 
Sa mission est de degager des voiles mystiques 
de 1a comedie divine et du paradis perdu, et des 
saints livres du christianisme, le cote reel de 
l'humanite, comme l'Iliade a extrait la figure 
grecque du systeme des ep'opees symboliques des 
Acheens et des Pelasges. (111) 
Both Quinet and Schelling speak of history as a drama; Schelling, however, 
envisages an interpretation of the drama which reconciles Spirit and. 
human freedom: 
If we think of history as a drama in which every-
one who has a part in it plays his role with complete 
freedom and at his own discretion, then a rational 
development of this confused play can be conceived 
only if it is one Spirit which composes in all, and 
if the poet, to whom the individual actors are mere 
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fragments (disjeati membpa poetae), has so har-
moniously arranged in advance the objective outcome 
of the whole with the free play of all the indi-
viduals that at the end something actually 
rational must result. But if the poet were 
independent of his drama, we would be only the 
players who execute what he has composed. But 
if he £9 not independent of us, but reveals and 
discloses himself only successively through the 
play of our freedom itself, so that without this 
freedom he himself would not be, then we are 
fellow-poets of the whole and our own designers 
of the roles we play. (112) 
What is more)Quinet's conception of history as presented in "De l'Avenir 
des religions, De Za NatuPe et de Z'histoipe and in Ahasvepus - "Ie 
mystere de l' idee' divine" - recalls Schelling's famous lines: 
History is an epic composed in the mlnd of God; its 
major parts are: that which represents the going-
forth cf mankind from its centre to the greatest 
distance from Him, the other which represents the 
return. The former is the Iliad, the latter the 
Odyssey of history. In the former, the direction 
was centrifugal, in the latter it is centripetal. 
The great design of the entire appearance o£ -the 
world expresses itself in this manner in history. 
The ideas, the spirits, had to fall away from the 
centre and enter into nature, the general sphere 
of the Fall, into particularity, in order that 
afterwards they might, as particulars, return 
into the indifference, be reconciled to it, and 
be in it without disturbing it.(113) 
Quinet, however, in his letter to the Revue du ppogpes soaiaZ rejects 
the idea of the fall of man considering it to be a specifically Jewish 
tradition. Unlike many of his contemporaries he does not overtly have 
recourse to the idea of the fall of man, or of a cosmic fall, in order 
to explain the initial impulse to history and progress. However, while 
not explaining the origin of the historical development of mankind in 
terms of disruption of the original unity of man and God in paradise, 
Quinet does speak of mankind as a traveller, like Ulysses forever searching 
for Ithaca. The East-West movement of civilisation may be interpreted as 
a journey where mankind returns through time and space to its land of 
origin, its home. The movement is circular but it is clearly implied that 
a transformation has taken place in the course of history. Thus the 
Wandering Jew becomes a second Adam and America a semi-paradise. Near 
the conclusion of Ahasvepus harmony is restored. But if God and the 
reestablishement of harmony is the end of history, why was the original 
harmony sundered? No clear reply is given. Quinet's God is not the 
personal God of Christianity. Each religion marks a stage in a process 
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wherein nature contemplates herself in and through the human conscious-
ness. For Schelling "God is not C. J if He were we would not be; but 
He reveals himself continually". (114) God only is at the end of history. 
Similarly the disturbing figure of "l'Eternite" appears at the close of 
Ahasverus. 
The separation of man from nature can, however, be interpreted more 
directly in terms of the fall of man into history, a life of suffering 
which contrasts with the unconscious world of nature. Quinet admits that 
the "permanence du monde materiel" may well arouse "de vains regrets" in 
man condemned to transience. Similarly the individual may be tempted to 
identify so completely with the peoples of the past that his personality 
becomes absorbed, not this time by nature, but by history itself. (115) 
Man, however, means nothing to Quinet without his personality, activity 
and his aspiration to freedom and infinity. It would be incorrect to 
interpret Quinet's desire to overcome the division between man and nature 
in a naively pantheistic manner as a desire to return to nature. The 
human condition requires the separation of man from nature even though 
the action of mankind in history may be interpreted as achieving the redemption 
of nature. When harmony is restored nature, too,has become infinite. 
The dynamic force of history lies in the development of individuality 
and freedom. This is .a1so a movement from spontaneity (the East, nature) 
to ref1exion (the West, the mind). In recent times it is clear that the 
development of the intellect has reached a crisis point in the evolution 
of German philosophy since Kant. In the Etude, referring to the disagree-
ment between Kant and Herder as witnessed in the latter's Metakritik, 
Quinet remarks that, had Herder approached Kant's philosophy with an open 
mind, he would have recognised that: 
C: .. J cette philosophie fi:e11e de Kant) dans ses vastes et 
obscurs developpements, est l'expression historique 
d'une condition de 1a conscience du genre humain, et 
que c'est a lui qui l'a creee qu'i1 faut en rapporter, ou1'honneur 
ou Ie blame. Comme dans l'Orient, l'homme naissant 
lui (Herde~ avait apparu cache sous 1es liens de 
l'univers, l'univers a l'extremite des temps lui aurait 
apparu voile et presque enseveli sous l'oeuvre et la 
pensee de l'homme. En effet, 1e jour ou 1a personna1ite 
libre eut tout envahi et tout dompte, ne cherchant que 
soi et ne trouvant que soi, dans ce silence de toutes 
choses n'entendant plus que l'harmQnie de ses invisibles 
spheres, elle se prit a s'adorer. G.:] Si ce fut 1a 
une tentative ou vaine ou glorieuse de 1a phi1osophie, 
el1e ne fit d'ail1eurs que mettre en 1umiere et pousser 
a ses extremes consequences Ie principe qu'exprimait a 
son insu toute l'humanite moderne dans ses actes, ses 
arts, ses cu1tes, et 1e systeme entier de sa regeneration 
civile. (116) 
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Elsewhere Quinet draws a deliberate parallel between recent developments 
in German philosophy and the events of the French Revolution and Empire. 
Thus the philosophy of Kant is linked to the constituent Assembly, 
Fichte to the Convention, Schelling to the Empire and Hegel to the Holy 
Alliance. (117) The association between Fichte and the Convention is 
revealing since Quinet is linking that particular revolutionary regime 
with the philosophical system which carried furthest the emphasis upon 
thE-' will, the activity of the Self creating the world. (118) In both 
philosophy and history an extreme point has been reached. Hegel too had 
seen the Revolution as a moment of crisis: 
C;.~ in the Phenomenology the events of the Revolution 
and the Reign of Terror are translated into the major 
arise de aonsaienae both of Hegel as an individual and 
of the collective mind of mankind. These events are 
the dark night of the Hegelian spirit, recovery from 
which sets it on the way toward fulfilment in the total 
discovery of its identity and destiny. The stage of the 
Revolution, Hegel says, is "spirit in the form of 
absolute freedom", the extreme ~oint of the "int"erac tion 
of consciousness with itself". ( 19) 
But Hegel wrote the Phenomenology of Mind (1807) in a mood of growing 
conservatism when the enthusiasm which he had originally felt for the 
" . Revolution together with Schelling and Ho1der1~n had long evaporated. 
Quinet, on the other hand, while interpreting the Revolution as a moment 
of crisis remains convinced that the Revolution was fulfilling its 
mission: IIG.J i1est des temps oUll fattque l'homme marche seu1 et montre 
ce qu'i1 sait faire sans Dieu".(120) The Revolution retains its signi-
ficance from a religious standpoint; as the English Revolution had been 
the expression of Lutheranism, so the French Revolution was the expression 
of Calvinism. A crisis point has nonetheless been reached and the 
argtnnent of IlDe. l' Avenir des religions" can be interpreted as an attempt 
to overcome the division between subject and object, between the intellect 
and nature. 
Two contrasting views have emerged from the works that we have 
examined thus far. In the first place the meaning of history has been 
shown to lie in the exercise of freedom and this means above all freedom 
of the individual. History, moreover, reveals the progressive development 
of liberty, individuality and personality. Man first separates himself 
from nature and then from the political state to which he had alienated 
his freedom; finally he becomes conscious of himself as a free agent. This 
last state is identified with the coming of Christianity. This view 
recalls Miche1et's picture of mankind as a Promethean figure creating itself 
in history. Htnnanity has created and destroyed its gods as it has 
advanced. At the same time, however, Quinet also aspires to a synthesis 
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which would give meaning to history within a wider framework including 
nature and God. An upward movement is manifested in nature which 
achieves consciousness in man. The aim of history becomes the self-
knowledge of the Absolute and history itself is seen as the revelation 
of God. Although man stands in opposition to nature and necessity, 
nature herself is seen as the expression of the divine and it is the 
Absolute which journeys to self-knowledge in history. The history of 
religions becomes the history of God and not simply of man's thoughts 
about God. 
Quinet, like Schelling and Herder, is faced with the problem of 
reconciling human freedom with the progressive revelation of God. In 
the words of Schelling: "Subjectively and for inner experience it is we 
who act; objectively it is not we but something else through us". (121) 
What, we ask ourselves, is the value of the individual within the context 
of a cosmic process of becoming wherein nature achieves self-knowledge 
in the mind of mankind. In so far as priority is given to the active 
role of mankind in realising the divine thoughts present in nature and 
in, so to speak, creating God in history the initiative· remains with 
man; in so far as man is a passive vehicle for the expression of the Absolute 
his responsibility is diminished. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
In the 1830s Quinet took up the stance which he was to maintain in 
later life as the defender of the value of the individual and the enemy 
of historical fatalism. From this point on he will resist all attempts 
which, in his opinion, sacrifice the individual either to an impersonal 
Absolute or to the greater glory of an equally impersonal deified humanity. 
During these years we witness, with certain qualifications, a reassertion 
of a vision of history, rooted in the affirmation of the exercise of in-
dividual freedom. Quinet's publications of this period raise important 
questions concerning the value of the individual, his role and respon-
sibility in determining the course of history and his relationship to 
God. These problems have already been encountered in relation to 
Ahasverus. However, whereas Ahasverus is above all a presentation of 
mankind as a collective being journeying through history, NapoZeon (1836), 
Promethee (1838), the Examen de Za vie de Jesus (1838) and Quinet's 
discussion of the Homeric question are more directly concerned with the 
individual. Did the historical Jesus exist? Did Homer exist? Was 
Napoleon his own master or a tool of Providence? 
Before turning to the texts themselves we must draw attention to the 
change which took place in Quinet's attitude towards Germany and German 
philosophical thought during the early years of the July Monarchy. In 
contrast to his earlier enthusiasm he now believes the people of Germany 
to be characterised by doubt, anger and materialism. What is more, he 
perceptively interprets the spectre of Germany united under Prussia as 
a threat to France. He is now convinced that in Germany religious faith 
has been transformed by the systems of post-Kantian Idealism but that these 
systems have themselves crumbled to dust leaving behind them only doubt, 
scepticism and the debris of both religion and philosophy. German 
philosophy is accused of carrying abstraction to excess and of ignoring 
contemporary problems. Quinet's most serious charge, however, is that 
German Idealism is guilty of an amoral attitude.. This is particularly so 
in the field of history: 
Le premier reproche qu'i1 faut lui Cl'idealisme alleman41 
adresser est 1e manque complet de sympathie, de charite, 
ou p1utot d'humanite; C ... J L'indif£erence entre 1e bien 
et 1e mal, entre 1e juste et l'injuste, entre 1a 1iberte 
et 1a tyrannie, est une marque de faiblesse autant qu'une 
marque de force. (1) 
The full weight of Quinet's criticism falls upon Hegel and his 
disciples. He does not hesitate to attack the "pantheism" of Hegel with 
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a considerable degree of sarcasm. What is more, he speaks harshly of "la 
doctrine de l'absolu" which was not without its affinities with his own 
theories in De Za Nature et de Z'histoire. (2) It is in the light of 
this reappraisal of contemporary German philosophical thought that we 
must approach the renewed emphasis which Quinet places upon the value of 
the individual. (3) 
-0-0-0-
The Romantic period, as is well known, showed a marked enthusiasm 
for all forms of "poesie populaire". Herder, whose theories Quinet 
naturally knew well, had been instrumental in arousing interest in folk 
poetry throughout Europe. He believed that such poetry was an anonymous 
creation, the spontaneous expression of the spirit of the Volk. These 
theories received widespread approval and exerted a great influence. 
Thus we find Fauriel in 1824 defining Greek popular poetry as: 
(L'Jexpression directe et vraie du caractere et de 
l'esprit national ( ••• 1 une poesie C ... ] qui vit, 
non dans les livres, d'une vie factice C .. J mais 
dans Ie peuple lui-meme, et de toute la vie du peuple.(4) 
The terms "poesie populaire" and "poesie primitive" nevertheless 
lacked precise definition. Many different types of poetry from the epic 
to the Volkslied could be described as "poesie populaire". w. Schlegel 
pointed to the need for clarification: 
II est important en ler lieu de delimiter con-
venablement la notion de poesie popuZaire C ... 1 
On a beaucoup trop souvent confondu la poesie 
natureZZe en general avec la poesie popuZaire 
proprement di te. Meme Herder C ... J avance les 
noms d'Homere, d'Hesiode, d'Orphee et d'Ossian. 
Cela est tout a fait inexact: une poesie dans 
laquelle s'exprime la plus haute culture d'un 
siecle, ne peut etreappelee poesie populaire~ 
si ce dernier doit signifier quelque chose. (5) 
Quinet, for his part, does not call into question the theory that 
the epic gives expression to a collective personality. At the same time, 
however, he seeks to differentiate between "poesie populaire" and genuine 
epic poetry. The true epic poet is an individual, an artist who creates 
an enduring work of beauty. "Poesie populaire" cannot on its own attain 
this artistic perfection. But if no dividing line separates the epic 
from folk poetry then the danger exists that the epic, too, will be 
understood to be simply the anonymous expression of the collectivity~ This 
Quinet cannot accept. 
The long and fascinating history of the Homeric question which it-
self reaches back into classical antiquity has been investigated by 
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J. L. Myres in his study Homer and his critics. (6) As far as Quinet is 
concerned, however, attention must be paid above all to the reception 
which the theories of vico and Wolf received in France. 
The Neapolitan philosopher had denied the historical reality of an 
individual poet named Homer. He had come to this conclusion since he 
argued that the Homeric epic poems should be interpreted as expressions 
of Heroic Greek civilisation. Homer was not an individual, wrote 
Michelet in his Discours sur Le systeme et Za vie de Vico; the name 
indicated: "C.::J 1 'ensemble des chants improvises par tout Ie peuple 
et recueillis par les rapsodes". (7) 
The most celebrated influential contribution to this debate was 
provided at the close of the eighteenth century by Wolf who had called 
into doubt the existence of Homer in his ProZegomena ad Homerum (1795). 
Briefly the main points af Wolf , s theory were as follows: the Homeric epics 
were not the creation of an individual poet but contained songs or short 
poems composed by a number of different authors. These poems had been 
transmitted orally by recitation and only received their fixed form at 
the hand of Pisistratus in the sixth century B.C. The unity of the poems 
was not the result of the plan of an individual Homer but was to a large 
degree ascribed to Pisistratus. This theory thus accounted for any 
discrepancies and inconsistencies within the poems. Wolf emphasised 
his belief that the absence of alphabetical writing at the time of the 
first composition of the poems rendered impossible the transmission to 
posterity of a long heroic poem. 
Wolf's theories found much favour within Germany and the question 
was pursued further by scholars such as Gottfried Hermann and Karl 
Lachmann. The sphere of influence of Wolfian ideas was wide, affecting 
such figures as Niebuhr, Friedrich Schlegel and W. von Humbolt. Hegel 
in his Aesthetic turns his attention to the question but his interpreta-
tion resists the excessive claims of the collectivity: 
c.: • J Ie poeme epique, en tant qu' oeuvre d'art 
reelle, ne peut etre que l'oeuvre d'un seuZ 
individu. Tout en exprimant l'esprit de tout 
un peuple, i1 n'est pas l'oeuvre collective de 
celui-ci, mais celIe de quelques-uns seulement G .. J 
meme Ie chant populaire a besoin d'une bouche 
pour exprimer par 1a voix et la parole l'interiorite 
participant d'un contenu national; une oeuvre d'art 
unfua besoin a plus forte raison d'un seul esprit 
appartenant a un seul individu.(8) 
Hegel describes as "une opinion barbare, anti-artistique" the theory that 
the Homeric poems lack unity and consist merely in the simple juxtaposition 
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of "diverses rhapsodies ayant Ie meme ton". 
In Italy Leopardi was influenced by the Wolfian current of ideas 
and in England, Coleridge, who Quinet claims rejected Wolf's views, 
remarked in ]830: 
I have no doubt whatever that Homer is a mere 
concrete name for the rhapsodies of the 'Iliad'. 
Of course there was a Homer, and twenty besides. (9) 
'In France, we also find doubt cast upon the historical reality of 
Homer among the writings of Quinet's contemporaries. Ballanche, for 
example, speaks of the Homeric epic as: "Ces chants qui prennent un 
nom, qui revetent une figure, qui deviennent un poete C. J ". (]o) And 
Jean-Jacques Ampere states that the mere names, Ossian, Homer: 
r. .. J ne nous apprennent rien d' authentique sur ceux 
a qui on les prete, mais designent pour nous une 
certaine ere de la poesie, comme Hippocrate une 
certaine ecole medicale.(ll) 
A number of books and articles bear witness to the curiosity which the 
Homeric problem aroused in France during the Romantic period. Benjamin 
Constant discussed the question of the historical reality of Homer in 
De la Religion aonsideree dans sa sourae~ ses formes et ses developpement~(I~ 
In 1830, Charles Magnin examined at length the different interpretations 
of the Homeric poems in an important article entitled "Examen des systemes 
de Vico et de Wolf sur la formation des poemes Homeriques".(]3) Moreover, 
the illustrious Fauriel, who knew and influenced Quinet, examined the 
whole Homeric question in a series of lectures which survive today only 
in the form of the detailed summaries provided by the young Egger for the 
Revue generale de l'instruation publique from April ]836 to January 1837. 
In his lectures Fauriel makes extensive use of his knowledge of the epic 
traditions of different nations. He investigates the hypotheses of 
critics such as Thiersch, Nitzsch and Hermann. He gives his opinion on 
the question of inconsistencies within the poems, examines the problem 
of the use of writing and puts forward his own views on the manner of 
the epic's transmission to later generations. Fauriel argues that the 
poems first existed "comme fragments detaches", that only in the sixth 
century B.C. did they receive a certain fixed order and were committed 
to writing, and that between their composition and that date the poems 
were altered in a great many respects. As for Homer himself, Fauriel 
remarks: 
(. . J Ie nom seul d 'Homere peut prendre place dans 
I 'histoire, mais C ... :] sa biographie et l' epoque ou 
il a vecu offrent des difficultes a peu pres 
insolubles. (14) 
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Fauriel clearly desires to steer a middle course between the extreme 
points of view on this subject: 
[ ... J entre l'opinion qui fait d'Homere un poete 
de cabinet, combinant, comme au seizieme et au 
dix-huitieme siecle, Ie tissu, les epidodes et 
les ornements d'un poeme epique d'apres certaines 
regles instinctives ou formulees; et l'autre 
opinion aussi peu soutenable qui voit dans ( •• J 
Homere la symbolique personnification d'un vaste 
et multiple travail auquel auraient pris part 
tous les homerides~ les cent poetes du cycle 
epique de l'ancienne Grece.(15) 
A similar desire for a compromise solution emerges from the article 
"Homere" which Guigniaut contributed to the Encyclopedie des gens du 
monde. Here Home r is described as "tout ensemble une personne et un 
symbole, un individu et un etre collectif". (16) Guigniaut, however, is 
quite definite in his rejection of the excesses of the Wolfian school 
whose influence he considers now to be on the wane. (17} He believes 
that those who remark no significant difference between "poesie populaire" 
and the Homeric epic reveal a lack of aesthetic sensibility and 
historical understanding. 
Our final illustration of reaction in France to the theories of 
Vico and Wolf is provided by Fr. Qzanam. In an article entitled "Des 
Niebelungen et de la poesie epique" (184l} Ozanam discusses the Homeric 
question and adopts a position similar in many respects to that of Quinet. 
Of particular interest is the manner in which Ozanam examines Wolf's 
arguments in relation to other aspects of intellectual life in Germany. 
His analysis closely parallels that of Quinet and deserves to be quoted 
at some length: 
Le scept1C1sme introduit dans les etudes litteraires 
ne s'y contient pas. Les existences historiques 
s'evanouissent a leur tour dans la nebuleuse clarte 
du my the et du symbole. Les annales des peuples 
s'effacent sous la main d'un inflexible exegese; et 
qui sait si les paradoxes de Niebuhr n'ont pas pre-
pare Ie scandale de Strauss? Peut-etre aussi, au 
milieu du decouragement general des intelligences, 
y a-t-il quelque danger dans un systeme qui meconnait 
la puissance de l'art. L'art, c'est Ie travail, c'est 
la liberte. Quand on nie la personna lite du poete 
dans la poesie, on est bien pres de nier la per-
sonnalite humaine dans l'histoire et d'aboutir a ce 
fatalisme qui, ne voyant que des necessites pour Ie 
passe, ne peut donner que la servitude pour l'avenir. 
Et ces deductions, remontant plus haut, conduisent 
jusqu'a la negation de la personnalite divine en 
metaphysique, c'est-a-dire jusqu'au pantheisme C .. . 1(18) 
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Quinet for his part undoubtedly wished to be remembered as the 
thinker who had defended the historical Homer and as the critic who had 
refused to confuse epic poetry with "poesie populaire". In the 
Avertissement to the 1858 edition of De Z'histoire de Za poesie he 
expresses his evident satisfaction at having combatted the pernicious 
influence of the theories of Vico and Wolf: 
J'ai resiste a la fascination excessive qu'exercent 
sur l'imagination les formes incultes et spontanees 
des peuples, dans leur berceaux (. •• J Les grands 
poemes n'ont-ils point d'auteur, les peuples n'ont-
ils point de grands hommes? faut-il absorber dans Ie 
grand Tout annonyme non seulement l'histoire, mais la 
poesie? (19) 
Quinet's views on this subject, however, are not as consistent as he might 
like us to believe. His defense of Homer, the individual creative 
artist, dates from 1836. In De Za Greoe Moderne (1830), on the other 
hand, there is present a tendency to consider art as an impersonal 
creation of the collectivity at large. (20) And Quinet's own theory of 
the epic developed in De Za Nature et de Z'histoire is significantly at 
variance with the views which he subsequently professed. For this 
reason we shall begin our analysis with an examination of the essay of 
1830 before passing on to refer to the series of articles devoted to 
epic poetry which was published during the 1830's. These are articles 
of intelligent vulgarisation and they resemble many others which appeared 
in the periodical press of the time. Quinet's enthusiasm is evident but 
the accuracy of his facts is not to be taken for granted. (21) 
The theory of epic poetry found in De Za Nature et de Z'Histoire is 
in many ways a direct continuation of Quinet's treatment of myth. (22) 
The more abstract philosophical considerations of the first part of the 
essay underlie the discussion of epic poetry which follows. Epic poetry 
is a stage in the development of what Quinet calls the "epic idea" which 
had previously found expression in nature and in architecture. The epic 
is "spontanement emane de l'ame du peuple, son expression la plus intime". 
It is the product of "la conscience generale" over a long period and only 
when the collective consciousness ceases to impart further developments 
to the poem does the epic receive a fixed form at the hands of an in-
dividual poet. Quinet gives his reader the impression that the poem is 
endowed with a life of its own, independent of the poet. Moreover, he 
likens the epic poem to architecture which he does not hesitate to con-
sider as the impersonal creation of "Ie genie de tous".(23) Does this 
imply that the epic should be envisaged along similar lines? The manner 
in which Quinet speaks of art in general and architecture in particular 
would seem to substantiate this view: 
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[ ... 1 ce sont presque toujours comme des familIes 
de Rhapsodes, qui se transmettent et achevent l'un 
apres l'autre une tradition de genie. [ •• l Les 
constructeurs du temple de Delphes, de Mantinee, 
Agamedes, Trophonius, sont evidemment des 
generations personnifiees aussi bien qu'Orphee 
et Linus. (24) 
But Orpheus, not Homer, is mentioned here and we cannot, therefore, 
conclude that the use of the analogy between epic poetry and architecture 
leads to the calling into question of the existence of Homer. At the 
same time, however, the general mood of De la Nature et de l'histoire 
is very far removed indeed from the position which Quinet will adopt 
in 1836. 
The extent to which this essay diverges from Quinet's subsequent 
defence of the historical Homer is highlighted if we examine some im-
portant modifications which Quinet made to the text when it was revised 
for publication in the Pagnerre edition (1857). The essay itself now 
receives the succinct title De l'Origine des dieux. 
One of the most important passages in the essay reads as follows 
in the original version: 
Lui-meme [le poeme epiqu~, forme de la substance 
d'une race, plus vrai, plus profond que l'histoire, 
il n'est donne d aucune puissance personnelle de le 
circonscrire d sa mesure. Au lieu de ramper avec Ie 
discours ecrit, enchaine a la pierre ou au bronze, 
il vole avec Ie chant d'iles en iles, de forets en 
forets, de montagnes en montagnes. Ce n'est que 
lorsque l'esprit generateur commence a lui manquer; 
lorsque, immobile et borne dans son progres~ il 
s'occupe a se recueillir, qu'il se laisse enchainer 
a la lettre et qu'il termine son aventureuse 
carriere dans une forme fixe et stable. (25) 
But in De l'Origine des dieux we read: 
Ce poeme forme de la substance d'une race est plus 
vrai, plus profond que l'histoire. Au lieu de 
ramper avec Ie discours ecrit, enchaine a la pierre 
ou au bronze, il vole avec Ie chant d'iles en 
iles, de forets en forets, de montagnes en montagnes. 
Quand Ie souffle generateur commence a manquer, 
c'est alors seulement qu'il se laisse enchainer 
a la lettre et fixer par l'ecriture.(26) 
The words italicized are omitted from the later version. They clearly 
are those which lend support to the theory of the collective origin of 
the epic. But more revealing still of Quinet's change of attitude is the 
manner in which in the 1857 version he treats the lines immediately 
following the extract which we have just quoted in the first edition 
of De la Nature et de l'histoire: 
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Le temps venu ou la conscience generale,.epuisee de 
genie, ne peut plus ni 1e [le poem~ supporter, ni 
l'etendre, est ce1ui ou elle Ie confie a un autre 
instrument qu'a elle-meme; soit que nous entendions 
par la la simple reunion de parties iso1ees comme 
fit Pisistrate dans Athenes, ou les inspirations 
des siec1es, recuei11ies une fois dans l'ame d'un 
poete tel que Ferdoussi ou l'Arioste: des qu'il a 
cesse de se mouvoir, i1 laisse voir en 1ui-meme 1e 
travail des ages lointains.(27) 
In the 1857 version, in place of this lengthy passage, Quinet substitutes 
the following short sentence: "Le poete apparait pour recueillir 1e 
testament poetique d'un monde qui s'efface".(28} 
In De Za Nature et de Z'histoire~ therefore, Quinet does not deny 
the existence of Homer but his argument undoubtedly gives priority to 
the collectivity over the individual poet. (29) It is perhaps signifi-
cant that the phrase "dans 1e poeme de l'Ionie" in the version of 1830 
becomes "dans les poemes d 'Homere" in the P agnerre edition, (30) 
-o~O-o-
We may now turn to the exposition of our author's considered 
judgments on Greek epic poetry to be found in the article "Des Poetes 
epiques 1. Homere" which appeared in the Revue des deux mondes in May 1836, 
The keynote of this article is the unambiguous defence of the historical 
reality of Homer and the affirmation of the role of the individual poet 
as opposed to the collectivity in the creation of epic poetry. The 
problem of the existence of Homer is immediately presented to the reader 
as the central matter to be discussed. Quinet begins by summarizing the 
ideas of Vico and Wolf and describing their influence. His conclusion 
is that the time for such theorizing has now passed: 
( ... J Ie temps approche oil disparaitront, sans 
doute, ces triomphantes hypotheses qui, partout 
mettant des forces abstraites a 1a place de 
l'homme (des personnalites humaines - 183~ 
abolissaient lartout la vie dans l'histoire et 
dans l'art.(3 ) 
A refutation of Wolf's main arguments now follows. Wolf had been 
mistaken as to the date when writing began in Greece and he had failed to 
understand the role played by poetry in Greek society. Above all the 
lack of organisation and unity which the German critic had discerned in 
the Homeric poems does not exist in Quinet's eyes. On the contrary he is 
amazed that the poems have retained such a high degree of unity considering 
that they were transmitted to posterity by the Rhapsods, the Homerids, 
the scholiasts and the grammarians of Alexandria. This leads Quinet to 
conclude that the unity of the poems must in the first place have been 
the work of one individual: "r .. J cette unite a du etre, au commencement, 
l' oeuvre d' une main souveraine". (32) 
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Since Quinet now attributes the greatest importance to the per-
sonality of the individual Homer he naturally disagrees with Wolf over 
the question of the Pisistratan recession, the belief that Pisistratus 
had been responsible for the order and unity of the poems: 
Si I' on disai t que cette ordonnance des parties es t 
l'oeuvre de Pisistrate, j'ajouterais que Pisistrate 
fut Ie plus grand et 1e plus incomprehensible des 
poetes (. •• J C' es t lui £Fomere) C .. J qui fit 
reellement la tache que l'on voudrait ("veut" - the 
1836 versioqJ attribuer a Pisistrate.(33) 
Quinet does not deny the close relationship between epic poetry 
and society but he interprets this relationship in such a way as to 
leave the initiative with the individual poet: "Le poete inventait, Ie 
peuple se ressouvenait".(34) Above all, the Homeric epic as a consciously 
created work of art transcends all "poesie populaire": 
C. •. J i1 es t difficile c:.:] d' admettre que l' Iliade 
l'Odyssee ne soient rien autre chose que des chants 
populaires. Ces poemes sont nationaux; mais ils 
depassent evidemment 1es forces de l'instinct 
abandonne a ses seu1es ressources C .. J Le vers 
d'Homere est ne de l'inspiration populaire; il en 
conserve les formes et quelques habitudes, mais il 
porte deja la couronne et Ie sceau d'un art cultive. 
II est sorti de Za Joule; on reconnait 1e roi a sa 
demarche roya1e. 35 
. In the preface to Napoleon~ 1836, Quinet likewise contrasts the 
"chant populaire" wi th genuine epic poetry. This dis tinc tion however 
in no way detracts from Quinet's enthusiasm for folk poetry. On the 
contrary) he considers it the duty of the modern epic poet to preserve 
in his work the orally transmitted folk songs which are daily being lost. 
But the epic poet, in the true meaning of the term, is no mere compiler 
of the products of the collectivity. His task is of a different order: 
"II eleve instinctivement aux formes de l'art reflechi et de la poesie 
ecrite cette poesie traditionnelle et orale C .. J". (36) 
Quinet's understanding of the relationship between epic poetry 
and "poesie populaire" within the context of the Homeric epic provides 
him with criteria which he can apply elsewhere. Thus, in his study of 
Latin epic poetry, Quinet remarks that the Romans lacked an "Eneide 
popu1aire" upon which a true national epic could have been based. Instead 
they had recourse to Greek models. Similarly in his discussion of the 
Old French epic in 1837 he relies heavily upon the distinction between 
the epic and the "chant populaire" •. Re writes that the poems under exam-
ination, cannot be said to attain the level of true art:"Leur place est 
celle des raps odes avant Romere t .. 1". (37) Although the ground was well 
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prepared no new Homer appeared to forge the Arthurian and Carolingian 
traditions into one great work of art: "Faute d'un homme, Ie travail 
des generations est demeure sterile". (38) 
It would be difficult to claim that Quinet's intervention in the 
Homeric debate was of great significance in the wider context of the 
state of Homeric studies in France. Guigniaut, Dugas-Montbel and Fauriel 
were to be mentioned by Magnin in a note when his article was republished 
in 1842. Quinet's name does not appear. E. Egger, on the other hand, 
whose university career had advanced considerably since his publication 
of Fauriel's lectures, would seem to have a higher opinion of Quinet 
since he includes his name in a note appended to the opening lecture of 
a course on Greek literature delivered in December 1845~39) 
A comparison between Fauriel's lectures and Quinet's article 
testifies to the evident superiority of the former. There is, however, 
another factor which should perhaps be borne in mind when we judge 
the significance of Quinet's articles on epic poetry. This is his 
own assessment of their importance. Writing to his mother in 1836 he 
remarks that he would much prefer to be writing poetry of his own. He 
adds the following comment:"(..;) Frurtart: cesmorceaux reussissent et je 
continue". (40) We should not, however, belittle either Quinet's erudition 
_ the footnotes to De la Gpeae Modepne are proof of his knowledge of 
recent German scholarship - or his sensitivity to the wider implications 
involved in the choice of a particular critical method. Above all his 
defence of Homer is a defence of freedom and individuality, the values 
which lie at the cent~of his own philosophy of history. (41) 
-0-0-0-
Napoleon and FTomethee throw considerable light upon the problem of 
individuality and at the same time reveal its complexity. Napoleon is 
deliberately contrasted with Ahasverus. The subject of the latter had 
been mankind in general; Napoleon on the other hand is concerned with 
"1 'honnne individuel, Ie heros,. Napoleon". (42) At first sight the following 
view of the Emperor's role seems to betoken a return to the man-centred 
conception of history: 
Son caractere est de representer Ie developpement 
de l' individuali te dans les temps modernes C: .. J 
Dans son epopee ne se rencontrent veritablement 
que trois personnages, - lui, - Ie peuple, - le 
monde. (43) 
We soon discover, however, that history in this poem is far from 
being envisaged in exclusively human terms. Napoleon is an epic and as 
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such corresponds to Quinet's definition of epic poetry as "la poesie de 
la Providence ou Ie jugement divin de l'histoire".(44) Napoleon is much 
more than an isolated individual. He is the symbol of an entire 
generation of Frenchmen. What is more, the individual as epic hero 
performs actions in accordance with a providential plan. 
In the introduction to his PhiZosophy of History Hegel takes 
Napoleon as an example of a World-Historical-Individual who is an 
instrument of the Absolute. World-Historical-Individuals are not aware 
of the real role which they are playing. They pursue their own personal 
aims and have "no consciousness of the general Idea &hicI!] they Gre:] 
unfolding". (45) Quinet shares with Hegel this desire to envisage 
Napoleon not only as an individual influenced by subjective motives but 
also as a figure participating in the realisation of a divine purpose. 
He enjoins the epic poet to concern himself with those events which are 
"marques du caractere de la necessite et de la volonte cHeste".(46) 
The task of the epic poet is defined as follows: 
C .. J i1 faut qu' i1 (J.e poete) fasse parler en 
lui [Le heros] la providence et l'intelligence 
universelle, bien plus que la voix d'une personnalite 
solitaire et capricieuse.(47) 
Some lines spoken by the Emperor in the course of the poem bear this 
out: 
Je me croyais Ie maitre, et j'etais l'instrument, 
Vers un autre que moi s'inclinait rna puissance, 
Et j'etais Ie hasard qu'on norome Providence • 
• • tI ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Voila ce que j'ai fait; je ne m'en repens pas; 
Et je Ie referais dans les meme combats. 
C'etait l'oeuvre de Dieu; qu'il l'acheve a sa guise! 
C'est lui qui me poussait, et c'est lui qui me brise.(48) 
In NapoZeon Quinet is once again searching for a middle road between 
two conceptions of history. The poem, while marking a return to in-
dividuality, nevertheless seeks to understand the individual within the 
context of the unfolding of a greater purpose. To this extent Quinet's 
Napoleon resembles Hegel's description of a World-Historical-Individual. 
Moreover, Quinet like Hegel is fascinated by the Emperor's fall from 
power. The fate of World-Historical-Individuals is not an enviable one: 
they are murdered like Caesar or exiled to Saint-Helena like Napoleon. 
Quinet, however, does not identify might with right and neither does he 
accept that the judgment of history is final. His belief in France's 
mission and his resentment at the humiliating defeats of 1815 prevent 
him from following the road to a fatalistic vision of history. 
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The very fact that Quinet chose the myth of the Titan and the story 
of his revolt against the gods as the subject of his verse drama Promethee 
is indicative of the persistence of the theme of individual freedom. 
Quinet's Prometheus, like Goethe's Titan, is a spirit of liberty who em-
bodies the aspirations of his creator. The poem's message is an outright 
rejection of fatalism and materialism; Promethee asserts the dignity and 
the nobility of man. The Titan refuses to submit blindly to received 
authori ty. 
Man, because he is a self-conscious thinking being, is capable in 
pascalian terms of despising the superior forces which c~ush him. But 
humanity's lot is far from being a happy one. Work, suffering, despair 
and death cannot be avoided since they are co-existent with freedom and 
consciousness of self. (49) Men may act incorrectly - in the poem they 
reject Prometheus's message in favour of a return to the old gods - but 
all responsibility is theirs. Prometheus explains this to Hesione: 
Libre dans l'univers, esclave de toi-meme, 
Entre Ie ciel et moi, l'autel et Ie blaspheme, 
Tu choisiras tes dieux: tu Ie peux, tu Ie dois; 
Et de ta volonte tu porteras Ie poids.(50) 
There is much more to this poem. however, than a retelling of the 
myths traditionally associated with Prometheus. Promethee~like Aha8veru~ 
raises problems of fundamental importance concerning the meaning of the 
history of religion. (51) In the Preface we learn that no single religion 
possesses absolute truth. Every people has written a page of what Quinet 
calls the OLd Testament of mankind. Pindar, Aeschylus and Sophocles are 
the brothers of Isaiah, Daniel and Ezekiel. All can be considered to be 
precursors of Christianity since they belong to "la tradition universelle 
du Dieu de l'humanite". "Ton pere est Jehovah", says the archangel 
Michael to Prometheus, "et nous sommes tes freres".(52) Christianity is 
no isolated phenomenon. The God whose coming was proclaimed in the East 
by the Hebrews found in the West its prophet in the figure of Prometheus. 
Only Christianity could end the ordeal of the Titan: "Ie Christ, en 
detruisant Jupi ter, es t Ie seul redempteur poss ible de Promethee". (53) 
The interpretation of Promethee~ like that of Ahasverus, is com-
plicated by the fact that the myth of the Titan, like the legend of the 
Wandering Jew, is being used simultaneously upon different levels. Firstly, 
Prometheus represents a stage in the history of religions marking a pre-
paration for the coming of Christianity. Secondly, he appears as the 
eternal prophet, symbolising man's religious aspirations and unending 
search for God: 
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Promethee est la figure de l'humanite religieuse. 
Mais il n'a pas seulement ce caractere historique; 
il renferme Ie drame interieur de Dieu et de l'homme, 
de la foi et du doute, du createur et de la creature; 
et c'est par la que cette tradition s'applique a tous 
les temps, et que ce drame divin ne finira jamais.(54) 
Quinet's Titan is both artist and prophet. He explains that the 
very name of Prometheus carries with it the notion of prophecy, an 
interpretation which accords with that proposed by Pierre Leroux: 
Promethee represente I' aspiration vers Ie ciel (.. J 
Promethee, comme son nom l'indique, est doue de 
sentiment. de pressent~ment~ de desir· de 
prophetie. C'est l'artiste p'ar excellence, l'artiste 
tourne vers la connaissance.(55) 
But Prometheus, like Ahasvetus, is also a figure through which Quinet 
expresses his desire for a transformation of religion in the nineteenth 
J 
century. The spiritual lodgings of the 1830's resemble those experienced 
in a world which awaited the birth of Christianity. Prometheus embodies 
the fundamental religious questionings of mankind: "Qui est-tu? Que 
crois-tu? Qu~attends-tu?"(56) Although these questions may remain 
ultimately unanswerable, the dignity of each generation lies in the 
attempt made to solve the riddle of human existence. Religion is no 
more static and immobile than humanity itself. Religion evolves and 
progresses as the human spirit advances. The reign of Jupiter is no 
more everlasting than that of Saturn. The passing of the Gods must be 
accepted as inevitable. But to accept this is to deprive man of security 
and stability. The doubt of Prometheus can become as acute as the 
despair of Ahasverus: "Moi seul, moi, j'ai tout fait, tout puise dans 
moi-meme./ Et mes cieux n'etaient rien qu'un splendide blaspheme'~.(57) 
Yet ~omethee does differ significantly from Ahasverus both from 
the point of view of form and content. ~omethee emerges from Quinet's 
correspondence as a work of peace and harmony in which the despair of 
Ahasverus has been replaced by confidence in Providence. A letter of 
1836 reveals a growing desire for clarity: "Tout man travail aujourd'hui 
consiste a arriver a la simplici te et a la clarte". (58) In ~omethee 
the abundant imagery of the prose of Ahasverus gives way to verse and the 
imitation of "les beaux modeles grecs". (59) "Apres les monstres". 
remarks Quinet, "j' ai visite les dieux". (60) We would be wise not to 
underestimate the significance of this return to Classical antiquity 
which, incidentally, is also a return to the models of French Classicism.(61) 
Should Promethee be interpreted as a call for the replacement of 
Christianity by a new religion? This would not seem to be the case. 
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The mood of this work, despite moments of doubt and despair, represents 
an aspiration to a profound transformation of Christianity rather than 
a call for a new religion as such. In his preface Quinet clarifies 
his position somewhat and defends himself against the accusations of 
impiety and pantheism. 
Si donc c'est etre impie de penser que Ie christianisme 
du dix-neuvieme siecle est different du christianisme 
du douzieme, a10rs, pour ma part, je merite 
l'accusation dont mon obscurite ne m'a pas toujours 
defendu. Si, au contraire, crest etre re1igieux de 
reconnaitre en chaque chose la presence-de l'infini; 
si c'est etre croyant de garder Ie cu1te des morts 
et la foi dans l'eternelle resurrection; si c'est 
etre l'ami de Dieu, de 1e chercher, de l'appeler, de 
1e reconnaitre so us chaque forme du monde visible 
et invisible. c'est-a-dire dans chaque moment de 
l'histoire, et dans chaque lieu de 1a nature, sans 
toutefois Ie confondre ni avec l'une ni avec l'autre 
de ces choses. a10rs ce1ui gui ecrit ces 1ignes est tout 
1e contraire de l'impie.(62) 
Alexandre Vinet welcomed Quinet's repudiation of pantheism and 
declared that Ahasverus and Promethee were separated by "un intervalle 
immense, un rejouissant progres".(63) But Vinet still maintained that 
Quinet failed to appreciate the real significance of the doctrine of 
redemption without which a true understanding of the message of the 
Gospels is impossible. Whereas in Ahasverus Quinet has been guilty of 
pantheism, in Promethee he stands accused of deism. Charles Magnin also 
had doubts concerning the orthodoxy of the message of Promethee. 
According to his interpretation the poem represented an aspiration to a 
new religi~us dawn which could only be described as "le par deZa 1e 
christianisme". (64) 
Promethee can, therefore, be seen as a continuation of the movement 
towards the anthropocentric conception of history which we discerned 
in Napoleon. This is all the more significant since Promethee like 
Ahasverus is directly concerned with the history of religions. As in 
Ahasverus, the quest for God is shown to be the motive power of history. 
In Promethee, however, it is evident that while humanity thirsts after 
the divine, the world of history is made by free men who are responsible 
for their actions. 
-0-0-0-
Quinet's critical examination of Strauss' Life of Jesus appeared 
in the Revue des deux mondes in 1838. His main aim was to defend the 
historical Jesus against the interpretation put forward by Strauss which 
had in affect transformed Christianity in~a mythology. He also criticised 
the influence of speculative philosophy upon Strauss' theology. These 
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two elements are not so closely related as they may at first appear. 
Strauss' mythical interpretation bears "a purely empirico-rational 
character" which is not strictly dependent upon his adherence to a system 
of speculative philosophy. (65) Thus to denounce Strauss' Hegelianism 
is not to dispose of his theory of myth. The strength of Quinet's 
analysis, however, derives from the fact that he discovers in both 
Strauss's Hegelianism and in his mythical interpretation an identical 
danger, a threat to the value and dignity of the individual. 
The defence of the historical Jesus recalls that of Homer. Quinet 
believes that the same critical methods which had previously been employed 
in the study of epic poetry were now being applied in the interpretation 
of the Gospel narra~ive: 
La methode que Wolf et Niebuhr ont appliquee a 
Homere et a Tite-Live, l'auteur C?trausiJ 
l'applique au christianisme; et, de la meme 
maniere que Homere et l'histoire romaine se sont evanouis 
comme une fumee entre les mains des deux premiers, 
Ie Cb~ist a son tour disparait dans Ie travail du 
dernier (. •• J Les evangelistes deviennent des rhapsodes, 
l'Evangile un poeme en prose, et Ie christianisme 
un reve du genre h~in faisant sa halte dans Ie 
jardin des Oliviers.~o6) 
The Life of Jesus is looked at within the context of developments in 
German theology since Kant. Quinet describes in some detail how the 
rationalistic and allegorical methods of interpretation had been applied 
to account for the supernatural phenomena recorded in the Bible. In 
/ 
his eyes the danger from the allegorical method is greater since it 
neglects the importance of the historical element. Strauss' study is 
an extreme example of this tendency: 
La lettre tue, mais l'esprit vivifie, voila Ie 
principe d'Origene. Mais qui ne voit qu'a son 
tour l'esprit en grandissant peut tuer et rem-
placer la lettre? Ceci est l'histoire de toute 
la philosophe idealiste dans ses rapports avec la 
foi positive. (67) 
Quinet's hostility to Hegelianism shows itself in his strong dis-
approval of what he terms Strauss' a priori approach. The German thinker 
is also guilty of an excessive use of erudition.which stifles "Ie 
sentiment de tout reali te" producing lila negation absolue de toute vie". (68) 
Quinet rejects the possibility of a reconciliation between religion and 
philosophy on the Hegelian model. He prefers to point to their essential 
incompatibility while at the same time interpreting the conflict between 
faith and philosophy as a source of movement and progress. Above all, 
he is horrified by the seemingly calm and untroubled manner in which 
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Strauss proceeds to destroy the basis of the Christian religion. We 
must not, however, misinterpret Quinet's hositility to Strauss' under-
standing of the miraculous element in the New Testament narrative as a 
rejection of higher criticism in general. Quinet is no fundamentalist, 
no believer in the literal infallibility of the Bible. His criticism 
of Strauss centres upon the threat to the individual.(69) 
Strauss, dissatisfied with orthodox Christology, had adopted the 
speculative Christology developed by Hegel, Marheinecke and Rosenkranz. 
God was not a transcendent creator but impersonal, infinite Spirit which 
manifested itself in man and in the world. In the Life of Jesus Strauss 
wrote: 
When it is said of God that he is a Spirit, and of 
man that he also is a Spirit, it follows that the 
two are not essentially distinct. To speak more 
particularly, it is the essential property of a 
spirit, in the distribution of itself into distinct 
personalities, to remain identical with itself, to 
possess itself in another than itself. Hence the 
recognition of God as a spirit implies, that God 
does not remain as a fixed and immutable Infinite 
encompassing the Finite, but enters into it, produces 
the Finite, Nature, and the human mind, merely as a 
limited manifestation of himself, from which he 
eternally returns into unity. As man, considered 
as a finite spirit, limited to his finite nature, has 
not truth; so God, considered exclusively as an 
infinite spirit, shut up in his infinitude, has not 
reality. The infinite spirit is real only when it 
discloses itself in finite spirits; as the finite 
spirit is true only when it merges itself in the in~ 
finite. The true and real existence of spirit, 
therefore, is neither in God by himself, nor in man 
by himself, but in the God-man. (70) 
Strauss, however, moves away from the speculative thinkers on one 
crucial point. (71) For Hegel and Marheinecke the essential unity of God 
and man lay in their identity as spirit and this unity was manifested in 
the person of the one individual Jesus Christ. For Strauss on the other 
hand, it is not an individual but mankind as a whole which is the 
incarnation of the Idea; 
In an individual, a God-man, the properties and 
functions which the church ascribes to Christ 
contradict themselves; in the idea of the race, 
they perfectly agree. Humanity is the union of the 
two natures - God becomes man, the infinite mani-
festing itself in the finite, and the finite spirit 
remembering its infini tude C: .. J it is the worker 
of miracles, in so far as in the course of himan 
history the spirit more and more completely sub-
jugates nature £: .. J It is Humanity that dies, 
rises, and ascends to heaven, for from the negation 
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of its phenomenal life there ever proceeds a 
higher spiritual life; [ •• J By faith in this 
Christ, especially in his death and resurrection, 
man is justified before God; that is, by the kindling 
within him of the idea of Humanity, the individual 
man participates in the divinely human life of the 
species [ ••• J if we know the incarnation, death and 
resurrection, the duplex negatio affirmat as the 
eternal circulation, the infinitely repeated pul-
sation to the divine life; what special importance 
can attach to a single fact, which is but a mere 
sensible image of this unending process? Our age 
demands to be led in Christology to the idea in the 
fact, to the race in the individual: a theology which, 
in its doctrines on the Christ, stops short at him as 
an individual, is not properly a theology, but a 
homily. (72) 
Quinet finds these views unacceptable. They are an example of the 
modern tendency to revere humanity as a substitute divinity at the expense 
of the individual: "Depouiller l'individu pour enrichir l'espece, diminuer 
l'homme pour accroitre l'humanite, voila la pente".(73) Humanity is in 
his eyes merely a quantitative conception, the sum total of a number of 
individuals. The individual is the centre: "toute vie, toute grandeur, 
. - 1- d 1'· d· ·d " (74) comme toute m1sere, re event e 1n 1V1 u • 
But Quinet's rejection of the impersonal Christ of pantheism and 
his refusal to admit that Jesus was the product of the myth-making 
faculty of society are not simply a restatement of the attitude which he 
had adopted over the Homeric question. In the course of his examination 
of Strauss' theories he is led to define the religious dimension of the 
human personality itself. 
We have seen how in his earlier work Quinet associated the coming 
of Christianity with the birth of true individuality. This belief is 
now reaffirmed: 
Si quelque chose distingue Ie christianisme des 
religions qui l'ont precede, c'est qu'il est 
l'apotheose,non plus de la nature en general, 
mais de la personnali te meme ( .• ~ Le regne 
interieur d'une arne qui se trouve plus grande 
que l'univers visible, voila le miracle permanent de 
1 'Evangile. ( ••• ) qu' es t-ce que l' Evangile sinon la 
revelation du mondeinterieur?(75) 
But Jesus is not presented as the Word made flesh who dwelt among 
us, was crucified and by his death atoned for sin. Sin and redemption, 
atonement and salvation, as traditionally conceived have no place in 
Quinet's religion. God did not manifest Himself in Christ alone. Quinet's 
Jesus is not redeemer or mediator but rather man as understood by 
Christianity. He is a human figure but paradoxically within his very 
humanity seems to lie the secret of his divine nature. 
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In Jesus we recognise that the divine is not something which is set 
over and against the human but also something present within man. But 
by man Quinet means man as an individual personality. That is the meaning 
of the incarnation and the two natures of Christ: 
( ... J si la vie du Dieu fait honnne a un sens 
comprehensible pour tous, irrecusable pour tous, 
c'est qu'elle montre que dans l'interieur de 
chaque conscience habite l'infini, aussi bien que 
dans l'ame du genre humain, et que la pensee de 
chaque honnne peut se repandre et se dilater iusqu'a 
embrasser et penetrer tout l'univers moral. (76) 
Quinet's argument could be said to make Jesus' divine nature 
dependent upon his human nature. Jesus must really have existed as a 
person, Quinet seems to imply, since it is through personality that 
the individual participates in the life of God: 
Si l'individu ne peut lui-meme etre le juste, 
Ie saint par excellence, s'il n'est pas un 
meme espIJit avec Dieu:J s'il est incapable de 
s'elever au supreme ideal de la vertu, de la 
beaute, de la liberte, de l'amour, qu'est-ce 
a dire? Et connnent ces attributs deviendront-
ils ceux de l'espece?(77) 
Existentially Jesus is a real person in the world; ontologically he 
remains a revelatio~ of Being. (78) The experience of personality by the 
historical Jesus is the manifestation of the presence of God. Quinet's 
Jesus is, indeed, a living symbol of modern man. Selfhood and Christhood 
become one. But as the lines quoted above suggest, the individual 
personality only participates in the divine life through effort and 
inner struggle. The incarnation, in the widest sense, thus becomes the 
work of the individual rather than of God. 
-0-0-0-
The true significance of the works which we have examined in this 
chapter evidently lies in the value which Quinet now places upon freedom 
and individuality. He has repudiated some aspects of German thought to 
which he had previously been sympathetic but which he has subsequently 
recognised as diminishing the individual. Above all, in the Examen de La 
Vie de Jesus, he has sought to describe the religious dimension of 
the human personality. Quinet's correspondence reveals that he experi-
enced a new feeling of serenity when composing ~omethee. This, to a 
great extent, reflects his faith in the individual. 
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Is it not significant that the urge to clarity and the return to 
Classical models coincides in general terms with Quinet's defence 
of Homer and Jesus? In both cases Quinct is freein£ hirr~elf to a 
certain degree from German influences. These ('.hanges in attitude 
are reflected in other ways. In 1831 he had enthusiastically 
proclaimed his "discovery" of Old French epics. In his article 
of 1837 on the French epic~howeve~ he expressly states that these 
poems should not be taken as models - a request which differs 
considerably from his own practice in NapoLeon. Similarly, ~uinet 
who in Ahasverus had made full use of Odental source material, 
condemns such imitation in his article on the Indian epic (1840). 
Alfred Michiels interpreted Qui.le t' s defence of l<'rench Class icism 
as an in!'lint;(.re act of self-interest: "Les idees progressives sont 
tres-bonnes sans doute; mais l' argent ne leur cede en rien (..:] 
M. Quinet ayant celebre nos classiques, on Ie nomma chevalier de 
la Legion d'honneur, on l'envoya professer a Lyon". Histoire des 
idees Litteraires en France au XIXe sieaLe, fourth edition, 
Paris, Dentu, 1863, vol. 2, p. 490. ~uinet's desire for a permanent 
secure pos t cannot be denied but MichIels' conclusions are unfair. 
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beau retour a la vraie langue [ .•• ] C'est une honorable retraite 
dans Ie classique de Corneille. Ce pays connaitra peut-etre, mais 
ne sentL',: ja' 'ais une autre poesie". Quinet' s welcome is tempered -
"je voudrais un peu plus de profondeur et d'audace" - but he can 
hardly be said to be hostile to the play. See Ed. Bir~, Viator de 
Laprade. Sa vie et ses oeuvres, Paris, Didier, n.d., p. 92. For 
a discussion of Quinet's aesthetic theories see Crossley, "Les Idees 
es thetiques de Quinet", Conoque du aentenaire, Clermont Ferrand, 
1978. The question of insincerity is also raised with regard 
to Quinet's acceptance of the Legion d'honneur in 1838. Mme 
Quinet (op. cit., p. 250) rapidly dismisses the award by means of an 
anecdote. She describes Quinet's mother's pleasure at the honour 
bestowed upon her son but she emphasises Quinet's reported reply: 
"Quoi, un ruban?". His mother's wish to conform socially and shine 
in society is well documented. The fact remains that he nonetheless 
accepted the honour whereas others, including Sainte-Beuve, refused. 
A letter to Carnot of May 1838 reveals that Quinet had definite 
scruples about accepting the honour. See Griffiths, OPe cit., 
p. 167. See also J. Gaulmier, "Sur une lettre inedite d'Edgar 
Quinet", Revue de Utterature comparee, 1959, pp. 90-4. 
Promethee, preface, p. XXI. Cf. Lamartine who writes as follows in 
a letter of 1838: "Maintenant Ie christianisme a la lettre est-il 
Ie christianisme en esprit? Le christianisme qui a traverse, en 
s'en impregnant, les ages les plus honteux de l'esprit humain est-il 
Ie christianisme de ses ages de developpement et de lumiere". Quoted 
by M.-F. Guyard in his edition of La Chute d'un ange. Fragment du 
Uvre primitif, Geneva, Droz, 1954, p. 122. 
(63) Vinet, Ope cit., p. 139. 
(64) Ch. Magnin, "Promethee", Revue des deux mondes, 1838, vol. 15, p. 473. 
See also the review by Fortoul which appeared in the Revue de 
Paris, 1838, vol. 51 pp. 218-46. Mme Quinet (op. cit., p. 249) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
At this point we propose to examine Quinet's major publications of 
the years 1842-1848. We must begin with Le Genie des religions which did 
not appear until 1842 although it was based upon the lectures which 
Quinet delivered at Lyons in 1839. The calm mood of this work was 
however soon replaced by the militancy of the years of combat, 1842-45, 
which Quinet spent as a Professor at the College de France. This was 
the moment when, together with his friends Michelet and Mickiewicz, he 
found himself at the forefront of the political and religious controversies 
of the period. The three professors achieved a wide popularity among 
those who were dissatisfied with the policies of the government of 
the day and were angered by the attacks of the clerical party upon the 
University. Those inclined towards anti-clericalism and the Republican 
tradition supported Quinet who proclaimed his faith in the principles of 
the French Revolution and denounced the danger which in his opinion was 
constituted by the presence of the Jesuits in France. In published form 
Quinet's lectures were given the following titles: Les Jesuites (1843), 
L'Ultramontanisme ou l'eglise romaine et la societe moderne (1844), 
Le Christianisme et la revolution fran~aise (1845), and Les Revolutions 
d'Italie (3 vols. 1848, 1851, 1852).(1) The content of these lectures 
was an obvious embarrassment to the government which retaliated by 
insisting upon a modification to the title of Quinet's lecture course. In 
1845 he ceased lecturing in protest and he resigned the following year. 
In 1846 he was tempted to playa more active political role and he stood 
unsuccessfully for election as a candidate of the Left.(2) 
-0-0-0-
"On ferait un beau livre de l'histoire de l'esprit divin dans les 
differentes phases de l'humanite", wrote Lamartine in his Voyage en Orient. (3) 
Le Genie des religions could be said to go a considerable way in fulfilling 
this wish. In the opening pages of his study Quinet exclaims: 
Vie de l'Esprit divin a travers Ie monde, Annales 
l'Eternel incarne dans Ie temps, que suis-je pour 
tenter cette histoire?(4) 
In reality much of Le Genie des religions is a development and a deepening 
of ideas which we have encountered in Quinet's earlier work. His in-
tention is not simply to provide a history of the doctrines of pre-
Christian religions. He wishes above all to relate changes in society to 
changes in religion. He opposes the view that religion should be under-
stood as a reflection of society. Religion itself is the creative element. 
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Each society develops as the expression of a religious idea, of a certain 
idea of God. This is the guiding principle which forms the common 
element uniting Le Genie des religions and the lectures given at the 
College de France. (5) 
It would be difficult, however, to claim that Quinet's general 
thesis was particularly original. It was a commonly held belief that 
religion determined the form of society. Jouffroy develops this point 
in his De l'Etat aatuel de l'humanite (1826): 
Toute veritable religion entraine C. J necessairement 
apres soi, non-seulement un certain culte, mais une 
certaine organisation politique, un certain ordre 
civil, une certaine politique et de certaines moeurs. 
En un mot, toute religion enfante une civilisation 
toute entiere, qui est a elle comme l'effet a la 
cause, et qui tot ou tard doit necessairement et 
inevitablement se realiser.(6) 
And Lamennais in Du Passe et de l'avenir du peuple (1841) adopts a 
similar position: 
L'histoire C ... ) nous montre l'humanite se 
developpant a mesure que Ie dogme se developpe, 
ou a mesure qu'elle avance dans la conception 
de Dieu et de l'Univers distinct de lui et uni a 
lui; de maniere quIa chacune des phases de ce 
developpement dogmatique correspond une notion 
du droit et du devoir sur laquelle se modele la 
societe, qui n'en est que l'expression, la 
realisation exterieure.(7) 
The belief that religion determines society and the conviction that 
without the idea of God no real society could exist lead us to enquire 
into the origin of the idea of God. As was the case in his early essays 
Quinet will have no truck with the theory of a primordial revelation, 
in the sense of a direct divine intervention into history. It was the 
contemplation of nature which produced the idea of God in the mind of 
man. He refers to "l'idee de Dieu reveU~e par l'organe de l'univers".(8) 
The first divine revelation was provided by nature, the "Evangile cos-
mogonique", wherein ancient seers, poets and prophets read the word of 
God. (9) The history of the religious consciousness began with man's 
reaction to "l'infini visible", that is to the rich vegetation of the 
Orient. (10) 
These remarks lead us to examine what is probably the most important 
issue raised by Le Genie des religions. This is the extent of the role 
played by nature in the development of the religious consciousness. 
Before we can look at this question, however, it is necessary to provide 
a brief outline of the general plan which is followed in this ambitious 
work. (11) 
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According to Quinet the Vedas provide evidence of the earliest form 
of religio~ that of a patriarchal, tribal society of nomadic herdsmen 
living on the slopes of the Himalayas. (12) At this stage the idea of 
God is revealed by the light of dawn which disperses darkness to lay bare 
the spectacle of nature: "la premiere revelation de l'Orient, terre du 
soleil, se resume dans l'idee de lumiere".(I3) "L'aube visible", produces 
in man "l'aube de la pensee".(I4) The character of this revelation is 
expressed in the figure of Indra who closely resembles Jehovah.(I5) This 
form of religion is replaced as the tribes leave the mountains and make 
their way to the coast. Now a fixed society with a king and a priesthood 
develops. A new revelation is provided by nature: "la revelation de 
l'infini par l'ocean".(I6) This "figure nouvelle de l'infini" is Brahma. 
Unlike Indra who had been characterised by activity Brahma possesses "Ie 
naturel indolent de l'ocean de Golconde".(I7) Quinet pursues further 
his analysis of Indian religion but these two illustrations suffice to 
indicate the role played by nature. (IS) 
The other religions included in Le Genie des peligions are approached 
from a similar point of view. Thus Persian religion is said to resemble 
the original identification of Indra with light while adding a new 
element: "la revelation par la parole". (19) Egyptian religion,on the 
other hand}represents "la revelation par la vie organique". (20) Egypt 
is closely associated with Africa and is considered as a land of servi-
tude where man sought the presence of the divine no higher than in the 
animal kingdom. The construction of the monuments of Egypt is explained 
by reference to the influence of a priesthood of Asiatic origin. A new 
important element is however present in Egyptian religion: "Ie sentiment 
naissant de la personnalite".(21) Quinet interprets the Egyptians' 
desire to preserve the physical body after death as "(Ie) commencement 
de la foi dans la personne humaine".(22) Babylonian and Phoenician 
religion, on the other hand, correspond to societies in which man is 
"epris d'un amour delirant pour l'infini sous la forme de la nature". (23) 
The Hebrew idea of God both reflects and transcends the spirit of 
Oriental pantheism. Before Renan, Quinet emphasises the fact that Jehovah, 
unlike the gods of India, Persia and Egypt, was not identified with an 
aspect of nature but revealed Himself to the Jews in the desert from 
which nature was, so to speak, absent. In Renan's terms the desert is 
monotheistic. Quinet, for his part, describes the desert as: 
G .::l la patrie naturelle du dieu jaloux G .. J partout 
1a face de Jehovah, seule brillante dans Ie vide de 
l'immensite, l'Esprit seul debout au milieu de son 
temple invisible. (24) 
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In Oriental pantheism time was simply an eternal present and God 
was identified with the physical universe. The Hebrew idea of God, on 
the other hand, conceives of the divinity as separate from nature, as a 
free personality. At this moment man becomes conscious of his own 
freedom and aware of the future as being other than the present. Quinet 
points out, however, that only the Christian doctrine of the immortality 
of the soul could really provide an answer to those questions which 
the Old Testament left unresolved. 
Henri Peyre does not hesitate to describe the final section of the 
first edition of Le Genie des religions as "une cinquantaine de pages 
inspirees".(25) Here Quinet's subject is Greek religion which in his 
mind corresponds to mankind's unique moment of serenity in history. 
This was the moment when "la croyance devint art" when faith became 
poetry. (26) Man became the measure of all things; he no longer sought 
infinity in external nature but found it within himself. The divine 
reason and the human reason were one. The same spirit of freedom and 
intellectual curiosity marked Greek art, drama, history and philosophy. 
Greece brought about the ruin of Oriental pantheism: 
L'epopee, la statuaire, la poesie lyrique, Ie drame, 
metamorphosent l'un apres l'autre l'ancien culte de 
la nature, lequel, prive de l'autorite du sacerdoce, 
se trouve livre a toutes les fantaisies de l'art.(27) 
The Greek idea of God remains nevertheless to a certain extent de-
pendent upon nature since in Quinet's opinion Greece herself can be 
envisaged as "l'immensite orientale, l'infini circonscrits dans une forme 
exquise".(28) Human freedom develops where man is no longer dominated by 
the external world. 
To what extent does man passively receive the idea of God revealed 
by nature and to what extent does he actively contribute to its 
development? What is the range of individual freedom and responsibility 
once it is accepted that not only art, philosophy, institutions but 
"jusqu'a un certain point, la suite meme des evenements" follow from a 
given religion? (29) To what degree was man condemned to accept the 
religions which denied him true freedom? Having seen Quinet speak of 
freedom as "une activi te qui ne reI eve que de soi" we wonder whether it 
is possible to make the development of the religious consciousness so 
dependent upon the influence of environment even if we accept that nature 
has been so arranged according to a providential plan. 
It may be fair comment that Quinet cannot be faulted for not having 
emphasised the role of the individual in those societies when it is precisely 
his thesis that freedom and individuality have not yet developed. It 
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is, nevertheless, the presence of freedom which Quinet is seeking in 
history. The inertia, the "sonnneil eternel" of the religions of the East 
cannot satisfy him: "t.:) individualit~ morale, conscience, activite, 
liberte ou les trouverons-nous?" (30) We must, therefore, enquire 
whether, in the light of his conception of freedom, his theory of the 
influence of nature is sufficient to explain to such a large degree the 
origins of religion. 
With regard to Greece, it is significant that Quinet does not merely 
state that nature revealed the idea of God. He remarks that the Greeks 
chose from the land about them the elements which corresponded to their 
national genius. In the case of Semitic monotheism, however, the influ-
ence of the desert is the truly decisive factor. In the desert which is 
devoid of the luxuriant vegetation of the East: "C.;) l'homme s'elevera 
presque necessairement a l'idee pure du Dieu-Esprit".(31) This statement 
tends to remove the initiative from man who receives impressions from 
the external world which then produce in him the idea of God as spirit.(32) 
In Le Sentiment de Za nature avant Ze ehristianisme (1866) Quinet's 
friend and admirer Victor de Laprade is critical of the argument of Le 
Genie des reZigions. The author of Psyche agrees that nature revealed 
the idea of God to man in the Orient but he states categorically that 
Jehovah was not revealed "par une voix de la nature, pas meme par la 
sublime et terrifiante immensite du desert". (33) Quinet's theory of the 
influence of environment is "profondement juste si on la contient dans 
certaines limites" but when carried too far it constitutes a threat to 
human free will and misrepresents the power of God: 
Si dans l'ordre du aeveloppement moral et religieux de la 
~reation, le peuple choisi pour conserver l'idee du 
Dieu un et pur esprit, du Dieu libre, personnel, 
independant de ses oeuvres, a ete place longtemps sous 
la sauvegarde du desert, afin que la sainte idee fut 
mieux preservee de tout alliage avec les images impures 
du polytheisme et du pantheisme, est-ce a dire que Ie 
desert lui-meme ait ete Ie revelateur? Faut-il, par 
une heresie inconcevable chez de grands esprits, re-
tirer a l'ame humaine son activite propre, a l'ame 
divine sa toute-puissance, son initiative eternelle, 
sa liberte, pour investir l'univers et la matiere 
du don de produire la pensee et d'engendrer l'ideal 
sans Ie secours d'un ideal anterieur et d'une pensee 
creatrice! (34) 
According to Laprade - whose general argument recalls Ballnache - as 
each individual receives a physical body and a certain temperament so each 
race is given by God a certain environment. God, however, respects 
man's freewill. 
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Quinet's argument, in the opinion of Laprade, would appear to deprive 
men of this vital power of choice. 
Laprade, however, lays bare only one side of the picture since 
Quinet does in fact draw attention to the activity of mind by which man 
changes the course of history. Through his art, his philosophy, his 
reinterpretation of traditional texts, man inevitably alters the character 
of the idea of God originally revealed by nature. Thus religions are 
altered and transformed. This human element often takes the form of 
doubt. Quinet dwells at some length upon the figures of Prometheus, 
Hamlet, Faust and Job. Doubt is not an inherently negative activity 
destined to produce black despair. Job may seem impious but "cette 
incredulite apparente est pleine du Dieu de l'avenir".(3S) In this sense 
doubt becomes an instrument for the discovery of truth. For Quinet, as 
for Hugo, doubt is not of necessity sterile: "C .. ] il est un doute 
fecond, comme il est une douleur feconde'~.(36) 
Le Genie des religions does not, therefore, remove responsibility 
from man to the extent suggested by Laprade. It remains a fact, however, 
that with regard to the origin of the religions examined in Quinet's 
study, the role played by nature is much greater than that attributed to 
an initial activity of mind. Laprade, moreover, was not alone in 
expressing reservations. Albert Reville, for example, while welcoming 
Le Genie des religions also had doubts on this score: "( .• J nous aimerions 
que, dans sa genese des religions, M. Quinet ftt une part un peu mieux 
definie a l'esprit des individus et des races".(37) Michelet also, to 
judge from certain remarks in his Journal, was not in full agreement with 
Quinet's thesis. In his entry for 28th March 1842 Michelet notes: 
"Je lisais surtout les Religions de Quinet: trop'd'exterieurs, trop de 
nature; pas assez la vie dont j'avais besoin".(38) 
In reality,Quinet in Le Genie des religions is still trying to 
transcend the opposition between man and nature and to reconcile freedom 
with necessity. He writes that although the "puissance de transformation" 
responsible for the production of new forms of life in nature has ceased 
to be active in the natural universe, this same power is at work "dans 
Ie coeur et la conscience de l'homme".(39) Religion, art, laws and 
institutions are now its manifestations. History, like nature, is in 
this sense a revelation of the divine. Once again the history of religions 
takes the form of a westward movement in which: 
( . . J chaque lieu de la nature, chaque moment de la 
duree ayant son genie propre, represente la Divinite 
sous une face particuliere; de chaque forme du monde 
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s'eleve une revelation, de chaque revelation une 
societe, de chaque societe une voix dans Ie choeur 
universe1; il n'est pas un point egare dans l'espace 
ou Ie temps, qui ne figure pour que1que chose dans 1a 
revelation toujours croissante de l'Eternel. La 
creation, d'abord separee de son auteur, tend de plus en 
plus a se rattacher a lui par Ie lien de l'esprit, 
et la terre enfante veritablement son Dieu dans Ie 
travail des ages. A ce point de vue, l'histoire est 
un culte eterne1 auque1 chaque civ~lisation ajoute 
un rite souvent baigne de sang.(40) 
Is there not a danger that if all history is the revelation of God 
then everything that has taken place, including evil, suffering and "sang", 
will be justified so depriving the individual of responsibility? 
Furthermore, how does Quinet account for the separation of creation 
from Creator? What is the relationship between God the creator, the 
God who reveals himself in nature and history and the God created by 
mankind? Does God have any objective existenc'e in contradistinction 
to the idea of God in the mind of man? Quinet unfortunately does not 
go into detail to elucidate these matters. In Le Genie des peligions 
he is concerned with the history of the idea of God and not with his 
own conception of God.(41) 
When in 1843 Eugene Pelletan tried to answer the question "Comment 
1es dogmes se regenerent?" he came to the conclusion that the conflict 
between Catholicism and Protestantism, the historical forms of Christianity, 
pointed to the necessi ty of "une troisieme croyance ( •• June croyance 
superieure".(42) Quinet adopts a similar position in the lectures delivered 
at the College de France. Catholicism is rejected as the embodiment of 
reaction, inertia and sterility. Protestantism is welcomed but is deemed 
incapable of providing a satisfactory solution to the religious problems 
of the nineteenth century. The future, however, only remains meaning-
ful so long as it is considered in a religious perspective. 
In Les Jesuites Quinet envisages the future with a certain degree 
of confidence. He discerns in the controversies of the time a sign that 
a transformation of religion is imminent: "C ... J une nouvelle aurore 
religieuse point dans Ie monde".(43) He urges his listeners to partici-
pate fully in this movement of spiritual rebirth: 
, .. J si la pensee religieuse souffle de nouveau sur 
Ie monde, si l'etoile nouvelle se leve, ne restons 
pas en arriere, et marchons Ie premier au-devant de 
ce Dieu qui se reveille dans les coeurs. Que 
d'autres (s'i1s Ie veu1ent) s'enracineij4 dans 1a 
lettre, courons au-devant de l'Esprit.~ 4) 
"L'Esprit" is a key word in Quinet's though at this time. We may consider 
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that it corresponds to the idea of God which he proposes for the future. 
Both Quinet's nationalism and his conception of the personality rest 
upon his faith in "1 'Esprit'~. This belief underlies his denun ... 
ciation of Catholicism as the enemy of the true Christian spirit and 
legitimises his interpretation of the French Revolution in terms of 
the realisation of Christianity. In many respects the manner in which 
he conceives of "l'Esprit" recalls the "Duch" of Mickiewicz. The two 
men first met in 1837 and the Polish poet immediately made a deep 
impression upon Quinet.(45) There can be little doubt that in subsequent 
years Mickiewicz influenced the development of Quinet's thought. At 
the same time, however, it is easy to overestimate this influence and 
neglect the extent to which the thought of both writers already converged 
prior to their first meeting. (46) 
With regard to the question of individuality Quinet's thought in the 
1840's continues the argument which he had put forward in defence of the 
historical Jesus. The subjectivity of the individual is the centre for 
the realisation of spiritual energy which immediately takes the form of 
purposeful activity. This is the religion of conscience, "Ie dieu 
interieur cache dans chacun de nous".(47) "L'Esprit", God as mind or 
spirit, reveals Himself in the life of the individual but this does not 
imply that the individual is merely an instrument. He is rather "the 
channel of the deity" to use an expression of Emerson's which Quinet 
noted down in his Carnets.(48) 
But if as individuals we participate in the life of "1 'Esprit" this 
is as the result of an unrelenting spiritual effort. Quinet underscored 
with evident sympathy Emerson's statment that "God will not make himself 
manifest to cowards". (49) In L'UZt~montanisme he makes the same point: 
"C .. J Dieu se cache aux pusillanimes, mais il se revele aux braves". (SO) 
The individual must look to the future and resist "Ie sommeil de 
l'Esprit". Responsibility for progress rests upon the shoulders of 
heroic individuals: 
Un homme, en grandissant interieurement, en redoublant 
en soi, par un effort sublime, la vie morale, fait 
sans qu'il Ie sache, une revolution dans Ie genre 
humain qui, tot ou tard est oblige de se mettre a son 
niveau. Je dirais volontiers que chacun porte, au 
dedans de soi, la chaine de diamant qui soutient 
l'univers moral; a mesure qu'il s'eleve, il oblige 
l'univers de monter avec lui.(SI) 
Quinet, like Mickiewicz, Carlyle and Emerson, champions the hero who 
is the embodiment of this spiritual energy. Heroism is akin to 
saintliness as an expression of this force. Quinet appeals to his audience 
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to develop the heroic spirit in their own lives: "II y a encore de 
grandes choses a faire; restez donc ou est Ie combat de l'esprit, Ie 
danger, la vie, la recompense". (52) 
The Church, on the other hand, is branded as the enemy of the heroic 
spiri t. It is antipathetic towards "tout ce qui nait du pur hero1sme". (53) 
Hostility towards spirit is carried furthest by the Jesuits who wish to 
"s'emparer de l'esprit pour Ie materialiser".(54) The society of Jesus 
is built upon written rules and laws which represent a denial of the 
life of spirit. The Spi~itual Exe~ci8e8 have as their real aim the 
crushing of spirit as manifested in the life of the individual personality. 
It soon becomes clear that the individual's spiritual nature 
realises itself in freely determined practical activity in the moral 
sphere as opposed to the contemplation of infinity or the mystic's 
union with the Godhead. The adjectives "religieux" and" moral" have 
almost the same content. The freedom of individual conscience cannot 
be made subject to any 'external authority, neither to Church, nor Bible, 
nor priest nor state. NoZite tangere christos meosJ writes Quinet, 
"nous l' appliquons a chaque personne morale". (55) In order to be 
religious it is not necessary to belong to a particular church. Religion, 
because it is so rooted in individual conscience, ceases to be limited to 
one aspect of human existence. It expands into all spheres of life, 
the intellectual, the moral, the social, the political, becoming 
identified with the cause of justice in society and the search for truth 
in science and philosophy. 
Quinet uses the words "ame", "esprit", "pensee", "intelligence", 
"conscience", almost as synonyms to express that part of our being which 
relates to God. "Pensee" and "intelligence" naturally refer to the pre-
sence of Spirit in intellectual activity and enquiry, in science and in 
philosophy • . "C ... :) toute la dignite de l'homme moderne", writes Quinet, 
, " (56) . 
"est dans sa pensee • The pursul.t of knowledge and truth is by 
nature a deeply religious activity. Ultimately science and religion 
are one: "impossibilite dans l'une et dans l'autre de se rassasier 
jamais, ni de verite, ni de saintete".(57) Bacon, Descartes and Leibniz 
"ont fraye la route au Verbe de l'avenir". Galileo, Kepler and Newton 
were seers, "les prophetes du monde moderne".(58) The philosophers of 
the Enlightenment had faith in "la puissance de l'invisible, de la 
If • d' L 'Ul pensee and thl.s, accor l.ng to t~amontani8meJ is what is most valuable 
in the Christian heritage. In Quinet's eyes the Enlightenment did 
not fulfil an exclusively critical function. On the contrary the 
Enlightenment may be described as "Ie pontificat de I 'Esprit". (59) In 
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the modern world the action of "1 'Esprit" transcends the boundaries 
separating the Christian churches and expresses itself in philosophy as 
well as in religion. (60) 
In Les Jesuites the new religious sp1r1t abroad in the world is 
described as an "Evangile renouvele".(61) In L'Ultramontanisme Quinet 
refers to "la vie de l'esprit creee par Ie christianisme lui-meme".(62) 
In reality his faith in "1 'Esprit" and his understanding of Christanity 
are one. For this reason he is eager to identify the transformation of 
religion which he is seeking with the essence of the Christian religion. 
Thus, in Le Christianisme et La Revolution Fran~aiBe, it is readily 
apparent that Jesus embodies the values which Quinet is defending: life, 
creativity, personality, movement. Christ is presented as the enemy 
of formal, organised religion. We are told that in the mind of Jesus the 
ideal of the Church was "Ie mouvement de la vie spirituelle". Action, 
the concrete realisation of Christianity is what is important; the spirit 
and not the letter: "il faut etre soi-meme G .. J une bible agissante, 
une prophetie visible". (63) Quinet proceeds ;:to describe the relationship 
between Jesus and his disciples in terms which suggest perhaps the manner 
in which he wis.hed his listeners to react to his own words: 
Dans l'esprit de l'Evangile, Ie maitre se donne a 
tous, pleinement, sans reserve, sans reticences. 
Chaque disciple devient, a son tour, un foyer qui 
repand la vie, la developpe autour de lui; et 
jamais Ie mouvement ne s'arrete dans la tradition.(64) 
Once Christianity is understood in these terms it becomes easy to brand 
the society of Jesus as a degeneration of Christianity and to cry: "C· . ;:} 
qu'y a-t-il de commun entre Jesus et Loyola?,,(65) 
Whereas at first Quinet limits his criticisms to the Jesuits a more 
general mood of hostility towards Catholicism soon becomes evident. The 
later lectures are dominated by the contrast between the Church on the 
one hand and the real Christian spirit on the other. Quinet argues that 
the conduct of the Church over the centuries rendered not only the 
Reformation but also the French Revolution inevitable. Upon too many 
occasions - he draws our attention in particular to the cases of Galileo 
and Joan of Arc - the Catholic Church acted in a manner which was pro-
foundly unchristian. Quinet recognises the spiritual strength of a 
figure from the past such as Gregory VII but this does not influence his 
conviction that Catholicism has remained static and closed to all new 
ideas since the Council of Trent. (66) By the seventeenth century it 
was already a spent force, divided against itself as the Jansenist 
controversy illustrated. At the same time genuine Christianity found 
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expression outside Catholicism, in the Reformation and in the philosophy 
of the Enlightenment. France and the Revolution are heirs to this 
tradition. 
What then is the meaning of Christianity for the men of the ]840's? 
Unlike the Saint-Simonians Quinet does not declare that Christianity 
belongs to the past. But, as he had made clear 1n the preface to 
FTomethee, the Christ of the nineteenth century 1S not the Christ of 
the Middle Ages. Religion is not static but progressive: "( ••• ] Dieu 
C ... J n'a pas ferme au moyen age les portes de son Eglise". (67) History 
continues to realise the Christian idea of God: "Ie Christ s'incarne 
de siecle en siecle dans l'histoire". The Middle Ages were "Ie culte 
de la mort", "Ie temps de la passion du genre humain sur Ie Golgotha 
de l'histoire".(68) Since the Renaissance and the Reformation men 
have come to realise that the kingdom of justice can be brought into 
being now, on this earth. That is the Christian meaning of the French 
Revolution: 
Le Christianisme reste C .. J enferme dans les tombeaux 
jusqu'a l'heure de la Revolution fran~aise, ou l'on 
peut dire qu' il ressuci te (. •• J L 'Eglise etai t 
devenue la pierre qui enfermait l'esprit dans Ie 
sepulcre. II fallait que cette pierre ftit otee un 
instant; l'ange de la France l'a soulevee; l'esprit 
s'est montre.(69) 
Quinet's message is that there is not only the Christ of the Passion 
of the Middle Ages; there is also the figure of Christ in his glory and 
maj es ty. (70) 
In the lectures delivered at the College de France the emphasis is 
placed upon action: if the principles of the Gospels have not yet been 
fully put into practice in society then this situation must be remedied 
by action in the present. Thus the realisation of Christianity becomes 
directly identified with political attempts to transform society. This 
is evident in the final lecture of Les Jesuites where it is made clear 
that the application of the spirit of the Christian religion "ne fait 
que commencer dans le monde civil et politique".(7]) Christianity be-
comes a reality by advancing the causes of equality, freedom, fraternity 
and solidarity, by defending the values represented by "famille, patrie, 
humanite", by aiding the poor and by raising the status of women. The 
message is unambiguous and represents a call to action and a rejection of 
all forms of resignation to the status quo: 
Les peuples ne se contentent plus d'entendre l'Evangile 
comme un murmure avant-coureur de la cite des morts; ils 
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veulent sciemment Ie realiser dans la vie sociale C .. J pourquoi ( •• J no us conseiller toujours 
d'attendre la realisation du christianisme dans 
Ie tombeau? (72) 
In order to understand France's role in the realisation of Chris-
tianity it is first necessary to examine Quinet's conception of nation-
hood. The French nation is a "personne morale", a collective personality .(7l 
Like an individual a nation is a manifestation of Spirit in the world. 
Its collective personality is as sacred as the personality of the indi-
vidual. "Tout progres du chris tianisme implique les progres nationaux", 
wrote Mickiewicz. (74) Quinet would have agreed. He believes that in 
the modern world spiritual power and moral authority do not lie in the 
Vatican but in "la conscience des peuples".(75) Each nation has a mission, 
each Christian people is "un ap8tre qui a sa mission particuliere". (76) 
Nationhood is a manifestation of life: "Mepriser les nationalites, ce 
n'est rien autre chose que mepriser la vie. en sa source la plus profonde".07) 
In the Examen de Za Vie de Jesus Quinet had refused to sacrifice the 
individual to Strauss' abstract god of humanity. In a similar manner 
the collective personality of the nation must not be suppressed. Quinet 
reveres humanity of which France is a part but he will not sacrifice the 
nation to an abstract cosmopolitan ideal. Patriotism need not of 
necessity produce an arrogant nationalism. He seeks "une unite d'esprit 
qui se concilie avec la spontaneite des peuples".(78) He does not wish 
national frontiers or languages to disappear. Each nation must realise 
its own mission and thus "agir pour tous en vivant de sa propre vie". (79) 
The same effort is required of the nation as of the individual: 
Une nation quelconque qui se retire de la melee, des 
dangers de l'existence. qui n'occupe pas dans Ie 
monde moral et social la place que Dieu a confiee a 
sa garde, qui ne fait pas sa tache entiere. une tel Ie 
nation peche, non seulement envers elle-meme, mais envers 
Ie genre humain, non seulement envers Ie passe, mais envers 
l'avenir; elle s'oblige d'avance a racheter ces moments 
d'inertie par des tresors futurs de courage et de vie. (80) 
The tragedy of Italy, for example, was that a genuine spirit of 
national unity never really existed. Instead of becoming masters of 
their own destiny the Italian people alienated their spiritual authority 
as a nation to the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. National unity, 
the prerequisite for the establishment of political freedom, remained 
to be created. 
"La France sent qu'elle est Ie monarque du monde", wrote Buchez.(8l) 
Michelet and Leroux go further and declare "la France est une religion". (82) 
Quinet for his part believes that upon the survival of France. this "terre 
consacree", depends the fate of other nations. Were France to give up 
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the struggle then he has no doubt that "l'esprit de mort s'abattrait 
sur l'Occident comme sur une proie assuree". (83) France alone can 
pronounce "[1a] parole sociale" which can restore life to those nations 
suffering as a result of the influence of Catholicism. (84) In this 
respect the lectures of the 1840's reaffirm sentiments which Quinet 
had expressed in his earlier work. In De l'Allemagne et de la 
Revolution (1832) he stated that France was nothing less than "1 'organe 
dominant de la civilisation". France had a "mission sociale" to fulfil 
and could be said to represent "l'instinct de la civilisation, Ie besoin 
d'initiative d'une maniere generale dans les progres de la societe 
moderne".(85) The French tradition from Louis XIV to the Revolution 
testified to the nation's position as the leader of the western world.(86) 
The French people, like Christ, embody those qualities which Quinet 
associates with "l'Esprit": sincerity, spontaneity, life, movement. 
The genius of France is "tout ensemble mouvement, force, elan, loyaute" 
and these qualities are manifested in French history and literature.(87) 
Quinet, however, has to come to terms with the fact that the disaster 
of Waterloo halted the progress of the Revolution and prevented the 
French people from fulfilling their mission. Since the Revolution is 
understood in Christian terms the defeat of 1815 naturally takes on a 
religious significance. It becomes "ce Golgotha des temps modernes".(88) 
Quinet believes that "C .. :) la France devait donner la Revolution au 
monde et payer son bienfait par un jour de mort". (89) Waterloo was an 
act of Providence the meaning of which the French people must try to 
understand: 
J' ai parcouru ce champ de colere [. •• ] Je n' ai 
rien vu sur Ie Golgotha de Mont-Saint-Jean, qu'un 
immense calice tout plein de larmes et du sang 
d'un grand peuple; buvons-y a loisir sans detourner 
les yeux, jusqu'a la lie[ •• J qui sait si cette mort, 
ou nous nouS agitons depuis trente ans, ne nous est 
pas donnee pour nous renouveler?(90) 
The desire to identify France with Christ is not, however, a new element 
appearing in Quinet's writings in the 1840's. As early as 1832 we 
encounter a direct assimilation of France to the figure of Christ: 
Qu'as-tu O-a Franc~ donc fait pour porter si haut 
a ton calvaire ta couronne d'epines, et pour boire 
si long-temps a ton verre ton fiel d'infamie? 
Depuis plus de trois jours tu es descendue dans ton 
sepulcre, toi l'hostie des nations.(91) 
Napoleon, too, has a religious function to fulfil. In an article of 1836 
Quinet develops an idea which is also to be found in Mickiewicz's work. 
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This is the analogy between Napoleon and Caesar: 
Cesar, l'homme du peuple, fut le precurseur guerrier 
de l'Evangile. Napoleon sera-t-il le precurseur 
d'un evangile nouveau? (92) 
France has the task of bringing about a new alliance of peoples 
and faiths. The wars of the Revolution and Empire were the first 
stage in this process since they led to "l'unite des ennemis", "l'alliance 
des Eglises", "l'accomplissement du christianisme".(93) During the 1830's 
Quinet had raised the possibility of European federation and had 
suggested that an intellectual and spiritual alliance between France and 
Germany might come about: 
Le pantheisme est partout le fonds de la philosophie 
allemande comme l'egalite est.partout au fond de la 
revolution fran~aise. Si ces deux principes 
viennent jamais a s'entendre, ils construiront entre 
eux le monde nouveau. (94) 
In 1840, despite the criticisms of Strauss and Hegelian philosophy, 
the hope persists that the Rhine may mark the alliance between France 
and Germany, between lila reformation religieuse et G.:) la reformation 
politique".(9S) By the time of L'Ultramontanisme~ however, this hope 
would seem to belong irrevocably to the past.(96) 
This theme of an alliance between the spirit of France and that of 
Germany reflects a desire to make France responsible for a wider recon-
ciliation between Northern and Southern Europe. Quinet, like Michelet, 
Gobineau and others, considers the French people to be a mixture of 
elements from North and South, ideally placed to be the "mediatrice entre 
Ie Nord et Ie Midi", between the Germanic and Latin peoples, between the 
Reformation and Catholicism. (97) 
A still more important task of reconciliation remains to be completed. 
This is the reconciliation between East and West which Quinet examines 
in Le Genie des religions in the chapter entitled La Renaissance orientale. 
Here he argues that in the nineteenth century the religions of East and 
West have ceased to exist in isolation and he hopes that from their 
fusion will result a new Reformation. (98) The initiative for the recon-
ciliation between East and West lies with Europe. Russia and Britain, 
by turning their attention to the Orient are acting "dans les voies de la 
civilisation,~.(99) France, too, has her role to play in this process 
as Napoleon's expedition to Egypt had illustrated. It is through the 
conquest of Algeria, however, that contemporary France can fulfil her 
"tache sacree" of reconciling Europe with the East. (l00) 
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Pierre Leroux considered that the Revolution, having overthrown 
Catholicism, contained the seeds of a new religion: "C. J la Revolution 
est un monde nouveau, une religion nouvelle L.J".(lOl) Quinet, for 
his part, speaks of the soldiers of the revolutionary armies as new 
crusaders, "soldats de l'Esprit" with not simply the defence of France 
but the salvation of the world upon their shoulders.(102) At first 
sight he would seem to have no doubts concerning this historical 
pedigree of the Revolution: 
(. .. J toute 1 'histoire moderne, d 'age en age, tend 
a la consonnna tion de 1a Revolution franc;aise ( •• :] 
La Revolution franc;aise [ ••• J ne tombe pas seulement 
des mains du dix-huitieme siecle; elle descend des 
hauteurs de tout Ie passe.(103) 
At the same time, however, despite this seeming confidence in the 
Revolution a definite note of unease is present in Le Christianisme et 
la Revolution Fran~aise. 
The cardinal principle of Le Genie des Religions was that every 
society is in the final analysis the expression of a religious idea. 
Each society requires a religion to give it meaning and life. Changes 
in society result directly from changes in religion and not vice versa. 
The relationship between Christianity and society is not, however, 
always envisaged in the same manner. At times the Revolution appears 
directly as the realisation of the spirit of the Gospels; a gulf of 
eighteen centuries separates the ideal from its realisation. Upon other 
occasions Quinet stresses the role of the early councils in defining 
the Christian idea of God which in turn determined the course of history: 
( ... J ce qui a ete decide pour Ie dogme se realise 
tot ou tard dans les faits c: .. ) Ie travail des 
quatre premiers siecles du christianisme est 
l'ideal, Ie plan sur lequel se developpent tous 
les siecles qui ont suivi.(104) 
Elsewhere the emphasis is placed upon the inner evolution within 
the spirit of Christianity which is not something fixed but a living, 
developing tradition. The Gospels are transformed, reinterpreted, but 
this process represents the life of Christianity which in turn renews 
human societies. On other occasions Quinet discerns a clear correspon-
dence between changes within the Church's organisation and changes within 
society. At all events he is convinced that since the Council of Trent 
the harmony between Church and society has remained broken. (105) 
The English and American revolutions could be said to arise directly 
from the Reformation but the French Revolution while going beyond its 
predecessors in its desire to realise Christianity in society found in 
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the French Church an enemy: 
Seule des nations modernes, la France a fait 
une revolution politique et sociale avant d'avoir 
consomme sa revolution religieuse. Suivez 
un moment cette idee; vous en verrez sortir, tout 
ensemble, ce qu'il y a d'original et de monstrueux, 
de gigantes3ue et d'inplacable dans cette 
histoire.(l6) 
The absence of a genuine religious revolution means that neither 
shall the course of the Revolution be smooth nor shall its gains be 
secure. It lacked the firm foundations of a Protestant, national 
Church which had formed the basis of the success of the English 
Revolution. All attempts to bring democracy into the Church resulted 
in failure. .The temperament which Catholicism had imposed on the French 
people over the centuries could not be eradicated in such a short period. 
Quinet admires the enthusiasm of those men of the Convention who thought 
it possible to create "un verbe, un dieu nouveau", but he considers that 
they too could not free themselves from the past: 
Le malheur est qu'au moment ou l'on pensait etre Ie 
plus revolutionnaire on retombait dans l'ombre de 
l'Eglise que l'on venait de repudier. Ces abstrac-
tions mises a la plac~ des saints, ces saisons, ces 
vertus, a la place des fetes ecclesiastiques, n'etait-
ce pas une imitation constante du catholicisme? Meme 
desir de fra7)er les sens, meme foi aux images, aux surfaces.(lO 
The achievements of the Convention in the defence of France are not 
to be denied. Quinet is certain, however, that the survival of the 
Catholic temperament, unchecked by a true religious revolution, led to 
violence and the rejection of all claims for the freedom of individual 
conscience: 
On lira demain au fond de l'ame; l'Etat fouillera 
dans les coeurs C:. J 1e Comite de Sa1ut Public 
demande C .. J l'abandon du sentiment intime, du 
secret entre 1'homme et Dieu, du cie1 interieur. 
Cette portion de l'individu qui echappe a tous 
les yeux est, depuis trois siec1es, affranchie 
du pape; 1a rendra-t-on a Robespierre? Non.(I08) 
In France any attempt to reconcile the individual with society is 
exceedinglY difficult: 
Entre 1es deux principes contradictoires que 1a 
Revolution fran~aise doit finir par conci1ier, 
l'association et Ie dr~it de l'individu, nous 
sonnnes naturellement dl.sposes a ajourner 1e second. [ ... J Chaque parti se promet interieurement une 
heure de despotisme, un ]8 brumaire, pour assurer 
l' independance des autres t .. J Notre premier 
mouvement est de fortifier l'Etat, l'association; 
nous ne pensons que par ref1exion a 1'individu, 
a 1a personne.(109) 
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Not everything, however, is to be rejected in the Catholic heritage. 
Quinet believes that it bequeathed to the Revolution an aspiration to 
unity and universality. 
If, however, we ask what the society of the future will be like we 
discover that Quinet gives no precise answer and expounds no detailed 
political doctrine. The word democracy is often on his lips and in his 
mind it is associated with popular sovereignty and the Republican form 
of government. Quinet's model democracy is that of the United States of 
America but he is well aware that American democracy rests upon Protestant 
foundations and cannot thus be applied directly in France. Above all, 
however, democracy as advocated by Quinet should be understood in terms 
of a continuation of the revolutionary tradition. 
It is, nevertheless, certain that democracy is the form of government 
best suited to allow the individual to express his will freely. Perhaps 
for this very reason no attempt is made to provide a detailed definition. 
Democracy can only be created by an inner struggle: 
Que1qu'un espere-t-il arriver a l'age d'or de 1a 
fraternite universe11e sans passer par 1e devouement, 
par 1e sacrifice, par 1e travail interieur, par 1a 
mort peut-etre?(IIO) 
Democracy, moreover, should not be interpreted as signalling the extension 
to all members of society of the material privileges enjoyed at present 
by the middle class. Quinet is at pains to argue that improvements in 
mankind's material wellbeing are of no value unless they are accompanied 
by a corresponding spiritual, moral development: 
L'avenement de 1a democratie ne peut et~qu'un 
nouveau progres de l'esprit, de 1a civilisation, 
de l'ordre universe1. Ou e11e sera tout ce1a, ou 
e1le ne sera jamais 
supposer. (111) 
rienj ce qu'i1 est impie de 
At the same time we must never forget that democracy should not be 
considered in isolation from "la patrie". The experience of belonging 
to a national community is of vital importance. Indeed a rather belli-
gerent nationalism is at times in evidence, notably over the Rhine 
question.(112) This serves to distinguish Quinet from the socialists as 
does the fact that economic considerations playa relatively minor role 
in his writings. He is well aware of the reality of class antagonism 
and conflict but in contrast to those who proclaimed international working 
class solidarity he believes that the members of the proletariat in 
France are first and foremost Frenchmen. (113) 
Quinet in no way denies the social dimension of man but he implies 
that association between individuals must be based upon a recognition of 
- 91 -
the sanctity of the personality. He forcefully defends the rights of 
the individual's religious conscience against those who seek to 
sacrifice the individual to the state: 
II y aura toujours un sanctuaire dans lequel 
l'Etat avec ses armees ne pourra penetrer; et 
ce sanctuaire ideal ( .•• ] c'est la conscience (114) 
religieuse de l'homme en commerce avec l'infi~i. 
This prompts him to reject the Saint-Simonian model of society since 
in his opinion it, too, neglects the individual. Such theories reflect 
the continuing influence of patterns of thoughrwhich have their origins 
in Catholicism. (115) On the other hand Quinet will not go so far as to 
call into question the very existence of the state and its institutions 
on the grounds that they place restrictions upon the individual. As 
L'Enseignement du PeupZe will make clear, he is convinced that, given 
the power of the Church in France, the state must remain as a necessary 
counterweight. 
It is useful to consider Quinet's thought in relation to the wider 
intellectual climate of the 1830's and 1840's which was marked by the 
break-up of orthodox Hegelianism. These years witnessed the publication 
of Kierkegaard's Either-Or~ the split into Young and Old Hegelians, 
Feuerbach's transformation of theology into anthropology and Marx's 
substitution of a theory of social practice for Hegel's concept of active 
spirit.(116) Hegel carreunder attack from two main directions. In the 
first place there were those thinkers, including Kierkegaard, who recog-
nised in the philosophy of Hegel a threat to the free individual. 
Secondly there were those who rejected the conservative conclusions of 
their master and favoured instead revolutionary change. Points of 
contact exist between Quinet and both these groupings. 
In the first instance Quinet has a place among those writers and 
thinkers who considered Hegel to be the enemy of the individual. 
J. Maritain puts the problem clearly when he writes that whilst Hegel 
glorified subjectivity, this was for him infinite subjectivity. This, 
in the words of Hegel, is not attained by the individual "in virtue of 
his particular idiosyncrasies but of his essential being t ... )". (117) 
Because the Hegelian self is a universal self, remarks Maritain, "it 
is essential to Spirit to deliver itself from the dictatorship of the 
singular". (I 18) Consequently Hegel was unable to recognise the true 
subjectivity of the individual as understood by Christianity. Quinet's 
own defence of the human personality involves, as we have seen, a 
repudiation of Hegelian christology and a general hostility towards the 
tendency prevalent in contemporary German history, criticism, philosophy 
and theology to undervalue the personality. (119) 
- 92 -
When discussing society and social relations Quinet is once again 
careful not to sacrifice the particular to the general. According to 
Hegel the individual only really existed as a member of the state since 
the state was the rationa'I expression of the divine will. Quinet, on 
the other hand, distinguishes between individual and nation and between 
nation and mankind in general. Each entity is considered as a whole in 
its own right and not simply as a part of a greater whole. National 
identities are not submerged but each nation struggles to express 
"humanity", in the sense of Herder's "Humanitat". 
But if Quinet's faith in the individual suggest parallels with 
Kierkegaard the manner in which he advocates action and a rejection of 
the limiting power of the past likens him to those who interpreted Hegel 
along revolutionary lines and denied the identity of the rational and the 
real.(120) Quinet, we remember, calls for the realisation ~f the promises 
of heaven here and now in this world. His own lectures became political 
acts which appealed to the French revolutionary tradition and represented 
a challenge to the society of Louis-Philippe. History, according to 
Quinet, is not a deterministic process and not the work of an impersonal 
historical necessity. (121) Each individual nation is responsible for 
its own fate. Hegel had confined himself to the study of the past, 
remarks Quinet; he, in contrast, urges the philosopher of history to 
turn his eyes to the future: 
La loi de l'humanite doit se composer du passe, 
du present et de l'avenir que nous par tons en 
nous C ... ) La vraie philosophie de 1 'histoire 
c'est Janus aux deux visages tournes l'un vers 
Ie passe, l'autre vers Ie futur.(122) 
Upon a number of important points Quinet's analysis of religion 
recalls that of Feuerbach. In the Essence of ReZigion the German philo-
sopher places the origin of religion in man's feeling of dependency with 
regard to nature. He argues that as the human will and intelligence 
developed man came to attribute these faculties to his God who ceased to 
be directly identified with nature. God is, therefore, a creation of 
the imagination with no objective reality. In the Essence of Christianity 
Feuerbach proposes his celebrated definition of religion as self-
projection: 
Consciousness of God is self-consciousness, knowledge 
of God is self-knowledge. By his God thou knowest 
the man and by the man his God; the two are identical.(123) 
In Le Genie des religions Quinet also makes the idea of God arise 
as a reflection of nature and points out how the evolution of the idea of 
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God corresponds to the development of consciousness, freedom and per-
sonality. What Quinet does not do, however, is to advocate an exclusive 
substitution of human reality for the divine. He does not conclude that 
the essence of religion lies in man's self-alienation. He is closest 
to Feuerbach in the study of pagan religions but he does not share the 
German thinker's harsh judgment of Christianity. Quinet considers that 
the inner division brought about by Christianity was necessary for the 
development of freedom and individuality. He repeatedly expresses his 
hostility to all forms of materialism. Nature and history remain "la 
revelation toujours croissante de l'Eternel" even if they are no longer 
expressly identified with the cosmic_process in which the Absolute attains 
self-knowledge. Quinet refuses to sacrifice the human to the divine. 
The aspiration to synthesis and unity remains. In the final analysis he 
remains closer to Herder than to Feuerbach. 
Quinet's God is not a personal, transcendent being whose relation-
ship to creation is based upon love. (124) "L 'Esprit" is a power which is 
present in the world and not set over and against the world. History is man-
kind's journey to God but God is already active in history. Man can 
never possess a full knowledge of God who defies all attempts made by 
man to define and limit Him. "C ... j nous croyons a un Dieu eterne11ement 
insaisissab1e de grandeur, de vie et d'esprit", writes Quinet.(125) 
Man's "convoitise de l'infini" produces the dynamic movement of history 
but God remains a Deus Ignotus who cannot be identified with the God of 
any particular religi~n.(126) These sentiments are well expressed by 
Prometheus: 
Soit que vous habitez, par de1a l'univers, 
Des mondes increes 1es ferti1es deserts, 
Soit que vous remplissez ma poi trine agitee, 
Dieux inconnus, soyez 1es dieux de Promethee.(127) 
In one sense Quinet's God could be described as the unknown, 
infinite possibilities of the future. Yet it is rather in terms of the 
continuous unfolding of a creative process that this God is best understood. 
As the preceeding analysis has shown, the lectures of the 1840's 
are characterised by an emphasis upon life, change, action and movement. 
Again and again Quinet returns to a series of opposites: vie/mort 
(silence, steri1ite), action/sommei1 (repos), movement/immobilite 
(inertie), realite (vrai)/apparence (faux), sincerite/pharisaisme, 
liberte/esclavage, invisible/visible, esprit/matiere (lettre, force), 
avenir/passe. The first conclusion to be drawn is that the past must not 
be allowed to become a burden or a dead weight. Man must throw off the 
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yoke of history. Even that which is most admirable in the past must not 
hinder the movement to the future. Two examples must suffice to illu-
strate this very important point. In the first place we find Quinet, 
despite his enthusiasm for the thinkers of the Enlightenment, urging his 
contemporaries to surpass their achievements: 
Ne rentrez pas dans ce siicle de vie pour vous i 
y emprisooner, mais, au contraire, pour y chercher 
une vie nouvelle! Le caractere des grands hommes 
qui Ie representent, est d'avoir ete des pre-
curseurs: ils veulent pour successeurs des 
intelligences libres, non des serfs.(128) 
Even the French Revolution itself is not something absolute which should 
simply be imitated: 
Toute grande qu'est la Revolution, je ne demande 
pas que vousen fassiez une idole C .. J Elle a 
tendu, d'un effort sublime, a embrasser Ie divin; 
elle s'en est approche en des instants supremes; 
mais elle n'est pas la Justice, l'Evangile 
eternel, 1a Religion absolue r .. J Hommes nouveaux, 
faisons-nous un monde nouveau. (129) 
We would be very mistaken, however, were we to interpret these remarks as 
a clear-cut rejection of the past. In reality Quinet wishes to envisage 
past, present and future as a continuity - but as a continuity in a 
perpetual process of creative self-transformation. For this reason 
history, nature and art are all understood in terms of transformation and 
creativity. Mankind, like nature, is an organic unity which transforms 
itself in history. Nature, in the process of creation, is an artist. 
Art is the perfection of nature. The same life is present in art, nature 
and history. This is apparent when Quinet discusses epic poetry in the 
preface to Napoleon: 
Plus qu'aucune autre forme de l'art, l'epopee 
concourt a 1a civilisation, parce qu'elle est 
el1e-meme la transformation continue du passe 
dans l'avenir, ou, pour mieux dire, Ie spectacle 
de la vie meme t a ~on principe et dans son d ~ 1 t \130J eve oppemen • 
"L'avenir est toujours scepdque a l'egard du passe puisqu'il s'en 
separe", remarks Quinet. (131) But at the same time within the process 
of t~ansformation "l'avenir" - which is almost a synonym for "l'Esprit" -
is already active in the present. In Quinet's terms to speak of "l'avenir" 
in isolation from the present does not really make sense for then the 
future becomes merely: 
r. .. ) une abstraction sans corps, sans forme, et 
qui n'existe nulle part. Sitot qu'il devient une 
realite, il se convertit en un present qui a lui-
meme un passe.(132} 
The future in this sense is not divorced from the present. A number of 
passages could be chosen to illustrate this point. This, for example, is 
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how Quinet takes leave of his audience at the close of L'Vlt~amontani8me: 
Vous cherchez, vous appelez un meilleur avenir! 
mais i1 est evident ( .• J que cet avenir est 
deja en vous ( •• J je pense que I 'esprit de 
l'avenir travaille notre pays dans les generations 
nouv711~s~ ~omme dans la source la plus pure de 
la V1e. t l.J3) 
As the future can be made to exist in the present which it transforms, 
so immortality according to Quinet begins in this life as opposed to being 
granted by God after death: 
Qu'est-ce que l'instinct de l'immortalite, sinon 
une vie morale, qui, accumulee dans Ie present, 
deborde dans I' aveni r? ( • • :) c' es t par un Han 
interieur que l'immortalite se revele.(134) 
In the words of the preface to Promethee "1'Eternel" is "passe, 
present et avenir, tout ensemble". (135) The great men of history are 
those who participate fully in the on-going movement of creation which 
is the life of Spirit. Thus the artist is above all a creator who trans-
forms the material presented by the past whilst at the same time prophesying 
the future. For this reason excessive imitation is condemned. True 
genius proceeds otherwise: "Il (Michel-Ange) fait, i1 accrott la 
tradition; il ne la re~oit pas".(136) Galileo approaches science in the 
same spirit as Raphael his art: "11 (Galilee) agit; it accroit I 'univers; 
il cree il ne disserte pas".(137) In philosophy the same criteria hold; 
Quinet refers to "l'esprit philosophique, qui est veritablement l'esprit 
de creation".(138) The highest possible value is placed upon creativity in 
science and in art: "Tout homme qui travaille prie, a-t-on dit; a plus 
forte raison, tout homme qui decouvre et qui cree".(139) 
Creation is accompanied by enthusiasm, or perhaps more accurately, 
"l'enthousiasme qui seul cree" should be understood in its original 
meaning as expressing the creative power of spirit acting through man.(140) 
The source and principle of "l'esprit", "l'ame", and "l'enthousiasme" is 
"l'idee meme de Dieu".(141) It would seem that man comes closest to 
knowing God in the moment of creative inspiration when the future, active 
in the present, transforms the past. 
To seek the presence of God in history is the task of both the epic 
poet and the philosopher of history. The epic poet spontaneously and 
intuitivelY differentiates between what is transient and what is eternal.(142) 
The qualities required of the philosopher of history do not seem to be 
markedlY different. In the pages of L'UZtramontanisme he readily becomes 
a prophet, a new priest: 
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Montrer Ie doigt de l'Eternel dans les affaires 
du temps, reconnaitre Ie divin mele aux choses 
humaines, a qui cela appartient-il, si ce 
nlest au pretre?(143) 
History itself can become a substitute for traditional forms of faith: 
Si elle etait complete, la philosophie de l'histoire 
universelle serait la manifestation de l'action 
divine dans toutes les choses humaines, elle 
s'identifierait par lA avec la religion 
universelle.(144) 
Does ,the presence of this "action divine" imply a corresponding 
restriction of human freedom? The reader might well be forgiven if he 
came to this conclusion. Quinet's lectures abound in references to 
Providence which seemingly intervenes in history by making individuals 
its instruments. This, for example, is how Quinet introduces us to 
. Galileo: "C ... ] la Providence va se servir d'un grand homme pour tendre 
a la papaute Ie piege Ie plus extraordinaire". In a similar vein 
Voltaire's actions are said to be those of a man "conduit par une force 
superieure".(145) Why was Protestantism not completely crushed in 
France? Quinet replies that the hand of Providence may be detected in its 
survival. The Revolution itself can be explained as the punishment meted 
out by Providence to the Church which was responsible for the persecution 
of the Christian spirit in science: 
II fallait qu'un grand chatiment vint tout a coup 
l'avertir Cl'Eglise) qu'elle se trompait de route. 
Ce chatiment sacre, la Providence Ie lui a envoye 
en dechainant contre elle la Revolution fran~aise.(146) 
France since the Revolution, remarks Quinet, has been "l'instrument de 
l'Esprit universel".(147) Napoleon/'l'homme du genre humain~ once again 
appears as "l'instrument presque passif d'un plan qui vient d'en haut".(148) 
"Derriere lui", writes Quinet in 1845, "on commence a voir la Providence".(I49) 
The defeat of Waterloo is not to be explained in human terms alone. It 
was not simply the work of the enemies of France: "C ... J i1 est bien 
evident, ce jour-la, que nous avons re~u Ie coup d'en haut".(150) 
We should not, however, be misled by Quinet's fondness for traditional 
religious language. Occasionally he points to the meaning behind the 
vocabulary and imagery: 
Esperez-vous que les cieux slouvrent pour montrer 
la royaute du fils de l'homme? Non, puisque vous 
I 'I I ' , -savez qu 1 s ne s ouvr1ront pas; vous avez re]ete 
cette esperance materielle. Ce ne sont pas les 
cieux visibl~qui se dilateront~ clest Ie ciel 
interieur, l'ame, l'esprit.(151j 
- 97 -
In a similar fashion Quinet is not really saying that a supernatural 
power intervenes in history. His Providence and his philosophy of 
history are one. It is for this reason that Quinet can claim that the 
Reformation was "dans les desseins de la Providence" and at the same 
time criticise the Church for not having recognised "la necessite divine 
de la Reformation, de la Revolution fran~aise". (152) 
Providence may be said to govern the world but we must remember 
that this is "1 'Esprit" acting firstly through individual conscience and 
secondly through nations. This power must be developed by man and be 
exercised in the right direction. When understood in these terms Quinet's 
Providence stands opposed to fate and destiny. In L'Ultramontanisme he 
describes a genuinely Christian philosophy of history in the following 
terms: 
[ .. J Ie Dieu n 'habi te plus seu1ement dans les 
hauteurs invisib1es; il n'agit plus par secousses 
et par surprises. II s'est incarne; i1 s'est 
fait homme; i1 vit dans Ie coeur des nations et 
des etats. Dans ce sens, l'histoire est un 
Evangi1e eterne1, tout remp1i du Dieu interieur; 
c'est lui qui parle et se remue dans 1e vaste sein 
des peuples; il agit du de dans au dehors, sans 
interruption; il habite au fond des choses, i1 
fa~onne l'esprit interieur des empires, et 1es 
evenements ne sont plus que 1a consequence qu'i1 
abandonne a l'homme; tout vivant, i1 communique 1a 
vie. C'est, dans 1es choses humaines, l'esprit de 
deve10ppement et de progres mis a 1a ~lace de 
l'immutabilite ou de l'arbitraire.(153) 
-0-0-0-
The relationship between religion and "1 'Espri t" in its different 
forms is central to a discussion of Quinet's religious ideas. He defends 
the power of mind and the reality of thought. All forms of materialism 
stand condemned. In L'Ultramontanisme reference is made to "Esprit pur" 
which naturally recalls Vigny.(154} In Les Jesuites our attention is 
drawn to "ce grand fonds de spiritualite qui est comme 1a substance de 
toute foi reelle". (155) Furthermore, as we have suggested, it is 
Quinet's belief in "1 'Espri t" which underlies his hopes for an "Evangile 
renouvele". He distrusts narrow Catholic orthodoxy and advocates a 
Christianity whose agent is revolutionary France, whose message is the 
dignity of the individual and whose traditions are those of the human 
spirit throughout history. Organised religion, as Quinet well knows, can 
become a way to retreat from" the struggle which is inevitable in the 
world of spirit. Quinet's faith is an aspiration to truth and justice 
which requires heroism and sincerity. All substitution of appearance 
for reality is denounced since it is a betrayal of the cause of spirit. 
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Change and movement are of the essence of this faith which is characterised 
by hope, by an aspiration to the future. "Les dieux possedent tout", 
declares l'Ocean; "Excepte l'inconnu", replies Prometheus. (156) 
Notwithstanding Quinet's opposition to orthodoxy we should be 
careful not to exaggerate his hostility to Catholicism in all its forms 
before the late 1840's. During the 1830's we find him on very friendly 
terms with writers, thinkers and poets such as Ballanche, Blanc Saint-
Bonnet and Laprade. At the close of the 1830's, while living at Lyons, 
he spent some time in a house in the country put at his disposal by 
Saint-Bonnet. Indeed the latter was at that time much in sympathy with 
. '·d (157) I 1841 Al a dre G ~ra d s t Q. t of h~s Qu~net s ~ eas. n ex n UL u en u~ne a copy L 
PhiZosophie aathoZique de Z'histoire. In reply Quinet remarked that the 
subject of this work was "l'unique question du siecle". He elaborates 
upon this point in terms which significantly envisage the contemporary 
religious crisis in terms of the transformation - not the radical replace-
ment - of the faith of the past: 
t .. 1 je suis d' autant plus impatient d' etudier 
votre ouvrage, que les solutions tentes nouvelle-
ment en Allemagne m'ont fort occupe et pas 
satisfait. Comment transformer le Catholicisme 
sans l'ebranler? Comme l'expliquer sans l'alterer? 
Voila la difficulte qui arrete notre epoque.(158) 
Quinet consistently calls for a transformation of Catholicism which is a 
form of Christianity no longer suited to the needs of the nineteenth 
century. He often uses the images of the entombment and resurrection, 
in order to reconcile his desire for change with his wish for a wider 
continuity within the context of the Christian tradition. In the epilogue 
to Ahasverus we have seen Quinet employ this image to describe how con-
temporary Christianity was moving towards pantheism. By 1838 Christ has 
become above all an individual, a person, but we note that the conclusion 
of the EXamen de Za vie de Jesus returns again to the same imagery in 
order to express the need for a transformation. During the .1840's Quinet's 
priority is the realisation of Christianity in society and here, yet 
again, he makes use of a similar language. In Les Jesuites he describes 
the "Evangile renouvele" as "ce Christ agrandi, renouvele, sorti comme une 
. d ' 1 ,,(159) seconde f01s u sepu cre • 
Christianity therefore continues to stand at the centre of Quinet's 
argument. It is the religion of spirit as opposed to the pagan religions 
of nature. Christianity marks man's realisation that God is present 
within individual conscience. Le Christianisme et La revoLution fran~aise, 
however, is the story of how difficult it is to make the Christian message 
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a reality. "C ... J l'homme commence it declarer que Dieu est descendu dans 
I 'homme" , remarks Quinet. (160) It has, however, taken eighteen centuries 
for this view to prevail. The Reformation freed individual conscience 
from subjection to priest, pope and council. The French Revolution -
in its apsirations at least - consecrated the dignity of the individual. 
In Quinet's thought the meaning of history and the meaning of Christianity 
are one. It is perhaps this close relationship between Christianity and 
the cause of individuality which prevented Quinet from following Michelet 
who in the 1840's was already elaborating his celebrated opposition between 
Christianity and the Revolution, grace and justice.(161) 
Quinet's understanding of religion at this period defies neat 
classification and easy definition. It is in the first place something 
intensely personal which is related to both "Ie coeur" and "la conscience". 
It could be argued that his concept of individuality is inherently 
religious since its ground is the relationship between conscience and 
infinity. Yet, at the same time, religion is also intimately associated 
with the life of a collectivity. Nations, as we have observed, become 
apostles; mankind is the new church. History and religion are one. 
Each nation has a role to fulfil in the realisation of a providential 
plan. The central element which underpins these beliefs is Quinet's 
faith in "1'Esprit". Sometimes "I 'Esprit" appears to be immanent in 
the mind of man. Upon other occasions, it would seem to possess some degree 
of transcendence. 
Religious ideas are the force which moves history but we must 
remember that Quinet does not just present the different religions as 
expressions of stages in the development of the human spirit. Religion 
cannot be satisfactorily understood as a phenomenon of consciousness 
alone. Neither can Quinet's God quite be identified with "la categorie 
de l'ideal", as understood by Renan.(I62) Le Genie des religions 
reveals Quinet's sympathy for a more speculative interpretation of the 
history of religions, according to which, nature reveals the idea of 
God to man who creates his gods 1n history. The ultimate purpose of the 
whole process i~ however, understood in terms of the return of creation 
to God. Above all Quinet is horrified by indifference to religion, to the 
idea of God. Such indifference amounts to a denial of what is most noble 
in human existence. The search for truth is also the search for God. A 
world without the idea of God would be a world without an ideal, without 
spiritual and moral progress, without real freedom. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Speaking in March 1848 upon his return to the College de France, 
Quinet welcomed a revolution "accomplie par la foi, par les faibles, par 
les pauvres, par les petits". (I) At that moment the Second Republic 
seemed to mark the regeneration of France, the beginning of a new 
era of justice, the triumph of spirit over matter. "Le pur evangile a 
vaincu", declares Quinet. (2) The fervour of the earlier lectures is 
undiminished: "La main de Dieu est visiblement etendue sur la France". (3) 
Confidence has been regai~ed in France's capacity to fulfil her mission: 
"La France ressuscitee apportera la vertu au mondel,,(4) The new 
Republic embodies the spirit of. true Christian brotherhood: 
Monmons au monde que les temps qu' il croyai t 
relegues par dela les siecles sont arrives, et 
que nous la possedons pour toujours la Republique 
des enfants du meme pere, la vraie cite de Dieu!(5) 
Quinet evidently succumbed as much as anyone to the heady optimism which 
followed the Revolution of February 1848. Having participated directly 
in the revolutionary events of those days he proceeded to engage actively 
in politics and was successfully returned to both the Constituent and 
Legislative assemblies. He sat as a left-wing member of Parliament but 
his influence was slight. As was the case with many similarly minded 
Republican sympathisers the enthusiasm of the early days of the Republic 
gave way to a more sombre mood. The course taken by events - the election 
of Louis Napoleon as President, the French intervention to crush the 
Roman Republic, the passing of the Falloux law - made Quinet recognise 
the strength of the conservative forces which he had previously under-
estimated. It should be noted, however, that in the June days he served 
as a colonel in the National Guard in defence of established order.(6) 
In the days following Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat Quinet fled 
France. Like many other exiles he first sought refuge in Belgium. In 
1858, however, he moved to Switzerland and settled at Veytaux.(7) His 
exile, which became voluntary upon his rejection of the general amnesty 
granted to political offenders in 1859, was to last until the collapse 
of the Second Empire. It should be remembered that throughout this 
period he received steadfast support from his second wife, Hermione 
Asaky, a Rumanian whom he married in 1852. 
Quinet saw himself as the embodiment of the spirit of France, the 
living symbol of the legality which had been overthrown by the coup 
d'etat of December 1851. In his eyes, no vote, no plebiscite could 
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legitimise the Second Empire. The overthrow of the Republic did not 
produce in him a revulsion against politics or a retreat into the past. 
His works of these years were weapons in the struggle against Bona-
partism and for this reason they could easily fall foul of the censor.(8) 
In reality, however, no one reading Marnix (1854), MerZin Z'enchanteur 
(1860) or Histoire de Za campagne de 1815 (1862) could be under any 
illusion concerning Quinet' s :political convic tions. Nevertheless,) as 
the years of exile passed he felt himself to be more and more alone. 
He was in poor health and grew depressed about the future as he saw the 
acceptance by Frenchmen of the regime which he reviled. He became 
bitter about the conduct of the opposition within France with regard to 
the exiles. Personal relationships suffered - even with Michelet.(9) 
France paid little heed to the advice and admonishments which came from 
Quinet's pen. His correspondence reveals how deep his pessimism became. (10) 
Hope did not return until 1869 and only after the proclamation of the 
Republic did Quinet and his wife cross the French frontier. They 
returned immediately to Paris and endured the siege by the Prussians. 
Quinet resumed his political activity firstly at Bordeaux and subsequently 
at Versailles where he died in 1875. 
-0-0-0-
In the majority of the publications which appeared between 1849 
and 1870 Quinet is once again concerned with the relationship between 
religion and revolution. He sets out to illustrate why in the long 
term, some revolutions succeed whereas others fail. This is the 
fundamental issue which is debated in L'Enseignement du peupZe (1850), 
Les EscZaves (1853), Marnix de Sainte AZdegonde (1854), La RevoZution 
reZigieuse au dix-neuvieme siecZe (1857) and La Revo~ution (1865). 
These works mark a continuation and a deepening of earlier meditations. 
At the same time, however, students of Quinet's work rightly stress the 
new mood which is apparent after 1848. Quinet, the defender of individual 
conscience now seems to advocate intolerance. Quinet the democrat appears 
to spurn the decisions of the majority. Quinet the patriot now expresses 
great doubts as to the political capacities of the French people at 
large. Can these views be reconciled with his earlier pronouncements? 
R. H. Powers pointedly remarks that after 1852 Quinet jettisoned his 
earlier liberalism which "failed to explain the tragic course of 
. " (11) . recent hlstory • In reallty we find both change and continuity in 
Quinet's thought. Some elements persist, others decline in importance, 
others receive a new interpretation. 
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The experiences of the years J848-1851 led many to reflect upon the 
nature of freedom and the relationship between the freedom of the 
individual and the power of the state. Works such as Vacherot's La 
Democratie (lB60), Jules Simon's La Liberte (1859) and Proudhon's De 
ta Justice dans la revolution et dans Z'egZise (1858) could serve as 
examples. Quinet, for his part, was forced by the events of the Second 
Republic to come to terms with the fact that the majority of the French 
people, having been accorded universal suffrage chose to cast their 
votes in a manner which he judged incorrect.(12} He did not, however, 
attribute the defeat of the ideals of February 1848 to socia-economic 
causes but to the fact that many Republicans believed that Catholicism 
was compatible with the Republic. By behaving in this manner they 
in fact gave support to the very principle Which aimed at the destruction 
of the Repub lic. 
We have seen how in the lectures delivered at the College de France, 
Quinet had contrasted Catholicism with the spirit of France. He had 
highlighted the danger which Catholicism represented in those countries 
which resisted the Reformation but nonetheless sought freedom and 
democracy in the nineteenth century. Such had been the situation 
prevailing in Spain which he had described in Mee Va~ances en Espagne 
(1846): 
Tout a ete,bouleverse, hors le principe de 
l'ancienne religion. L'intolerance du moyen 
age est restee au fond des garanties nouvelles. 
( ___ ) 11 me semble voir un grand peuple se 
precipiter dans l'avenir les fers aux pieds.(13) 
As a consequence of the events of the period 1848-51 Quinet's 
anti-clericalism becomes more intense than ever before. Liberal 
catholicism is a contradiction in terms. Freedom of thought and freedom 
of conscience line seront jamais que reveries et vanites aupres des 
peuples serfs du grand pretre romain".(14) Anti-clericalism was hardly 
a rare phenomenon among the exiles of the Second Empire but in Quinet's 
case it became the central issue. Nowhere are these points more 
eloquently made than in Les RevoZutions d'Itatie. Quinet's long cultural 
history of the Italian people grew out of his lectures at the College 
de France but its publication was spread over several years. The first 
volume was completed before February 1848 but the second did not follow 
until 1851. It bore the following dedication: "Aux Exiles Italiens. 
Cet ouvrage est dedie comme une expiation personnelle du meurtre de 
l'Italie par des mains fran~aisesCl.(15} The final volume appeared 1n 
)852 and its conclusion contains some of the most critical remarks Quinet 
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ever made in print about France and the Church. We are left in no 
doubt whatsoever as to the similarities between recent events in 
France and the tragic history of Italy. Both nations are trapped by 
their past, both are afraid to take sufficiently strong action against 
the Church, both suffer from class conflict which threatens the very 
life of the nation. Quinet considers that his direst predictions have 
been realised. France must be saved from the fate of Spain and Italy. 
For that reason it is imperative to solve the urgent problems of the 
moment rather than indulge in theoretical discussions concerning life in 
an ideal democracy. Those, like the Saint-Simonians, who await the 
coming of a "messie social" are in fact abandoning the present to the 
enemy. (16) 
How best to escape from the pernicious influence of Catholicism? 
That is the problem which faces France. In 1849, having surveyed the 
series of revolutionary explosions which had marked French history since 
1789, Quinet asks why each renewed aspiration to freedom should be 
followed by a return to servitude. He concludes that two warring 
principles exist within the French nation: 
Si la France n'obeissait qu'au principe catholique, 
elle se reglerait sur Ie modele de la politique 
sacree de Bossuet, et se reposerait immuablement dans 
l'abso1utisme. 5i e11e n'obeissait qu'a l'attraction 
des principes phi1osophiques qui 1a travail1ent, e11e 
suivrait en droite ligne la direction de la liberte 
moderne. ( ••• J La France es t emportee par un vif 
mouvement de liberte; mais une enorme puissance de 
servitude l'entraine en meme temps par sa masse; 
d'ou i1 resu1te que ses e1ans 1es plus fiers 
d'independance n'aboutissent souvent qu'a 1a faire 
graviter vers un violent servage.(17) 
Here in a nutshell is the problem to which Quinet will address 
himself throughout his exile: How can the periodic return to servitude 
be avoided? 
"Mais, sitot que vous serez libres, quelle nouvelle servitude 
vous forgerez-vous?,,(18) This question is addressed to the French people 
in L'Enseignement du peupZe. It might equally well be taken as a summary 
of the plot of Les EscZaves. The latter is a verse drama, which has as 
its subject matter the revolt of Spartacus against Rome. Quinet sets 
out to show why the rebellion failed. We learn that only Spartacus, 
inspired by his wife the priestess Cinthie, was capable of envisaging a 
world of equality from which all slavery had been banished. The other 
gladiators and slaves were motivated by a desire for plunder and 
revenge. They were divided amongst themselves and jealous of their leader 
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to the point of treachery. Their aspirations went no further than the 
desire to ape their former masters. The failure of the revolt stemmed 
from their inability to transcend the mentality of the slave even when 
victorious: "L'esclave a repare lui-meme l'esclavage".(19) 
Quinet's message is that a "revolution servile" cannot succeed. 
By this he means any revolution which takes place within a spiritual 
vacuum: "J'appelle revolution servile toute revolution qui se propose 
un but materiel, independamment de tout progres moral, de toute 
emancipation spirituelle ou religieuse~"(20) In such instances the 
apparent victors are responsible for their own ultimate defeat: "Toujours 
contre lui-meme, il o.'esclave) tourne son poignard".(21) Quinet, 
moreover, leaves us in no doubt as regards the similarity between the 
revolt of the gladiators and recent events in his homeland. 
In Fondation de la republique des provinces-unies. Marnix de 
Sainte Aldegonde (1854), we are presented with the contrasting example 
of a successful revolution. Marnix's revolt against Spain in order to 
secure national independence and to defend the cause of the Reformation 
triumphs for the very reasons that the rebellion of Spartacus had 
failed. Once again the belief in the necessity of religious revolution 
determines Quinet's argument: "La revolution hollandaise a reussi, 
parce qu'elle s'est donne pour base une revolution religieuse C •• ::l". (22) 
In this case the similarities with the problems faced by modern France 
are more obvious since Catholicism is the common enemy. Quinet makes 
no attempt to disguise his didactic purpose. The aim of the work, 
he writes, is to explain lice qu'il faut pour oter la liberte aux hommes 
ou pour la leur rendre". (23) 
It is in La Revolution (1865) that all these issues come to a head. 
Quinet's study of the French Revolution attempts to understand the past 
but at the same time seeks to come to the aid of the France of the 
Second Empire. However, we must not forget that a number of the main 
themes of the work - the centrality of the religious question, the 
Terror envisaged as a return to the Ancien Regime, the failure to 
respect the individual - were already present in Le Christianisme et la 
revolution fran~aise. We cannot, therefore, divide the development of 
Quinet's thought neatly into two halves: before and after 1848. 
Quinet now wonders whether the Revolution itself can legitimately 
be judged to have been successful.(24) His attitude is that of a 
friend of the Revolution who, having witnessed the course of French history 
during the nineteenth century, cannot avoid asking whether the reason 
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why lasting political freedom has not been established in France does 
not lie in the Revolution itself. He attempts to understand why a 
movement begun in support of the cause of freedom produced its opposite. 
He is convinced that the moment has come to look dispassionately and 
objectively at each revolutionary regime, to describe events in their 
correct sequence and to take note of the corresponding changes in 
national mood. The bad as well as the good qualities of the leading 
actors must be revealed. Difficult questions can no longer be evaded. 
What purpose, asks Quinet, was served by the imprisonment and execution 
of Louis XVI since these actions served only to arouse sympathy for the 
monarchy? Still more significantly he calls into question the necessity 
of the Terror. He seeks to describe the contradictions of the 
Revolution, the reality whichtay behind appearances, the forces which 
in fact determined the course of history. The historian's duty is to 
seek the truth and not to be the handmaiden of a particular political 
faction. (25) 
Returning to the theme of Les Esolaves Quinet argues that the 
French people did not embark upon the revolutionary adventure simply 
in order to improve their material well-being or to secure civil 
equality. Progress of this kind, we are told, is irresistible, inevitable 
and has no need of revolutions. It is to be taken for granted that the 
trend towards a better standard of living will continue in the future: 
II est certain que, dans un siecle, les hommes 
seront mieux nourris, mieux couverts, mieux 
vetus, plus facilement transportes. lIs 
possederont, a n'en pas douter, ce qu'ils 
appellent une meilleure vie animale. A moins 
d'un cataclysme, rien n'empechera ce progreso 
Mais cette chose divine, la dignite, compagne de 
la liberte, il faut qu'ils la meritent pour 
la posseder.(26) 
Quinet refuses to accept that human behaviour can be satisfactorily 
explained in terms of political economy. Man is far too complex a 
creature. "Le cote materiel" is not the swrmum bonum of life and we 
shall never adequately understand the Revolution if we approach it 
exclusively from this standpoint.(27) The real meaning of the 
Revolution is spiritual not material. It marked an aspiration to 
genuine political and religious freedom. Freedom intervenes in history 
as a moral value of a different order, quite distinct from the material. 
That which Quinet refers to as "la Revolution materielle et sodale" 
would have taken place in the normal course of events. (28) 
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The message of the Revolution continues to be identified with the 
cause of freedom: "la liberte naquit dans la nudite du Jeu de Paume 
comme l'Enfant-Dieu sur la paille de l'etable".(29) This was the 
moment when the French people were fired by "une sorte de religion de 
la justice".(30) The true spirit of the Revolution - which Quinet 
largely identifies wi th the wishes expressed in the "cahiers" of the 
Third Estate - is the enemy of all forms of absolute authority. The 
Revolution sought to replace a regime which was morally, politically and 
religiously bankrupt and which had ceased to believe in itself. Its 
aim was not to overthrow legality but to establish, to create the rule 
of law. 
We would be wrong, therefore, to conclude that Quinet's enthusiasm 
for the Revolution had evaporated during the years of exile. He con-
tinues to believe that the aim of the Revolution was nothing less than 
the regeneration of mankind. He speaks of "la grande experience qu'allait 
tenter pour l'espece humaine Ie peuple fran~ais".(31) The capture of the 
Bastille was "la delivrance de l'esprit humain". (32) Quinet retains his 
admiration for the revolutionary armies and his respect for the achieve-
ments of the Convention. The Revolution was also the real birth of 
French national consciousness. No other people experienced to the same 
degree: 
( ••• ] Ie desir C. ••• l de s'unir etroitement; de se 
penetrer, d'une frontiere 8 l'autre, de n'avoir 
partout qu'un coeur et une arne; et ce fut 18 une 
des inspirations sacrees de la Revolution. (33) 
Once all this is said, however, we discover that Quinet's enthusiasm 
is strongly tempered by a sober analysis of why the ideals of 1789 
failed'really to take root in France. The Revolution failed in its 
religious dimension. It sought to bring about a regeneration of man, 
a transformation of his spiritual essence, of what Quinet calls "l'homme 
interieur". The extent, of what might have been possible is suggested 
by the following lines: 
Deplacer les choses n'est pas ce qu'il y a de 
plus difficile: mais deplacer les sentiments} 
en acquerir de nouveaux, s'enrichir dans les 
choses invisibles, lA est Ie probleme. Un sen-
timent non encore eprouve, une maniere nouvelle 
de considerer la vie, c'est pour cela qu'il a 
fallu franchir des torrents de sang.(34) 
Logic required that the Revolution should consciously separate itself 
from Catholicism or create a new religion. It did neither. 
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La Revolution relates the failure of the leaders of the Revolution 
to appreciate the gravity of the danger represented by the continuing 
presence of Catholicism in France. It was only to be expected that the 
Revolution as the spiritual heir of the Reformation should carry further 
the liberation of the individual from external authority. Surely this 
indicated that firm action had to be taken against the institution which 
was the spiritual foundation of the Ancien Regime? But from the 
Constituent Assembly onwards there was in Quinet's opinion a clear 
reluctance to act in such a manner. There was much muddled thinking 
on this issue. Measures such as the Civil Consitution of the Clergy 
were insufficient to produce any radical change: 
Quoi de plus i110gique que de se dire pretre 
d'une Eglise qui vous renie? C'etait 1a 
situation de tout 1e clerge constitutionnel. 
11 se pretendait catholique, et Ie chef legitime 
du catholicisme lui jetait l'anatheme dans chaque 
bref. Sur cette pente glissante, l'Eg1ise qui 
n'etait nouvelle que de nom devait s'abimer au 
premier souffle de l'ancienne.(3S) 
The more extreme of the revolutionaries lacked SOy real grasp of 
the religious issues which underlay events: "L'idee des Jacobins sur Ie 
point fondamental des choses humaines, la religion, est Ie vide".(36) 
Then - as in 1848 - an attempt was made to reconcile the ideal of 
freedom with an institution, the Church, which was synonymous with 
despotism. This was an illogical enterprise of the highest order. In 
reality, the men of the Revolution stand accused of a lack of daring ~n 
religious matters. Robespierre, for example, was blind to the real 
dangers facing France: 
Re1isez les discours de Robespierre; vous verrez 
qu'il n'a d'autres vues que ce1les du c1erge sur 
1a necessite des vieux aute1s t ... ] Ce monstre 
d'audace ne peut se detacher du moyen age. ( ••• ] 
Ce n'est pas lui qui eut ose toucher aux augures.(37) 
The attempts at innovation in religious matters made during the 
Revolution were unsuccessful since they were at heart but pale imitations 
of the past: 
Adorer la Raison eternel1e, quoi de plus beau en soi? 
Mais par une chute incroyab1e, des que Chaumette, 
Hebert voulurent realiser cette idee, ils la detruisirent. 
lIs imaginerent de 1a figurer par une personne vivante, 
une belle femme, qui devait jouer pendant une heure 
sur une estrade, 1e role de 1a Sagesse [ •• J Une pierre 
brute, un bois vermou1u aurait eu sur 1es imaginations 
cent fois plus de prise qu'une actrice qui se depouil1ait 
une heure apres, de sa divinite.(38) , 
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Confusion was the keynote of the revolutionaries' attitude to 
religion. They wanted change but were not prepared to accept the 
consequences of change. They even took it upon themselves to defend 
the Church against those new "iconoclasts" who were attacking eccle-
siastical property. The men of the Terror failed to realise that the 
necessary precondition for the establishment of freedom was the suppression 
of Catholicism at least in the short term. They confused illusion 
and reality, means and ends, truth and falsehood. 
Why did this confusion arise? Quinet stresses the particular 
difficulties which affected France. Among other nations freedom had 
as its base "Ie trepied de la reiorme, de la renaissance et de la 
philosophie".(39) This, to be sure, is a restatement of what Quinet 
had written in the 1840's. His conclusions, howeve~ are now somewhat 
different. Whereas in L'UZtramontanisme he had been thankful for the 
survival of Protestantism in France on the grounds that it contributed 
to the universality of the aspirations of the Revolution, in La Revotution~ 
on the other hand, he laments the fact that France did not possess a 
really strong Protestant element in 1789.(40) This rendered the re-
generation of the French nation much more hazardous. A further compli-
cation was added since the Revolution was driven to base itself not 
upon religion but upon the philosophy of the eighteenth century, and in 
particular upon Rousseau's Profession de foi. Quinet praises this famous 
work but he holds no 'brief for its conclusion where the Savoyard vicar 
tells us that despite his advanced religious ideas he will remain within 
the Church, and continue to say Mass. In Quinet's opinion this insin-
cerity and timidity spelt disaster for the cause of the revolution. This 
was a major source of the revolutionaries' greatest illusion - the hope 
that changes could be wrought within religion without overtly challenging 
the power of the dominant religion. 
The explanation of the failure of the Revolution, however, lies 
within French history itself. We must remember that the Revolution 
was a noble attempt to "achever l'honnne d'un seul coup, en un moment".(4J) 
The spirit of 1789 ·was nothing less than an attempt to create "un 
ideal nouveau de la nature humaine".(42) Yet the movement which set out 
to free the individual, to create justice, to restore life to the declining 
provinces was to witness a return to centralisation, absolutism 
and "Ie mepris de l'individu, triste legs de l'ancienne oppression". (43) 
In the absence of a real religious revolution the habits of the past 
reasserted themselves with a new vigour, culminating in Napoleon's coup 
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d'etat, the Empire and the signing. of the Concordat. The latter marked 
the death of the Revolution: 
Dans la politique, la Revolution revenait a 
Cesar; dans la religion, elle revenait au 
pape. La France n'avait pu, parmi Ie chaos 
qu'elle venait de traverser, degager sa 
personne morale au milieu des traditions 
antiques dont elle etait investie. N'ayant 
pu trouver en elle-meme, dans sa conscience, 
son centre de gravite morale, elle restait 
en partie, Ie satellite de Rome. C'est la 
ce qui se lit a chaque ligne de cette 
convention. (44) 
In the years before 1848 both the Revolution and the Napoleonic 
Empire could, with some reservations, be situated within the greater 
continuity of the history of religion. The Revolution was presented in 
Christian terms, Napoleon was described as the possible precursor of a 
new religion and even Gregory VII could appear in the unlikely guise of 
an ancestor of the French Revolution. If we focus our attention upon the 
1860's, however, we soon discover that events are viewed in a significantly 
different light. Quinet's admiration for Napoleon has evaporated, his 
critical reinterpretation of the Revolution has been fully developed and 
his anticlericalism has increased in virulence. During the 1830's and 
1840's the past had largely been conceived in terms of resistance to 
change. After 1851, however, we find that the power of the past to halt 
progress and frustrate the desire for freedom has grown considerably. 
Quinet now insists that prior to 1789 the history of France contained 
nothing but absolutism and despotic rule. Those individuals or groups 
who had sought to advance the cause of freedom had been crushed. France 
in 1789 was "une nation obligee de renier son histoire". (45) The theme 
of the past weighing down on the present and frustrating hope for change 
occurs often in the pages of La Revolution. In 1789 the supporters of 
the Revolution found themselves "sous Ie fardeau du passe de la France".(46) 
The heroic, the epic stature of the Revolution sprang from the enormity 
of the task which had to be faced. At the same time, however, if we 
follow Quinet as he looks at the events of the years in question we find 
that what we might call the mentality of the Ancien R'egime reappeared 
among men who at first sight seem ardent revolutionaries. Here are three 
examples of this phenomenon: Robespierre is described as pursuing "un 
ideal de terreur monarchique, aristocratique", Marat is termed the product 
of "mille ans d'esclavage", the Terror itself becomes "Ie legs fatal de 
. d F " (47) l'histo~re e rance. 
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Quinet is not simply saying that in order to understand the 
Revolution we must remember what life was like under the Ancien R~gime. 
His argument goes much deeper. It is that what was in essence the 
master/slave power relationship of the Ancien R'egime proved to be so 
deeply embedded in men's characters that it soon returned to determine 
their actions and their half-conscious desires: 
Le passe est un aimant cache qui attire perpetuelle-
ment Ie genie d'un peuple et influe sur chacun de 
ses mouvements. Voila pourquoi il ne marche pas 
en ligne droite. C'est une vaste science que celIe 
de ses mouvements composes.(48) 
The strength of Quinet's argument lies in the multifarious ways in 
which he shows how the past acts on the present. As the slaves and 
gladiators remained mental prisoners of their masters despite their 
physical liberation, so the French people, leaders and the led, were 
to stay the captives of habits of mind produced by the preceding 
centuries of servitude: 
Voila Ie fond de l'homme dans toute la 
Revolution. II veut la liberte, du moins il 
croit la vouloir. Mais l'idee qu'il s'en fait 
a ete formee sous Ie despotisme de l'ancien 
reg1me. Elle est pleine encore du genie 
intraitable du passe. Chacun devenu roi dit 
royalement: "Tel est mon bon plaisir". Malheur 
, 1· ... a qui pense et sent autrement. Ce u1-la .est 
un ennemi gulil faut extirper comme. 
rebelle. (4} 
The Dix-huit Brumaire provides a further excellent illustration of 
the power of the past to act upon the present. Once Napoleon seized 
power he reimposed the ~entralised state, did away with freedom and 
required absolute obedience to his authority. By so doing he re-
established order as traditionally understood in France: 
C ... 1 ce que nous appelons l'ordre, c'est-a-dire 
l'obeissance sous un maitre et la paix dans 
l'arbitraire, est enracine, chez nous dans Ie 
roc et renait presque infailliblement de soi-
meme et de la tradition immemoriale. L'ordre 
ainsi compris est protege par les sieeles; son 
antiqqite travaille pour lui et fait sa surete.(SO) 
Depressing as this picture may be Quinet goes further and remarks 
upon the absence of freedom throughout French history. In this context 
reference is made to a "racial" characteristic of great force: 
Cette impuissance de Danton,-de Camille Desmoulins, 
de Couthon, a se faire une idee quelconque d'un 
changement dans l'ordre religieux, ne tient pas ~ 
leurs personnes, elle semble appartenir a la race 
latine. Jamais les Romains ne purent sortir de leurs 
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anciennes formesreligieus es; ils n' en con~urent 
pas meme l'idee. La meme sterilite, plus 1amentable, 
s'est retrouvee chez nous.(51) 
Even this is not the complete picture, for Quinet believes that the 
origin of much that is tragic in French history can be traced to the 
defeat of the Celts by the Romans. 
This point had in fact been made in Le Christianisme et la revolution 
fran~ise but not until the exile years does its real importance become 
clear. The defeat of the Gauls helps in the first place to explain why 
the Reformation did not take root in France. Secondly it casts new light 
upon the meaning of the Revolution. 
Dans l'impossibilite de s'affranchir de Rome, 
je sens une nation rivee encore apres seize siecles 
au dur anneau de Jules Cesar; elle a pris gout a sa 
chaine. L'obeissance, qui n'etait d'abord que 
materielle, est desormais volontaire; c'est 
maintenant le fond de 1 'homme qui est vaincu C .. :] 
La race indigene a ete conquise deux fois, d'abord 
par les Romains, puis par les Francs. On a repete 
que la Revolution fran~aise, c'est le Gaulois 
emancipe des Francs. Tout le monde peut voir que la 
conquete romaine dure encore; la crainte de Rome est 
restee la religion du Gaulois.(52) 
There is, however, another factor which needs to be taken into con-
sideration. In March 1848 Quinet had spo~en lyrically of "Ie genie divin 
des masses". He had referred to "la voix de Dieu, roulant dans la bouche 
de tout un peuple, durant la nuit et la journee du 24 fevrier'~.(53) 
This enthusiasm was not destined to endure. Quinet in exile seems to 
have abandoned all hope in the people at large: "Je n'attends rien ou 
presque rien de l'elan des masses", he writes to Th~ophile Dufour in 
1853.(54) The failings of the French people are revealed in the character 
of Jacques Bonhomme in Merlin l'Enchanteur.(55) Jacques is naive, 
unreliable, easily impressed by military glory. He almost causes his 
master Merlin's demise. Yet his heart is undoubtedly in the right place 
and his faults are really a consequence of his gullibility. Perhaps the 
desire for freedom, responsibility and dignity was not as great in all 
men as Quinet had once thought? "Faisons autrement", the injunction of 
Spartacus, is likely to fall upon deaf ears.(56) It is apparent that 
Quinet now suspects that the majority of men will without any reluctance 
renounce the spiritual struggle and avoid the risks inherent in the 
exercise of freedom if, in its stead, they are offered material improvements 
and a return to their former habits and prejudices. We would be wrong to 
conclude that such men will lament the absence of freedom. If France is 
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to be saved then it will be due to the efforts of individuals and not the 
masses. This attitude emerges with great force in La Revolution. Hope 
rests with a few far sighted individuals who remain true to their 
principles. It is the individual who in the end communicates his energies 
to the mas~s. Ordinary mortals have a great need for hero figures. 
"Rendez-moi les grands honnnes sans lesquels nous perissonsl", cries 
Quinet in the preface to Les Esclaves.(57) 
In Le Christianisme et la revolution fran~aise Quinet had warned his 
audience that as France's influence waned so those systems of government 
which gathered spiritual and temporal power together in the hands of 
one man were growing in strength. By this he was referring to Russia' 
and the Papacy. If this was to be the future then the road to decadence 
lay open. Yet Quinet still held out hope in France's mission and he 
argued that facile comparisons between the present and the decline of 
the ancient world should be resisted since such comparisions neglected 
the all-important fact that modern man was conscious of his condition 
and hence capable of changing it. By the 1850's and 1860's, however, 
the possibility of the decline and decadence of the West to which Quinet 
had alluded in L'Ultramontanisme has become a reality. The present is 
denounced as a time of corruption, hypocrisy and unthinking materialism 
when men habitually reduce all matters to "une question d'argent".(58) 
Only the United States resists the spirit of this new Byzantine age. 
The West has entered upon a period of decline. France has failed to 
keep alive the ideal which she represents: 
Si la France ne se relevait pas, l'Europe 
marcherait a une servitude industrielle, 
commerciale, temperee de loin en loin par 
. le progres des machines a vapeur C .. :) 11 
ne s'agit plus de la decadence de la France 
ou de telle autre nation; c'est l'esprit 
humain lui-meme, qui est en danger de 
faiblir en Europe, et de s'y eteindre.(59) 
These lines are important since they do more than restate Quinet's 
sceptical attitude towards material progress. They reaffirm the belief 
that France, in an ideal sense at least, is the incarnation of freedom 
without which progress is impossible. But how can the ideal France be-
come a reality? How can freedom and a respect for the individual be 
introduced in a country whose inhabitants are the products of a tradition 
which finds such notions quite foreign? What chance of survival has 
liberty in these circumstances? These are the problems to which Quinet 
must address himself. 
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"Le peuple n'avait pas ete prepare a faire un bon usage des libertes 
qu'il venait de conquerir".(60) This was how Michelet commented upon 
the events of 1848. He concluded that education must be brought to 
the masses. Quinet's attitude was similar and in L'Enseignement du 
peuple (1850) he put forward his own ideas on the subject of educational 
reform. (61) He champions the elementary school teacher as the incarnation 
of the lay spirit, "Ie precepteur du souverain (peuple)", "Ie representant 
populaire de la science moderne".(62) At the heart of Quinet's argument 
lies his conviction that Church and State must be separated. The time 
has come for all forms of organized religion to be kept out of the 
schools. Religious instruction may continue outside school but within, 
school children must become conscious of their common identity as 
Frenchmen. "L' insti tuteur doi t dire: vous etes tous enfants d' un meme 
Dieu et d'une meme patrie". (63) These measures are clearly aimed at 
breaking the power of the Church over the minds of French youth. 
The changes which affected the French educational system at this 
time were however hardly those advocated by Quinet. Is education in any 
case a complete answer? During his exile Quinet came to doubt whether 
educational reform could bring about real change. He remains true to 
the concrete proposals made in L'Enseignement du peupZe but he wonders 
whether more radical measures need to be taken. Is not a nation's real 
education provided by its religion? In La Revolution reZigieuse au 
dix-neuvieme sieaZe and in his Lettre a Sue he returns to the central 
problem of how best to deal with the threat posed by Catholicism. The 
Church may no longer be a living force but Quinet has no illusions 
concerning the danger which it still represents. 
He 'contends that there exist three ways to end the power of a 
religion. In the first place it may be stamped out by force. Secondly 
it may be replaced by a new form of the same religion. Thirdly religion 
itself may give way to philosophy. The first solution is described as the 
only effective answer: Christianity's victory over paganism was only 
complete once pagan rites had been proscribed and temples demolished. 
Does this imply that Quinet is urging the use of force against the 
Church in the present? This is an important question to which we shall 
return. For the present it should be pointed out that whereas the 
analogy employed by Quinet suggests intolerance, he in fact makes the 
point that such violent methods are contrary to the spirit of the 
nineteenth century. With regard to the third possibility - the replacement 
of religion by philosophy - Quinet has no illusions. In the first place 
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he declares it to be a common failing of philosophers to believe that 
the power of a religion simply withers away. Secondly he has no doubt 
that the masses, dissatisfied with philosophy alone, will readily fall 
back into their habits of superstition. Only the second solution, the 
replacement of one form of a religion by another form of the same 
religion, offers any serious grounds for hope. In this context Quinet 
puts forward the Unitarianism of Channing as a possible answer to the 
needs of his contemporaries. 
But although education may help and Protestantism may represent a 
step in the right direction, will either be adequate to halt the 
symptons of decline which Quinet discovers all about him? This seems 
unlikely if we bear in mind the seriousness of the situation described 
in the Lettre a Sue: 
Une generation s'avance tete basse, sans 
qu'aucune pensee se luit sur son front. Un 
vide etonnant, inconcevable, inconnu se fait 
dans l'esprit humain. Les idees les plus 
simples deviennent une fatigue. Le niveau 
de l'intelligence baisse a vue d'oeilj l'ame 
se retire, la voila qui cede de toutes parts 
a la matiere. (64) 
To arrest this decline Quinet calls for a courageous act of national 
self-criticism. Only when Fr'enchmen have attained an accurate under-
standing of their nation's past will a degree of confidence return. 
What is required is an honest presentation of the facts, however 
unpalatable. For this reason the crucial role will be that played by 
the historian who alone can reveal the truth concerning the national 
past. 
This attitude explains the stance which Quinet adopts in La 
Revolution and in his Histoire de la campagne de 1815.(65) The myth 
of the Terror is as dangerous as the myth of Napoleon to the future 
of France. Although neither of these works could be described as 
politically neutral, Quinet would have argued that each of them constituted 
a sincere attempt to replace falsehood by truth, myth and illusion by 
reality. A great act of national self-knowledge was required as a 
necessary precondition for the regeneration of France and a return to 
freedom. 
The implications of these ideas are examined at greater length in 
an article entitled "Philosophie de l'histoire de France" (1855). This 
contains a critique of the spirit in which history had been written in 
France since the Restoration. G. Weill described the article as "cette 
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declaration de guerre a l'histoire officielle". (66) In the Pagnerre 
text of the article Guizot, Augustin Thierry and Louis Blanc are 
mentioned by name. The most substantial criticisms are however 
directed at two works: the immense Histoire parZementaire de Za 
revoZution fran~ise (]834-]838) by Buchez and Roux and Theophile 
Lavallee's popular Histoire des Fran~is (]838-1840). Quinet is not 
really so much concerned with individuals as with the assumptions which 
governed the produc don of their work. The >only exceptions to which 
he refers are Henri Martin and Michelet. (67) 
In the pages of this article Quinet condemns the willingness of 
historians to justify might not right and excuse the evils of the past 
as supposedly "necessary" steps along the road to freer institutions. 
Analyses of this sort can readily serve to caution the usurpation of 
power in the present. (68) Too often historians succumb to the same 
temptation as the Republicans of 1848 - they endeavour to rehabilitate 
the enemies of their own cause. If freedom has been defeated then it is 
the historian's duty to explain the reasons while expressing sincere 
regret. Quinet refers us to the Albigensians and the rise of the 
Communes under Etienne Marcel. The ultimate failure of these movements 
cannot be explained away by calling them "premature" attempts to seize 
freedom. To do so is to endanger the future. The complacent acquiescence 
shown by historians towards the conquest of Gaul provides a further 
illustration of this dangerous practice: 
Une race d'hommes s'evanouit, elle perd la con-
science de son existence; nous lIen felicitons, 
parce que son sol se couvre de routes militaires, 
de grands edifices, et meme de chaires de 
rhetorique. Un monde entier disparait, celui 
de nos ancetres, qui pourtant nous manquera a 
chaque moment de notre histoire; nous applaudis-
sons a cette chute parce qu'elle nous precipite 
aussitot, et d~s les langes, dans les liens d'une 
antiquite deja degeneree. ( ••• J Ce que nous 
nommons civilisation, nous l'achetons par la perte 
de la liberte; nous rentrons dans l'humanite en 
rejetant nos aieux. (69) 
These lines throw an interesting light upon the r~lationship between 
history in the sense of the past and history undersood as writ-
ing about the past. We have previously quoted statements from La 
RevoZution to the effect that the defeat of the Gauls by the Romans 
was deeply to be regretted. In the passage here under discussion, however, 
Quinet makes the point that historians are responsible for concealing 
the true nature of the facts. Yet this should not simply be taken to 
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mean that historians are guilty, consciously or unconsciously, of· 
distorting the reality of history since the latter, once "correctly" 
interpreted a La Quinet, reveals that the errors of the French 
historian - worship of success, lack of pity, indifference to 
freedom - correspond to the failings of the French people in general. 
Freedom consequently is under threat in the interpretation of French 
history in exactly the same manner as in the events themselves. The 
writing of history is an act which participates in the movement of 
history and may indeed influence the course of events. For this reason 
the exercise of the spirit of free enquiry on the part of the historian 
is not a neutral activity. It is itself a significant example of the 
presence of freedom within history. 
One of the assumptions underlying PhiZosophie de Z'histoire de 
France is the belief that the fatalistic interpretation of history was 
itself the result of definable historical and ideological conditions. 
The theories under athack were produced "sous la royaute consitutionnelle 
ou pendant les courtes annees de la republique" and were elaborated, 
so we are told, by men who considered that the form of parliamentary 
government then being practised was the culmination of the political 
evolution of France. For this reason those who adhered to such views 
had no qualms about interpreting the French past as a preparation for 
the present even if, as a consequence, they were paradoxically led to 
conclude that the absolute rulers of the past were the forerunners of 
the institutions of the present based upon a degree of freedom. (70) 
Quinet's implied comment is that in the light of the situation pre-
vailing after the Deux Decembre:these theories have lost their only 
justification. The historian is in duty bound to rethink his position. 
Quinet is now much less inclined to describe history in relation 
to God and divine Providence. Events are seen as examples of human 
error rather than as divine punishments. In La RevoLution reLigieuse 
he takes the Saint-Simonians to task on account of their "abus de la 
, . ,,(71) langue theolog1 que • Could not a similar criticism be made of 
his own earlier work? There is a process at work here which we might 
perhaps describe as the secularisation of Quinet~s conception of history. 
Quinet who, in the 1820's, had admired Bossuet's historical vision 
now shoWS that he is quite conscious of the dangers inherent in the 
adoption of a religious model: 
De Saint Augustin a Gregoire de Tours, de Gregoire 
de Tours aux scholastiques, des scholastiques a 
Bossuet, la methode est la meme. c. ... J Imitant ce 
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systeme, nous avons traite l'histoire de France 
comme une histoire sacree, qui trouve son inter-
pretation finale dans l'ere politique inauguree 
avec Ie regime constitutionnel du dix-neuvieme 
siecle. Ce denouement non-seulement explique, 
mais legitime tout Ie passe.(72) 
Yet Quinet's argument is not intended to indicate that the search 
for an adequate explanation of historical phenomena is illusory. In 
fact, despite the pessimism of the moment he does not abandon his 
conviction that history in general terms is a progressive movement. We 
may witness a period of regression but this does not signify that history 
is absurd. On the contrary we learn from La Revolution that Quinet remains 
unshaken in his belief that the meaning of history is to be found in 
the development of the individual personality. "Le resultat de toute 
l'histoire", he writes, is "l'affranchissement de l'individu".(73) In a 
similar fashion "modern" remains a significant word in Quinet's 
vocabulary. It obviously does not correspond to the world as it is. It 
is value-charged and has meaning in relation to Quinet's understanding 
of history. 
In the final analysis there can be no question of Quinet's accepting 
that the French people are destined to remain a nation of slaves. He 
believes in France's mission even if contemporary Frenchmen are not true 
to their destiny. This is a further illustration of the contrast between 
the real and the ideal France. Indeed we might well ask how the spirit 
of 1789 could be accounted for if the previous history of France were so 
complete a story of subservience. At this point the implied distinction 
between the French character in the abstract and its concrete historical 
manifestations intervenes. Quinet writes that the "cahiers" of 1789 
did not reflect the past. Yet neither for that matter are they presented 
I' ~\ 
as a direct rejection of the past. In the cahiers we find "tout ce que 
la nature (and not Go~ avait mis originairement de beau et de vraiment 
noble dans l'ame des FranlSais".(74) A past of despotism may be invoked 
to explain various phenomena - the violence of the Revolution, so-called 
French frivolity - but this does not tarnish the transcendent qualities 
of the French spirit: "justice, precision, sagacite, rapidite". (75) In 
1789, at all events, "Ie long esclavage" had left no "vile empreinte". 
This is presented as a fact although no adequate explanation can be 
provided: "Les forces vives avaient ete conservees, on ne sait conunent, 
dans la lethargie seculaire de la France". (76) 
We might legitimately infer from the above that if France could 
survive the Ancien R'egime she might well survive the Second Empire. 
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Quinet, however, tends to draw differing conclusions. He prefers to 
stress the great divide which separates 1789 from the 1860's. Spontaneity, 
sincerity and hope characterised 1789. Even the enemies of the Revolution 
fought openly against it. In the 1860'~howeve~all is deceit, 
insincerity and hypocrisy. A qualitative difference separates the two 
periods: liCe sont comme deux peuples absolument difH!rents". (77) Is 
not the real France however still alive in the hearts of the exiles 
themselves? 
But might it not be said that in Me~Zin Z'enchanteur (1860) Quinet 
constructed a mythical history capable of sustaining him during the 
first half of his exile? There is much more to this ambitious work than 
a reworking of the legends traditionally associated with Arthur's 
magician. There is a strong confessi~nal element - Me~Zin is in many 
respects a veiled autobiography. But it is also a philosophical work 
containing its author's meditations upon life, death and immortality. 
Many of the historical figures found in the pages of Quinet's other 
works reappear: Robespierre, Mirabeau, Louis XVI, Descartes, Etienne 
Marcel, Washington, Joan of Arc to name but a few. We are introduced 
to Michele; Mickiewicz and even to Quinet himself! In Me~Zin, however, 
individuals drawn from history mingle with creations of the human 
imagination - with Prometheus, Psyche, Oberon and Titania, Macbeth and 
the witches. Quinet builds upon the framework of the stories associated 
with Merlin in order to reveal the underlying unity of myth and legend. 
He has another aim, however, and this is to mock and deride the decadent 
world of the Second Empire. The failings of the French people are 
faithfully recorded. Will Jacques Bonhomme ever mend his ways? 
Yet Me~Zin is not just a restatement of ideas expressed elsewhere, 
in La RevoZution for example. By blending history with autObiography and 
by transforming reality through art Quinet can travel further in the 
direction of optimism than was possible in his other works of this 
period. After the manner of his hero he too may become a prophet. He 
can describe how France - symbolised in the figure of King Arthur - finally 
reawakens from her slumbers. He can even allow himself the luxury of 
portraying the ultimate victory of good over evil. 
These then were the ideas which strengthened Quinet's resolve during 
his exile.(78) They contained nothing, however, which pointed to the 
imminent collapse of the Second Empire. At Geneva in 1867 he delivered 
a darkly pessimistic speech: Mo~t de Za conscience humaine.(79) He 
told his audience that hope lay in a return to justice and freedom but 
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nothing in what he said suggested that such a change was at hand. Yet 
by 1869 hope had returned and Renaissance de La conscience humaine was 
the title which Quinet chose for the speech which he gave that year at 
Lausanne. He had recovered his faith in France. In the elections of 
May 1869 the masses had awakened from their slumbers: "La vie s'est 
retrouvee dans Ie peuple".(80) Quinet saw this as a vote for the 
Republic. Gambetta had been elected and the results from Paris pointed 
the way to the future: "(.. J Paris a retrouve Ie genie de la nation, 
~ 1 F " (81) . Paris a sauve a rance • Even the d~screpancy in results between 
urban and country areas was not dispiriting. 
At this point we must turn to a consideration of those works which 
appeared in the wake of the Franco-Prussian war. Two in particular will 
engage our attention: La RepubZique. Conditions de La regeneration de 
Za France (1872) and L'Esprit Nouveau (1875). Will a successful break 
at last be made with the past? How will Quinet's interpretation of French 
history be modified? 
In his letters of July and 
the grounds that it is a device 
August 1870 Quinet attacks the war on 
by which the Bonapartists are seeking 
to maintain their hold over the people. Napoleon III is the real enemy 
and for this reason Quinet deplores the enthusiasm for war which came 
from the Left. Had the time now come for him to return to France? The 
proclamation of the Republic removed all obstacles and he hastened to 
Paris: "La France s'est retrouvee. Jamais Paris ne m'a semble. si beau". (82) 
Napoleon - not the French people - was responsible for Sedan. The 
Republic marked the beginning of a new era - even if the circumstances 
of its birth were hardly propitious. (83) During the siege of the capital 
Quinet, despite his years, was active in keeping alive the sp~nt of 
resistance. Between September 1870 and January 1871 he published in the 
press a series ~f AppeZs au gouvernement.(84) In these he urged the 
continuation of the war, opposed immediate elections and called for the 
raising, in the provinces, of a properly organized army of conscripts 
to relieve Paris. When elections did take place in February 1871 he was 
successfully returned and took his seat at Bordeaux in an assembly for 
the most part composed of royalists. He spoke in favour of the continuation 
of hostilities and against the terms negotiated by Thiers which included 
the sacrifice of Alsace and Lorraine •. 
As a radical republican Quinet criticised the a.ssembly' s move to 
Versailles instead of Paris. He sat on the far Jeft as a member of the 
group called L'Union RepubZicaine. Other members of this group included 
- 130 -
Louis Blanc, Peyrat, Brisson and Edmond Adam. At Bordeaux he found him-
self in what he calls IIce tte Assernblee ennemie ll • (85) He feared a 
return to the monarchy and lamented the fact that the Republic was still 
of a provisional nature. His state of mind is revealed in a letter of 
March 1871: 
Si j'avais eu besoin d'apprendre ce que vingt 
ans de bonapartisme ont fait de la France, 
l'Assemblee me l'aurait appris en une seance. 
C'est une nation a refaire. Mais Paris a ete 
sublime. L'esperance est la. Et ils voudraient 
Ie detruire [ •• 186 ) 
Little published material exists concerning Quinet's attitude to 
the Commune. It would appear that he disapproved of it since it 
weakened the cause of Republican unity. Nonetheless it was obviously 
a most distressing period of his life. After the destruction of the 
Commune he sought to heal the wounds as best he could. On a personal 
level we find him writing to the Communard sympathiser Floquet who was 
then in prison. (87) In Parliament he proposes legislation aimed at 
strengthening the representation of large towns over the countryside. 
This measure he believes would advance the cause of justice: "On a 
toujours dit que Ie meilleur moyen de terminer les guerres civiles, c'est 
de faire un pas dans la justice". (88) 
La Republique. conditions de la regeneration de la France aims to 
restore a spirit of national unity and purpose after the war and the 
Commune. Quinet describes a defeated nation divided by class-warfare. 
A new plutocracy has gained ascendency. The Church retains its influence. 
Recent events have provided further proof of France's chronic inability 
to stay free: 
J'ai vu pendant vingt ans des hornmes ployes 
jusqu'a terre sous Ie plus viI des jougs. lIs 
sly echappent. Vous croiriez qu'ils sont im-
patients de se donner carriere; vous craignez 
que cette furie ne les emporte trop loin. 
Rassurez vous. lIs reparaissent plus insati-
abIes que jamais d'esclavage.(89) 
It is as if all the evils of the past have risen up to thwart the 
victory of the Republican cause. In the first place 1870 naturally 
recalls the defeats of 1814 and 1815 which Quinet had always so profoundly 
resented. Soon he will wonder if a new Terreur Blanche will not follow 
as well. But there are other historical parallels and none propitious; with, 
;for example, 1830. Quinet refers caustically to the "new doctrinaires" 
of 1871 who like their predecessors swiftly abandon their principles and 
ally themselves with the Church once they have achieved power. Furthermore 
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the reaction of 1871 is a reincarnation of that of 1795. It represents 
"Ie residu e tIes cendres de tout ce qui es t mort dans l' espri t humain". (90) 
Quinet proceeds to inform us that the spirit of reaction has dominated 
French history during the preceding 1,500 years! 
Will the return to the past be complete? Will power again be handed 
to one man, be he king, emperor or president? Surely the enemies of 
the Republic will use the threat of a new Commune to caution a new 
coup d'etat. There are moments when the reader senses Quinet's emotion 
as he sees France once again repeating her past: "Ne suis-je revenu de 
l'exil que pour y rentrer?,,(91) More often, however, Quinet addresses 
himself to the difficult task of finding a solution: "[ ••• 1 la tradi tion 
chez nous c'est l'esclavage; il s'agit, non de la perpetuer, mais d'en 
sortir".(92) It is imperative to make the Republic a reality in fact 
as well as in name. This requires the development of republican 
institutions and the drafting of a republican constitution. Quinet 
favours a number of reforms which were widely discussed at the time. 
Most important undoubtedly is the reform of the army. The latter must 
become "la nation armee", an expression of the republican spirit. (93) 
The divorce between soldier and citizen which had already been condemned 
in La Revolution must now cease. Martial law is an abomination, a denial 
of the fundamental rights of individual citizens - a point which Quinet 
had made forcibly in L'Etat de siege in 1850. Military service should 
be of three years' duration and not five as some conservatives wished. 
The longer period is excellent in producing the praetorian mentality 
requisite for the seizure of power by aoup d'etat but it is not so 
effective in defending the frontiers of France. Quinet's real adversary 
of course is still "une Eglise intransformable". (94) He remarks 
pointedly that the Prussians would never have allowed themselves to be 
dominated by priests: "C .. J depuis trois siecles ils ont vomi Ie saint-
siege et sont par la des hommes nouveaux". (95) As a solution he puts 
forward educational reform along the lines suggested in L'Enseignement 
du peuple. He also favours changes in taxation and the operation of the 
elective principle in the judiciary. On the other hand he opposes a 
bicameral form of government and is hostile to the notion of an Assembly 
from which a number of members retire at regular intervals. Sincerity, 
the quest for knowledge, the willingness to accept change, in a word the 
Republican spirit, must be made manifest in every aspect of the life of 
society from personal relationships to diplomacy. Artists, writers, 
scientists, philosophers, and perhaps above all the women of France must 
play their part in this process of regeneration. 
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So despite the great obstacles which must be overcome Quinet's 
mood is not as gloomy as during the Empire. (96) There are some grounds 
for hope and he urges us to reject strongly the temptation of pessimism. 
To this end he condemns facile comparisons with Byzantium: 
of 
the 
"Un 
Ne par1ez plus des ressemb1ances de 1a France 
actuelle avec 1e monde byzantine Oub1iez-vous 
qu'avant Byzance i1 y a eu une longue epoque 
de 1ibertes repub1icaines qui ont compose l'age 
mur des peup1es grecs? Cette epoque pour nous 
ou est-e11e? Nous ne faisons que l'entrevoir. t97 ) 
Faith in France has returned. The people have become the guardians 
the Republican spirit which the reaction seeks in vain to betray. Even 
peasantry no longer obeys unquestioningly the orders of parish priests. 
immense avenir" has again become possible for France. (98) Quinet can 
return to the spirit of th~ 1830's and 1840's and forget the pessimism 
of the Empire. France has her mission to fulfil in the service of mankind, 
of civilisation. The sufferings of the present moment are a prelude 
to the rebirth not the demise of France: 
La souffrance.est 1a condition de tout etre qui se 
trans forme • t .. J Ne vous a1armez donc pas 
outre mesure si 1a France aussi souffre a en mourir. 
Signe de transformation, non de ruine. E11e change 
d'age, e11e ne meurt pas.(99) 
In the interval between the publication of La RepubZique and that 
of L'Esprit nouveau Quinet continued his political activities in the 
service of the Republican opposition. The threat from the past was 
ever present. In the Summer and Autumn of 1873 the possibility of a 
restoration of the monarchy grew as Or1eanists and Legitimists discussed 
"fusion". Subsequently the danger of "un cesarisme nouveau" reared its 
head in the shape of the proposal to give Macmahon a ten year period of 
office. Here was France yet again repeating the errors of the past, 
curbing essential freedoms while reinforcing the power of the executive. 
L'Esprit nouveau contains Quinet's last attempt to come to terms 
with French history. In this instance the emphasis is placed upon the 
role played by characteristics transmitted by heredity. Does heredity 
condemn France to an endless repetition of the cycle, reaction -
revolution - reaction? Quinet refuses to draw unduly pessimistic 
conclusions. He argues that the fact that the French mind had been formed 
by catholicism during the Middle Ages did not prevent the coming into 
being of the Renaissance or the Enlightenment. He tries to differentiate 
between the influence of heredity on,the one hand and the role played 
by imitation on the other. Prospects for the future become much brighter 
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if it can be shown that the seemingly inevitable return to reaction is 
due to the imitation of the past rather than to heredity. 
Quinet does not cast doubt upon the action of heredity but in his 
hands it becomes a weapon directed against the ruling class. Making use 
of the researches of A. de Cando11e he concludes that in France by 1789 
"l'organisation physique ihait devenue 1a meme pour toutes 1es c1asses".(10~ 
No family of pure Germanic blood survived the eighth century. Inter-
marriage between social classes had destroyed any right to rule which 
the aristocracy might claim on behalf of inherited characteristics. The 
same is true for the middle classes: "La bourgeoisie et 1a noblesse 
moderne sont peup1e et ne peuvent etre que peup1e".(101) The contemporary 
ruling class can be denounced as so many parvenus disguised behind 
aristocratic names. The reaction of the 1870's is not a consequence of 
heredity it is the work of these parvenus, an imitation of the past 
which as such is far from being inevitable. 
In L'Esprit nouveau the Byzantine spirit returns in a new guise. 
Those Or1eanists, Legitimists and Bonapartists who disguise their true 
beliefs behind the slogans of order and moderation are the real men 
of the new Byzantiwn. Quinet is convinced that "la decadence de ,1' espri t" 
can become so engrained as to produce "une decadence d'organe".(102) 
Sophistry and lying can actually produce a shrinking of the cranium! 
But Quinet has rediscovered his faith in the people and can without 
difficu1 ty condemn "les classes dites superieures". (103) He believes 
that a reform of the national character is possible. No individual 
or society is condemned to remain shackled by the past. Hope lies in 
emulating the Greek spirit.(104) 
Quinet even manages to interpret French history since the Revolution 
in a more optimistic light. If we look at the series of revolutions -
1789, 1830, 1848, 1870 - one thing becomes obvious. In each case the 
time taken to overcome the enemy was drastically reduced. Is this not 
a hopeful sign? Quinet now revises an analogy which we have seen him 
use in La Revolution: 
A mesure que 1e passe s'e10igne, sa force magnetique 
decline en raison de 1a distance. 11 viendra un 
moment ou cet aimant du passe ne se fera plus sentir. 
La reaction est destinee a s'user; l'action seu1e 
demeurera continue et patiente, parce qu'e11e ne 
sera plus combattue.(I05) 
Perhaps a day will come in the future when men of differing political 
convictions will recognise that despite their differences they belong to 
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the same nation: 
Concluez-en que, si de nouvelles revolutions se 
produisent, elles trouveront, pour s'accomplir, 
moins de resistance que les precedentes, jusqu'a 
ce que Ie mouvement de revolution, de moins en 
moins contrarie, se resolve en un equi1ibre social, 
un battement interieur des arteres, regulier, presque 
inconscient, qui marque les pulsations de 1a vie, 
dans un organisme acheve.(106) 
Between the years 1850 and 1875 therefore,Quinet's attitude towards , 
French history changes as it reflects his concern for the predicament 
of the French nation in the present. During the Empire he struggles to 
retain hope. After 1870 it seems as if the Republican ideal may yet 
be made a reality. Quinet, however, is far from being sanguine about 
France's future. Although neither La RepubZique nor L'Esprit nouveau is 
as darkly pessimistic as Michelet's Histoire du XIXe sieaZe the 
correspondence of Quinet's last days reveals anything but confidence 
in France. Quinet voted for the Wallon amendment but he considered that 
in reality this marked a victory for the Reaction: "On semble avoir gagne 
Ie mot de Republique, mais je crains qu'on n'ait perdu la chose". 
The future appears bleak indeed: 
J'aurais voulu que la France fit enfin un pas vers 
la liberte, dont elle n'a jamais connu que l'ombre, 
et c'est la liberte qui a ete sacrifiee. Ce qui 
s'ouvre devant nous, c'est ce meme cercle sterile 
ou la France tourne depuis Ie commencement de ce 
siecle.(107) 
NOTES 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
- 135 -
Discours prononce\au College de France Ie 8 mars 1848, Oeuvres 
completes, Paris, Pagnerre;" 1870, vol. 11, p; 248. 
Ibid., p. 249. 
Ibid., p. 246. 
Ibid., p. 245. 
Ibid., p. 244. 
See R. H. Powers, Ope cit., p. 137. 
See M. du Pasquier, Edgar Quinet en Suisse, Neuchatel, la Baconniere 
1959. 
The text of Marnix was modified for publication in France. 
L'EXpedition du Mexique (1862) was printed in London and copies 
were seized at the French frontier. Cf. H. Monin, "Sous l'Empire: 
Buloz et Quinet d'apres leur correspondance", Le Censeur, 1907, 
pp. 65-73. 
See below chapter b. See also I. Tchernoff. Le Parti repubZicain 
au coup d'etat et sous Ie second empire, Paris, Pedone, 1906, 
pp. 147-8. 
See the Lettres d'exil published posthumously which unfortunately 
contain numerous alterations and ommissions for which Mme Quinet 
was responsible. 
(11) R. H. Powers, Ope cit., p. 150. Cf. A. Reville, Ope cit., p. 1140. 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
( 17) 
(18) 
See the conclusion of the final volume of Les Revolutions d'ItaZie 
(1852), p. 529. Cf. Jean Reynaud writing in 1852: "N'avoir pense 
qu'au bien du peuple, lui avoir sacrifie ses meditations et ses 
veilles, et s'en trouver si etrangement recompense!" Quoted by 
D. A. Griffiths in Ope cit., p. 333. 
Mes Vacances en Espagne, pp. 80-1. 
Les Revolutions d'Italie, p. 390. Quinet's mood is close to that 
of Renan in his article of May 1848 end tIed "Du Liberalisme 
clerical" collected in Questions aontemporaines, 2nd ed., Paris, 
Michel Levy, 1868, pp. 253-97. 
See also La croisade autrichienne, fran~aise, napoZitaine, espagnole 
contre la Republique romaine (1849) ,Oeuvres completes, Pagnerre, 
1870, vol. 11, pp. 253-97. 
This point is made with great force in La Revolution religieuse au 
dix-neuvieme siecle, Oeuvres completes, Pagnerre, vol. ,11, pp. 163-238. 
L'Enseignement du peuple, Oeuvres completes, Pagnerre, Vol. 11, p. 26. 
Ibid., p. 27. 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
- 136 -
Les Esclaves~ p. 442. 
Ibid., preface, p. 331. 
Ibid., p. 368. 
Marnix~ p. 84. 
Ibid., p. 8. After reading part of Marnix Daniel Stern commented: 
"C'est un violent defi jete au catholicisme; un ClPpe1 a 1a guerre 
d' extermination. C' est singulier, aUd.acieux, pas tres prat'ique~ 
comment exterminer un plus fort que soi?" Quoted by Jacques Vier 
in La Comtesse d'Agoult et son temps~ Paris, Colin, 1961, vol. 4, 
p. 64. Cf. L. Veui110t, Melanges religieux~ politiques et 
litte-l'aires~ Paris, Gaume et Duprey" 1860, 2nd series, vol. 3, 
pp. 166-77. 
Quinet's reflexions on the Revolution need to be seen within the 
context of a more general desire to come to terms with the 
revolutionary tradition in the light of events after February 
1848. This mood is well caught by E. Montegut in "Veritable cause 
de 1a crise sodale", Revue des deux mondes~ Oct. 1851, pp. 197-218. 
Quinet's refusal to mince his words made La Revolution an important 
intellectual event. It stirred up controversy on all sides and ran 
into a number of editions. Among the numerous reactions and 
replies we find: A. Peyrat, La Revolution et le livre de M. Quinet~ 
Paris, Michel Levy, 1866; H. Baudrillart, "Les Idees economiques 
et socia1es de la revolution", Journal des economistes~ 1866, vol. 4, 
pp. 366-354; Ch· Dollfus, "La Revolution", Revue moderne~ 1866, 
pp. 176-87; E. Littre, "La Revolution", La philo sophie positive~ 
1868, pp. 373-96; Ed. de Pressense, "Les Le<;ons de 1a revolution 
fran<;aise", ReVue Chretienne~ 1865-66, pp. 513-38; Saint- Rene 
Taillandier, "L'Histoire et l'idea1 de 1a revolution fran<;aise", 
Revue des deux mondes~ 1866, vol. 63, pp. 451-2. See also the 
reactions of Burckhardt contained in Judgments on History and 
Historians~ tr. Zohn, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1958, pp. 235-6 
and Vacherot in La Religion~ Paris, Charnerot, 1869, pp. 458-60. 
La Revolution, Paris, Librairie internationa1e, 1865, vol. 1, 
pp. 108-9. 
Ibid. , vol. 1, p. 119. 
Ibid. , vol. 1, p- 98. 
Ibid. , vol. 1, p. 58. 
Ibid. , vol. 1, p; 232. 
Ibid. , vol. 1, p. 128. 
Ibid. , vol. 1, p. 67. 
Ibid. , vol. 1, pp. 111-2. Here Quinet is very close to the splrlt 
of the early chapters of Michelet's history of the Revolution. 
Ibid., vol. 1, p. 120. 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
(51) 
(52) 
(53) 
(54) 
(55) 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
- 137 -
Ibid., vol. 1, p. 171. 
Ibid., vol. e, p. 139. 
Ibid. , vol. 2, pp. 138-9. 
Ibid., vol. 2, p. 144. 
Ibid. , vol. 1, p. 248. 
See L 'Ultramontanisme, p. 177. 
Ibid. , vol. 2, pp. 118-9. 
Ibid. , vol. 1, p. 28. 
Ibid. , vol. 2, p. 184. 
Ibid. , vol. 2, p. 525 
Ibid. , vol. 1, p. 27. 
Ibid. , vol. 1, p. 11. 
Ibid., vol. 2, p. 205, vol. 1, p. 457 and vol. 2, p. 195. On the 
question of the Terror envisaged as a return to the Ancien Regime 
Quinet's argument recalls that of Proudhon in his Confessions d'un 
revoLutionnaire pour servir a Z'histoire de Za revoLution de 
fevrier, Paris, Garnier, 1850, pp. 29-30. See also A. de 
Tocqueville, L'Ancien regime et La revoLution, Paris, Michel Levy, 
1856. 
La RevoLution, vol. 2, p. 480. 
Ibid. , vol. 2, p. 348. 
Ibid. , vol. 1, p. 9. 
Ibid. , vol. 2, pp. 145-6. 
PhiLosophie de L'histoire de France, pp. 404-5. Cf. J. Barzun, 
Race. A Study in Modern Superstition, London, Methuen, 1938 and 
M. A. Clarke, Rimbaud and Quinet, Sydney, 1945. 
Discours ••• , pp. 242 and 249. 
Lettres d'exiL, vol. 1, p. 97. 
The use of the name Jacques Bonhomme recalls Augustin Thierry, 
Michelet and others. 
Les EscLaves, p. 379. 
Les EscLaves, preface, p. 342. 
La RevoZution reZigieuse, p. 187. 
Lettres d'exiZ, vol. 2, pp. 138-9. 
(60) 
(61) 
(62) 
(63) 
- 138 -
Quoted by J. Cornuz, OPe cit., p. 266. 
In La RevoZution, (Vol. I, p. 6) Quinet tells us that he abandoned 
the idea of composing "une histoire de l'ancienne France pour Ie 
peuple" since such a work could only produce hatred and resentment, 
emotions "utiles, en 89, steriles aujourd'hui". 
L'Enseignement du peupZe, pp. 78 and 79. See G. Cogniot, La Question 
sC6laire en 1848 et la loi Falloux, Paris, Editions Hier et 
Aujourd'hui, 1948, pp. 114-5 and J. Seebacher, "L'Education ou la 
fin de Michelet", Europe, Nov-Dec 1973, pp. 132-45. 
L'Enseignement du peupZe, p. 89. 
(64) Lettre sur la situation religieuse et morale de l'Europe. A 
Eugene Sue, p~ 146. 
(65) 
(66) 
(67) 
(68) 
(69) 
(70) 
(71 ) 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
(75) 
(76) 
(77) 
(78) 
Quinet's Histoire de Za campagne de 1815, needs to be looked at in 
relation to other works on the same subject which appeared at 
this time; notable among these was the study by Quinet's fellow 
exile Charras. Quinet's correspondence leaves no doubt that his 
own study was principally an answer to the interpretation placed 
upon events by Thiers. Hugo refers to Quinet's work in Les 
MiserabZes. 
G. Weill, Histoire du parti repUblicain en France de 1844 a 1870, 
Paris, Felix Alcan, 1900, p. 458. Weill suggests that Quinet was 
in fact developing a theory defended by Frederic Morin in 1854. 
Cf. the reaction of Barres in Mes Cahiers, Paris, PIon, 1949, 
vol. XII (jan. 1919-june 1920), p. 54. 
Cf. J. Michelet "Note. De la methode" in His to ire de France, 
Paris, A. Le Vasseur, n.d., vol. 10, pp. 9-10. 
See La Revolution, vol. 2, p. 13 and Les Roumains, p. 87. 
Philosophie de l'histoire de France, p. 370. 
PhiZosophie de l'histoire de France, p. 361. 
La Revolution religieuse, p. 208. 
revolution fran~ise, p. 248. 
Cf. Le Christianisme et la 
PhiZosophie de l'histoire de France, pp. 363-4. 
La Revolution, vol. 2, p. 604. 
Ibid., vol. 1, p. 28. 
Ibid., vol. I, p. 31. 
Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 29 and 26. 
Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 74-5. 
See the concluding pages of La Revolution in which Quinet describes 
why despite everything he still believes in France and in the 
French people. 
- 139 -
(79) Speech collected in Oeuvres completes, Pagnerre. vol. 11. pp. 379-88. 
An eyewitness present at the conference remarked: "J'avais peine . 
a Ie reconnaitre (Quineu, dans ce viEil1ard a la voix ,$rave et 
caverneuse, a l'accent lugubre, au geste tragique ( •• oJ". James 
Guillaume quoted by J. Drouilly in La Pensee politique et religieuse 
de Dostoievski, Paris, Librairie des cinq continents, 1971. Cf. 
the Russian novelist's own reactions to the conference in 
Correspondance de Dostoievski, Paris, Calmann Levy, 1960, vol. 3, 
p. 136. 
(80) Lettres d'exil, vol. 4, p. 155. 
(81) Le Reveil d'un grand peuple (1869), in Oeuvres completes, Pagnerre. 
vol. 11, p. 399. 
(82) Lettres d'exil, vol. 4, p. 314. 
(83) See Mme Quinet, Paris. Journal du siege, Paris, Dentu, 1873, 
pp. 28-9. 
(84) 
(85) 
(86) 
(87) 
(88) 
(89) 
(90) 
(91) 
(92) 
(93) 
(94) 
(95) 
(96) 
(97) 
(98) 
(99) 
(100) 
See Le Siege de Paris et la defense nationale, Oeuvres Completes, 
Paris, Hachette, n.d., vol. 25. 
Lettres d'exil, vol. 4. p. 338. 
Ibid., pp. 335-6. 
Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 350-2. 
La Republique, Paris, Dentu. 1872, p. 308. 
Ibid., p. XV. 
Ibid., p. 138. 
Ibid., p. 211. 
Ibid., p. 136. 
Ibid., p. 67. 
Ibid., p. 172. 
Ibid., p. 139. 
Cf. Cl. Digeon, La ~ise allemande de la pensee fran~aise (1870-
1914), Paris, P.U.F., 1959. 
La Republique, p. 258. Cf. Quinet's preface to his wife's Paris. 
Journal du siege, p. III. 
La Republique, p. 257. 
Ibid., p. 80. 
L'Esprit Nouveau, Paris, Dentu, 4th ed., 1875, p. 87. Cf~ 
M. Rouche, Herder. Frecurseur de Darwin? Histoire d'un my the, 
Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1940, pp. 9 ff. 
(101) 
( 102) 
(103) 
(104) 
(105) 
(106) 
( 107) 
- 140 -
L'Esprit nouveau, p. 86. 
Ibid., p. 89. 
La Republique, p. 238. 
See Vie et mort du genie grea, 3rd edition, Oeuvres completes, 
Paris, Hachette, vol. 28. This was the work which Quinet was 
composing when he died. He tells us that whereas his contemporaries 
point to an opposition between "l'hero!sme" and lila sagesse" the 
strength of the Greeks lay in the fact that they united the two 
concepts (p. 19). They fell into decline when they ceased so to 
do. (p. 22). 
L'Esprit nouveau, p. 139. 
Ibid., p. 140. 
Lettres d'exil, vol. 4, p. 491. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
At this point we would like to pause in our wider analysis of 
Quinet's work in order to examine in greater detail three particular 
issues each of which concerns the meaning of freedom. In. the first 
two instances we shall be concerned with the tensions which arise in 
Quinet's works after 1848 between his belief in freedom and democracy 
on the one hand and his faith in history on the other. In the third 
section we shall turn our attention to the difficulties which he en-
countered in trying to reconcile Darwinian evolutionary theory with a 
form of metaphysical idealism. 
1. Universal Suffrage. 
Although there was evidence enough by 1852 that universal manhood 
suffrage was in no way certain to aid the cause of reform this fact did 
not lead Quinet to abandon his democratic convictions during the Second 
Empire. Once this is said, however, it should be made clear that he 
was by no means a believer in the infallibility of the majority. "La 
faiblesse des democrates", he writes in La Revolution, "c"est qu'ils 
n'osent desobeir au peuple, meme pour Ie sauver".(l) Democracy, France, 
the Republic - each term denotes the embodiment of freedom. But free-
dom is also the meaning of history. At this point the question arises 
whether the legality of a r~gime such as the Third Republic derives from 
history or from the will of the sovereign people. Ideally no conflict 
should exist between the two, but Quinet has to try to reconcile his 
theories with a reality in which this conflict is only too apparent. 
In fact this problem had already arisen in 1851 in relation to 
the status of the Second RepUblic. In the pages of Revision (1851) 
Quine t denounces Bonapartis ts and Honarchis ts alike. He is appalled 
that there should be any doubt whatsoever concerning the need for a 
, . 
Republic. The choice of reglme is not a matter for discussion. When 
such changes take place: "Elles eclatent dans Ie monde avec la puissance 
de la necessite, elles s'enracinent avec l'autorite d'un evenement". 
The Republic cannot be put in doubt since its basis is "non pas une boule, 
un hasard de suffrage, mais une journee de la Providence". (2) Monarchy, 
like aristocracy, belongs irrevocably to the past. 
After 1870 Quinet found himself in a remarkably similar situation. 
Here was an assembly, republican in name, but which to say the very 
least neglected to give wholehearted support to the Republic. Could the 
defenders of the Monarchy not understand that an assembly elected in the 
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wake of a revolutionary upheaval drew its authority from the event? In 
these circumstances the restoration of the Monarchy was an impossibility: 
"J'ai toujours soutenu que Ie pouvoir constituant est le pouvoir d'or-
ganiser ce qui existe, et non de creer ce qui n'existe pas".(3) 
September 1870, like February 1848, was a step towards freedom and 
justice and since Quinet has no doubt that this is the real direction of 
history then the legality of the r~gimes produced by these events is 
beyond question. In both cases it might be said that we are dealing 
with explosions of popular discontent which were expressions of the 
popular will. Yet the real authority of both the Second and Third 
Republics derives from Quinet's understanding of history. History 
teaches that the Republic is the necessary form of government for modern 
France. During the 1840's Quinet accused the Church of failing to recognise 
the divine necessity of the Reformation and the French Revolution. After 
1870 the opponents of the Republic are criticised on similar grounds. 
How can they hope to resist "la force des choses, l'esprit de notre temps 
la necessite de notre epoque?" How can these men, who claim to be 
religious, hope to oppose "ce qu' ils devraient appeler ( ••. J la volonte 
d'en haut,,?(4) 
The operation of plebiscitory dictatorship under Napoleon III was 
proof enough that universal suffrage should not be worshipped as 
infallible. In Le PZebisaite et Ze aonaiZe (1870) Quinet explains how 
the Roman emperors exploited the right of provo(Jxi1;io ad populwn. 
Under the Republic this had meant that the authority of the people 
might, in extreme circumstances, be vested in the person of a tribune. 
Subsequently, however, it was claimed by the Emperors that the Emperor 
alone was the express10n of the popular will. A similar method had 
been applied by Napoleon III. Nothing could be further from true 
democratic principles than this system even if it were based upon the 
exercise of universal suffrage. No plebiscite could change history; none 
could prevent the Deux Decembre from remaining a crime. Votes cannot 
alter that which has been decided by history: 
Ce qui est au-dessus de la nation, c'est la force 
des choses. La nation, reunie en plebiscite, ne peut 
pas faire que la monarchie n'ait ete renversee sept 
fois depuis Ie commencement de ce siecle.(S) 
While rejecting "un plebiscite aveugle" Quinet calls for new 
elections. (6) He believes that a strong Republican majority would be 
returned if fresh elections were held. Now if this were the case the 
situation would correspond to that described in Aux Paysans (1870): 
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"Les peup1es 1ibres font eux-memes ou par leurs mandataires 1a 
Constitution qui 1es regit".(7) The new assembly would be in accord with 
both the will of the people and the meaning of history. However, the 
problem remains that the appeal to the sovereign people may only be 
confidently undertaken if the people are free and conscious of the value 
of their freedom. Otherwise we return to the dilemma of Les Esclaves. 
What if the majority yet again chooses to return to subservience by 
electing a reactionary assembly? We are left in no doubt that such a 
decision must be resisted: 
Que le suffrage universel proc1ame 1e syllabus, 
l'encyclique, l'infai11ibi1ite du pape, 1e devoir 
pour chacun de nous de se conformer au catho1icisme: 
en quoi ce vote de millions d'hommes pourrait-i1 
me 1ier? Comment changerait-i1, un seu1 moment, 
mon esprit, ma conscience? Evidemment.tout ce 
qu'i1 ferait dans ce sens serait nul, de toute 
nullite. (8) 
By appealing to conscience Quinet is being consistent with his 
earlier thought. However, we should not forget that the appeal to con-
science is itself an appeal to history since history is the story of the 
progressive liberation of individual conscience. 
The sincerity of Quinet's belief in universal suffrage is not in 
question. He refers to it as "1e fondement de notre existence po1itique, 
notre raison d'etre".(9) Yet he also believes that like all things 
universal suffrage may be improved. As a move in this direction he 
suggests a stronger representation for urban areas as opposed to the 
countryside. "Ce n'est pas de l'ega1ite, ce1al" was the indignant comment 
of a political opponent when Quinet argued his case in Parliament.(lO) 
What is interesting however is the way in which he defends his point of 
view. He argues that it is necessary to respect "la personna1ite 
politique des villes" and once again we find that he explains his proposed 
legislation in relation to French history: 
( ... J 1a societe franc;aise n'est pas seu1ement une 
masse informe, une agglomeration confuse, une 
multitude. Cette multitude, pour devenir un peup1e, 
est arrivre, par 1e travail du temps, a sortir de la 
confusion. E1le a rec;u de 1a main du temps certaines 
formes, des traits, une physionomie, un caractere, 
qui font 1a societe franc;aise. Et parmi ces traits, 
i1 en est un qu'i1 est impossible de meconnaitre: 
c'est 1a distinction des vi11es et des campagnes.(11) 
What will happen if Quinet's words go unheeded and the Republic 
remains provisional? An even greater revolutionary explosion may take 
place. Will the forces of reaction never understand the meaning of French 
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history? The nation must respect "des jugements et des arrets pro-
nonces par les evenements". (12) Is history after all the final arbiter? 
And if so should not those who fail to obey its decisions be punished? 
What should we make of the following statement made by Quinet near the 
end of his life: "La Reaction en France, est impunie depuis quatre-vingts 
ans et elle a ete pervertie par l'impunite,,?(13) Here we encounter the 
subject to be discussed in the next section of this chapter. Is 
intolerance necessary to defend freedom? 
2. Intolerance 
Before 1848 the words liberty and conscience were often on Quinet's 
lips. They were implicitly identified with the moral good. Their origin 
lay in the deeply religious dimension of human subjectivity: "Ie dieu 
interieur cache dans chacun de nous".(14) The inner being of the 
individual was sacrosanct and inviolable. The religious conscience was 
"cette Eglise que ne peut reglementer aucun pouvoir temporel".(15) This 
clearly meant that the private realm of religious experience - "Ie droit 
sacre de l'individu, l'autorite desormais inviolable de la conscience 
privee" - should not be made subject to the authority of the state: 
Nous voulons que C ... J toute creature humaine, e t la 
femme aussi bien que l'homme, soient entoures d'un 
cercle sacre que ne puisse franchir la violence des 
princes et des rois, dans Ie temporel, ni dans Ie 
spirituel [.. J et nous nonnnons cela les garanties de 
la liberte individuelle.(16) 
political freedom was thus founded upon the rock of religious freedom. 
The dignity of the individual was the source of law and right since the 
individual was the highest expression of "1'Esprit", of the divine in 
history. In the modern world "l'autorite politique repose sur la con-
science".(17) How then could it come about that Quinet was charged with 
advocating intolerance? 
The debate concerning the use of intolerance arose as a consequence 
of the publication of La Revolution. Its importance was such that when 
in 1867 Quinet published his Critique de La Revolution this was largely 
in the hope of rebutting the charge. Was Quinet really saying that the 
Terror had been insufficiently intolerant towards the Church? Even 
critics who were sympathetic towards his general thesis expressed serious 
misgivings. Here is Ed. de Pressense, an otherwise friendly critic: 
Malgre quelques restrictions et quelques 
attenuations, la pensee de l'illustre ecrivain 
n'est que trop claire. II regrette que la 
Revolution fran~aise, au lieu de se livrer a 
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des violences steriles. n'ait pas abattu de sa 
puis sante hache l'arbre de la superstition qui 
etendait encore ses ombres mortelles sur la 
generation nouvelle. (18) 
Anyone reading La Revolution will rapidly discover the kind of passage to 
which a de Pressense - not to speak of a Veuillot - might take exception. 
Onesuch example reads as follows: 
Sous les empereurs chretiens, quand i1 s'agit 
d'arracher le peup1e d'Egypte aux cultes des 
pharaons, toute la nation restait incertaine 
autour des temples. Un centurion sortit de 
1a fou1e. i1 donna Ie premier coup de marteau 
au temple d'Isis. La fou1e suivit, et acheva 
ce que 1e centurion avait commence. De ce 
moment, l'Egypte appartint au monde nouveau. 
Ce centurion manqua a la Revolution fran~aise.(19) 
Yet if we read Quinet's Critique de la Revolution we have to admit 
that he was successful in defending himself. Was not the very spirit 
in which his book had been written an illustration of the power of free-
dom of thought to criticise dogmas? With just cause he draws his reader's 
attention to statements contained in La Revolution whi~h leave no doubt 
that the author is advocating the separation of Church and State rather 
than the violent extirpation of the Roman Church. His readers had not 
grasped his method: they had not realised that in order to reveal the 
contradictions of the Terror it had been necessary to show that logic 
required that the weapon of violence should have been used against the 
Church and not against the supporters of the Revolution. The Terror was 
a system which had to be understood. Quinet had entered into the spirit 
of the Terror but in order to lay bear its weaknesses. In reply to those 
who believed that he was calling for the forcible conversion of the French 
nation to Protestantism Quinet quite correctly requested that they should 
reflect upon the page where he declared that by 1789 it was already too 
late for France to become Protestant. La Revolution contains a number of 
'. "Lt" " ~. categor1cal statements.. a erreur. we are told, ne reuss1t pas a 
1a democratie parce que 1a democratie a besoin de justice ( ••• j". (20) 
In the Revolution the means and ends were incompatible: 
C'est une des grandes difficultes. d'autres diront 
infirmites. de la liberte qu'el1e est obligee 
d'etre humaine. Elle ne peut se. !?ervir de tous les 
moyens, comme les tyrannies et meme les religions.(21) 
Quinet put forward a similar point of view 1n his private correspondence. 
He wrote that his study of the Terror was "tout le contraire d'une 
apologie de l'intolerance".(22) This may be a defensible position to 
adopt with reference to La Revolution but we cannot ignore the fact that 
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the subject of intolerance arises in a number of other works of this 
period and Quinet's attitude at times appears much more equivocal. 
Although it is impossible to keep politics and religion apart let 
uS begin by focusing our attention upon intolerance in the political 
sphere. The problem may be summarised as follows: is a revolution which 
"., has overthrown a repressive reg~me duty bound to accord freedom to its 
enemies even if the result is that the latter work to bring about the 
destruction of the new government? La Revolution described the impossi-' 
bility in modern times of producing freedom by coercion. It seemed that 
a modern democracy was tied to a respect for the individual. Feelings of 
humanity and pity could not be denied. In the years which immediately 
followed 1848, on the other hand, Quinet unhesitatingly called for 
tougher measures. 
Once again it is a question of the dominion which Catholicism, in 
one way or another, exerts over the minds of Frenchmen. The dilemma is 
nicely put in L'Enseignement du peuple. How should the new rulers of 
France have behaved towards their enemies? There seems no easy answer: 
L'ordre nouveau renonce-t-il a inspirer Ie sentiment 
de crainte a ses adversaires? Accoutumes a ne 
respecter que ce qu'ils craignent, Ie pouvoir 
nouvellement etabli tombe infailliblement dans leur 
mepris. Si au contraire, il reste arme, pour sa 
defense, on l'accuse de n'avoir rien change au 
regime de l'ancienne societe; en sorte qu'il 
rencontre Ie double danger de perir sous Ie mepris 
de ses ennemis s'il leur pardonne~ ou sous la 
contradiction s'il les chatie.(23) 
Is toleration of dissent an obligation? Quinet's pamphlet Revision (1851) 
reveals his bitterness: 
La bonne Republique (. •• J est celle qui nous donne 
Ie droit imprescriptible de nous proclamer 
officiellement monarchis tes absolutis tes, 
imperialistes, tout hors republicains; celIe que 
peuvent attaquer, cerner tous les systemes, sans 
qu'elle use jamais de represai1les C ... J celle que, 
lorsqu'on la frappe sur une joue, tend aussitot 
l' autre joue c ... J. (24) 
A similar point is made in Marnix. We learn that the most dangerous 
moment in the life of a revolution is not when it is openly fighting 
its enemies. Paradoxically, it is when the revolution is victorious, 
for that is the signal for its former adversaries to feign loyalty to 
its principles in order to destroy it. 
Sitot qu'une revolution est victorieuse, de tous 
cotes l'invitation lui est faite de perir pour 
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l'honneur de son principe, et il est rare que 
cette invitation ne reussisse pas aupres du 
grand nombre.(25) 
Furthermore in Les Revolutions d'Italie we are informed that a successful 
revolution must take precautions to ensure its survival. Idealism and 
sincerity are not enough: 
Dans les epoques corrompues, si vous ne tenez 
pas compte de la perversite de vos adversaires, 
vou~ etes necessairement vaincus d'avance; car vous 
omettez dans vos calculs un element qui les rend 
i1lusoires. Pour que les lois philanthropiques 
de la democratie puissent etre appliquees et 
durer, il faudrait que les hommes fussent deja 
ameliores ef c~anges par 1es lois de 1a 
democratie. 26 
Marnix leaves uS in no doubt that it was necessary for the Reformation to 
deal intolerantly with Catholicism. Without any hesitation Quinet 
approves the actions of the victorious Protestants: 
( ... J partout OU Ie protestantisme a laisse la 
liberte a l'eglise ennemie, il n'a pas tarde a 
disparaitre deshonore C •. J Reprocher au pro-
testantisme naissant son intolerance c'est lui 
reprocher d'avoir voulu vivre.(27) 
In La Revolution reZigieuse Quinet is quite open about his purpose: "Ll 
faut que Ie catholicisme tombe!,,(28) To this end he calls for "une 
alliance de tous les esprits libres de 1a terre" to work against the 
Church of Rome.(29) But does he not also say that no religion ever 
relinquishes power voluntarily? Protestantism, philos,ophy and education 
may help to remedy the situation but are not stronger measures required? 
If this is not the case why should Quinet devote 'so much space to the 
decrees of Constantine, Theodosius, Arcadius and Valentian which commanded 
the violent suppression of paganism? Will not at some point force have 
to be met by force? 
Le despotisme religieux comme tout autre 
despotisme ne peut etre extirpe sans que 
l'on sorte de la lega1ite, puisque sa 1e-
galite, c'est son caprice. Aveug1e, i1 appel1e 
contre soi la force aveugle; et, en effet, avec 
Ie temperament qui se forme dans les gouverne-
ments et les religions du bon plaisir, il ne 
faudrait non plus se,'IDontrer trop etonne si 
tant de peup1es serfs brisaient eux-memes 
demain ce qu'ils adorent aujourd'hui.(30) 
Quinet's friends became alrmed at the direction which his thought was 
taking. Was the champion of freedom really preaching the persecution of 
Catholicism? Those who were concerned included Jules Ferry and Saint 
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Rene Taillandier. Paul Bataillard wrote to Quinet asking for clarification 
of his point of view since this was troubling a friend.(31) Quinet 
replied as follows: 
Je n'ai pas la pensee de retourner purement et 
simplement contre Ie catholicisme les decrets 
d'Arcadius et d'Honorius. Je sais combien une 
pareille idee est peu de notre temps. Mais il 
etait, je crois, necessaire de traiter cette 
question theorique: "Connnent ont disparu les 
anciennes religions :'(32) 
Now this letter was written in 1862 and the lines which we have just 
quoted show Quinet deploying what are in essence the arguments which he 
will use in 1866 in defence of La Revolution. In the early years of his 
exile however he was far from adopting the more nuanced approach of the 
1860's. Here, for example, in contrast to the .letter to Bataillard, is 
what Quinet wrote to Michelet in 1853: 
Je pense depuis long temps que la seule chance de 
salut est de delivrer la France de la religion 
du moyen age: et que pour cela, il faudra une 
volonte semblable a celIe qui, vers la fin de 
l'antiquite, a ferme par un decret de trois 
lignes les temples du paganisme dans toute 
l'etendue de l'empire. Je Ie pense encore; je 
crois que les temples de cette autre antiquite 
que nouS voyons se survivre ne se fermeront pas 
d' eux memes et sans qu' on les y aide t ... J (33) 
If more proof were needed we have only to open the pages of Les Revolutions 
d'Italie. In this instance the author's willingness to countenance the 
use of intolerance is beyond question: 
C'est une pensee favorite du liberalisme de nos 
jours, que la force grossiere ne peut absolument 
rien contre les idees, pour moi, j'avoue n'avoir 
pas la meme conviction de cette impuissance. C ... J 
Quand je considere que les hommes de theorie 
rejettent eux-memes la force que Dieu met quelque-
fois entre leurs mains, et qu'ils tremblent de 
s' en servir j e me demande si ce n' es t pas Iii un 
temoignage de scepticisme plutot que d'assurance. 
11 faut toujours une certai~e foi pour oser 
toucher a la hache C ... J (34) 
Quinet even goes so far as to provide us with an argument in favour of the 
Terror: 
C ... J Ie plus souvent les hommes veulent une chose, 
et tout en la considerant comme necessaire, ils 
s'effrayent des extremites qui seules la rendent 
possible; temoin la Revolution fran~aise. On 
etait libre de la vouloir ou de ne la vouloir pas; 
mais des qu'on l'acceptait, la logique commandait 
d'en accepter l'implacable condition, qui etait 
la terreur. Les revolutionnaires qui, en rejetant 
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Ie systeme de contrainte, rejetaient Ie systeme de 
la Revolution, ne pouvaient manquer de s'abimer 
dans une contradiction aussi violente. lIs 
etaient dans la situation de catholiques qui eussent 
blaspheme contre Ie bucher; l'inquisition les 
eut tues ( •• J Michel Lando, Savonarole, Carducci, 
perissent par la meme loi eternelle; ils voulaient 
une chose et n'en voulaient pas la condition. 
C'etaient les Girondins de l'Italie.(35) 
It is difficult to imagine readers of these lines suspecting that the 
Girondins in La Revolution would be portrayed as martyrs to the cause 
of freedom. 
Powers writes that after the coup d'etat Quinet "embraced the logic 
of faith" and began to preach the destruction of liberty.(36) If we 
enquire what this faith is we soon discover that it is substantially the 
same faith in history which sustained Quinet during his exile and per-
mitted him to retain a modicum of hope in France. Quinet does not write 
from the standpoint of an utilitarian system of ethics and he does not 
present an interpretation of history as a working hypothesis. Freedom 
is the presence of the divine in history and Quinet knows what history 
means. He knows that Catholicism is both out of date and dangerous. That 
is a fact which no reasonable person could possibly deny. Now this degree 
of historical certainty is as relevant to the question of intolerance as 
it was to our discussiorr of democracy and universal suffrage. An 
accommodation with Catholicism is not bad tactics. In Quinet's words it 
is an armistice with evil. If one's enemies persist in not understanding 
history then perhaps it will become necessary to place restrictions upon 
their freedom. No one could be more eager than Quinet that men should act 
in accordance with their principles and that words should be spoken to 
reveal their true meaning. He sees this as logical behaviour. But is it 
not equally logical to expect that the defenders of the cause of freedom 
would grant freedom to all members of society whatever their political or 
religious views? Quinet would have said no. This argument sacrifices 
the content of the freedom in order to preserve the word, the appearance 
as opposed to the reality of liberty. It is the antithesis of logic. It 
is in fact rank stupidity and highly dangerous at that. 
On the one hand Quinet believes, indeed knows, that modern man has 
been free since the Reformation: 
N'oubliezpas que l'homme moderne est ne, il y a 
trois siecles; depuis ce moment il n'est plus de 
pape, ni de concile religieux qui puisse s'imposer 
a la conscience individuelle.(37) 
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On the other hand, although he is armed with this knowledge he is con-
fronted by the world of the Second Empire in which the power of Church 
is very great. A conservative Pope sits in the Vatican. Religious 
innovators in France remain trapped within the Catholic tradition pro-
ducing but poor imitations of the Church which they reject. Perhaps 
intolerance is the only way of compelling the recalcitrant present to 
give way before what Quinet knows to be the reality of history. It is 
knowledge of the meaning of history which ultimately justifies intolerance. 
It is permissible for those who take power in the name of freedom to make 
use of "la force que Dieu met quelquefois entre leurs mains". But what, 
the reader asks, is their God if not history? Not history as blind 
necessity but the transcendent purpose, known to Quinet who interprets 
God's ways to man. 
Les Revolutions d'ItaZie showed that intolerance was a necessity in 
those nations such as France and Italy which remained subservient to 
Rome. La Aevolution reZigieuse gives the impression that intolerance 
is not so much morally wrong as only capable of being used successfully 
by those whose faith is unshakable. But is this really a plea for a 
campaign of religious persecution? Perhaps a clue is provided by the 
.following passage in which Quinet is discussing Marnix's works: 
Ne cherchez [. •• J point iei les capi tulations de 
notre temps. C'est un livre non de ruse mais de 
veracite, sans merci et sans quartier. Si vous 
voulez etre abuse, ne Ie lisez pas. Ce qu'il 
vous promet, il vous Ie donne. Pour quiconque 
l'aura lu jusqu'au bout, Ie dogme catholique 
aura disparu de fond en comble. II restera 
l'emplacement d'une vieille eglise rasee, 
abandonnee aux sifflements et aux ricanements 
des vents, une derniere forme de paganisme mis 
a nu, une mythologie restauree et soudain ren-
versee, les debris epars d'une autre Diane 
d'Ephese, et par-des sus ces ruines paiennes, la 
conscience de l'homme moderne qui cherche, a 
travers l'Evangile, son retour aDieu et a la 
liberte. (38) 
In these lines the destruction of the cathedral takes on a metaphorical 
not a factual status. Is this an indication of what Quinet really sought: 
a destruction of the Church in men's minds? Similarly the chapter 
entitled liCe qu'il faut faire" does not contain encouragement for would 
be iconoclasts. It is a plea addressed to all who sympathise with the 
cause of freedom to leave the Church. Morover we should also note that ) 
when Quinet proposes an alliance of free men against Rome he adds an 
important qualification: 
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Si l'alliance que je propose a des esprits, a 
des Eglises, a des systemes, qui tous ont un 
interet commun, s'accomplissait; si par la 
justice de l'histoire, la loi de l'eternel 
talion voulait que Ie Droit catholique fut 
applique par la Providence a l'Eglise catholique, 
avec Zes temperaments qu'exige Z'humanite 
moderne; si les avertissements de la diplomatie 
se realisent; qu'arriverait-il? La chute de cette 
Eglise.(39) 
History can even become an argument in favour of tolerance in the 
present. He who knows the transcendent meaning of history knows that 
the present is a time of tolerance. Quinet can decide that intolerance 
was successful and acceptable in the 16th century while at the same 
time deem it incompatible with the spirit of the Enlightenment and the 
19th century. This point is made in Marnix and in La RevoZution. Such 
a viewpoint however implies a degree of moral relativ ism which sits 
uneasily with Quinet's conception of the historian as the guardian of 
the moral conscience. 
3. Natural History 
Natural History became Quinet's central interest during the latter 
half of his exile. The ideas which he developed in this field are to 
be found principally in two works: La Creation (1870) and L'Esprit nouveau 
(1875). Although in the event professional scientists were critical of 
his theories it would be unfair to dismiss his contribution as that of an 
enthusiastic amateur and vulgariser. He was thoroughly conversant with 
the latest developments in paleontology, biology, zoology and geology. 
He refers knowledgeably to the works of Darwin, Wallace, Huxley, Desor, 
Vogt, Heer, Lyell, Favre, Lubbock and many more besides. We should not, 
however, suppose that La Creation is a dry, scientific tome. Quinet 
remains a poet often guided by int~ion and whose prose upon occasion 
resembles poetry. He is not setting out to popularise the discoveries of 
others. He seeks to use their findings in order to construct what is in 
essence a grand theory of cosmic evolution. As in the 1820's and 1830's 
the underlying aspiration is to unity and synthesis. But whereas in 
his earlier works Quinet had not infrequently contrasted science un-
favourably with religion, he now considers that he has reason to place 
his faith in science. Science has rendered possible the elaboration of 
what he terms "la philosophie de la vie universelle".(40) Science has 
shown that man can retain moral values and yet cease to be isolated from 
nature. With the help of science and technological advance man may yet 
recreate the harmony and serenity of classical Greek civilisation: 
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En se sentant d'accord avec l'univers, l'homme se 
trouvera confirme dans sa pensee. II ne marchera 
plus en chancelant dans Ie vide; il retrouvera la 
serenite perdue. Je pense qu'une grande paix en-
trera dans les esprits, quand ils se verront sou-
tenus par l'experience de toute creature ( •• J 
lIs prendront enfin possession de l'univers, non 
comme des hates d'un jour, mais comme possesseurs 
et heritiers legitimes de ses eternites.(41) 
In La Creation Quinet regrets that he had not begun a detailed study 
of nature at an earlier date. The opportunity had certainly presented 
itself since he had known Geoffroy de Saint-Hilaire. (42) But what is perhaps 
even more surprising is that, despite his association with the Saint-
Hilaire family, Quinet remained a supporter of Cuvier until the middle 
years of his exile. In fact the works published before 1851 contain but 
scant information on the subject of evolution.(4~) This, however, should 
not be taken to mean that Quinet was a novice in such matters. He was 
after all the translator of Herder's Ideen. What is more, his reading of 
the 1820' Sl which included Schelling, Oken and Karl Ritter, suggests some-
thing more than a passing acquaintance with the philosophy of nature. 
Neither should we forget that the first part of Ahasverus testified to a 
deep interest in the interpretation of ancient cosmogonies.(44) Even 
Le Christianisme et La revolution fran~aise contained a reference to 
embryological theory.(45) It was in De la Nature et de l'histoire~ 
however, that Quinet came closest to presenting a general theory of 
evolution. But here, we recall, the evolutionary process was understood 
in relation to the Absolute's journey from unconsciousness to consciousness. 
This was evolution as understood by German Idealism. Hegel, for example, 
envisaged nature as a number of stages which arose from one another but 
did not actually generate one another. (46) Evolution in this sense is 
ideal, not real, and does not imply true descent. 
In La Cl'eation on the other hand, we are told that the Naturphilosophie 
of Schelling and Hegel belongs to the past. According to Hegel nature 
was "un jeu subtil de l'esprit avec lui-meme". In the work of the German 
philosopher the universe became "une dialectique de l'absolu pour broyer 
les faits et les rendre au neant".(47) Yet Quinet has not become a 
positivist concerned only with phenomena and their relations. He certainly 
is no materialist. The following extract gives us a clearer impression 
of his real position. Here he describes those aspects of philosophical 
systems like that of Hegel whic~ despite his general criticisms, he still 
considers to be valid: 
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[ ... J dans tous ces systemes, une idee vraie 
subsiste: que 1es lois generales de l'esprit 
doivent se retrouver dans 1e developpement de 
l'univers; qu'i1 doit y avoir une parente entre 
1es principes de l'intelligence et 1es 
principes s~r lesquels sont fondes les divers 
regnes de 1a nature; que l'eche11e des idees 
doit se retrouver dans l'eche11e des etres; 
qu'enfin, i1 y a une 10gique dans 1e monde 
physique, cornrne dans Ie monde inte11ectuel; 
que ce1ui qui aurait 1e secret de cette 10gique 
aurait 1a clef de 1a terre et des cieux.(48) 
La creation is divided into twelve books, the first nine of which 
present Quinet's general evolutionary scheme. In the remaining three 
books the author examines the implications of his theories. The division 
into primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary periods is accepted 
without question and considerable space is devoted to a description of 
the development of different forms of life within each period. Man's 
origins are looked at in the context of the analysis of the quaternary 
period. Quinet agrees that similarities exist between man and the 
higher primates but he denies that there is direct descent. He is con-
vinced that prehistoric man was no mere variety of ape. Man is descended 
from "une meme souche primitive que celIe des singes" but all trace of the 
intermediary stages has been lost.(49) 
Upon more than one occasion Quinet tells us that his facts are 
correct and are the result of objective scientific observation. His 
avowed aim, however, is not to restate proven facts but to investigate the 
relationship between history and nature in order to show that the same 
laws apply in both. Once this premise is accepted the barriers which 
separate different disciplines break down. Discoveries in the field of 
the natural sciences can influence history, ethics, the arts, economics. 
In a similar manner, unsolved problems in the understanding of nature may 
be solved by referring to the philosophy of history. Here we are dealing 
with something of much greater importance than an interchange of possibly 
useful ideas. Analogy becomes "une methode de decouvertes" a way of getting 
at the truth. (50) Thus the analogies between birdsong and human speech 
lead us to discover "des verites dont on cherche vainement a penEhrer Ie 
h ." (51) . mystere par un autre c em1n • Where other methods fa11 we turn to 
analogy since this method, far from being arbitrary, is based upon the 
contention that the same laws operate in different areas of study: 
"1' ana10gie me pousse a conc1ure G. j" (52) . 
La creation should be envisaged as a first step towards the con-
struction of lila science comparee des lois de l'histoire civile et des lois 
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de l'histoire naturelle".(53) Quinet believes, for example, that there 
exist methodological similarities between paleontology and the philosophy 
of history. Having taken note of the influence of the ideas of Malthus 
upon Darwin's Origin of Species he urges a much extended application of 
this type of approach. La Creation contains numerous examples of how the 
vocabulary and concepts of one discipline can be used to describe and 
illuminate another. In a discussion of language we are told that grammar 
represents "la permanence de l'espece". It is ilIa structure et comme 
Ie squeJette interne de l'organisation".(54) Words, in this context, 
become the flesh on the bones of grammar. Yet grammar, we learn, is in 
fact no more fixed than any natural species. In a similar fashion the 
discovery of the relationship between the different Indo-European tongues 
may cast new light upon unresolved questions of biology and zoology. 
La Creation testifies to a general acceptance of many of the 
evolutionary ideas then in vogue. Species are not fixed and their 
mutability is the result of natural selection in relation to the influence 
of their physical environment. Characteristics are transmitted by 
heredity. Quinet follows Darwin in paying attention to those creatures 
which, like insects, do not change or adapt to new situations. The notion 
of spontaneous generation is of course banished as is any possibility of 
a miraculous intervention by a supernatural agency. 
Quinet, however, seeks to combine the notions of adaptation to milieu 
and inheritance of acquired characteristics with a belief in the older 
idea of a series of cataclysms, identified in turn with the division of 
geological time into four periods. This may well reflect the continuing 
influence of Cuvier. Quinet contends that important changes in plant and 
animal life correspond to drastic alterations in the relationship between 
land and sea. New flora and fauna develop as a result of "Gme) nouvelle 
distribution de la terre et des eaux".(55) Large mammals can only develop 
on large land masses. Were the continents of the present day to revert 
to being collections of small islands then reptiles would eventually 
return to the ascendency. Both animal and plant life are "l'expression 
vivante d'un certain age historique du globe". (56) This fact is often 
reiterated. 
The cataclysmic theory has an additional advantage - it provides an 
explanation of the difference between man and ape. The two are not only 
separated in time; they reflect different "configurations du globe". 
Man's upright posture proves that he, unlike the apes, originated after 
the emergence of mountains. Man, so Quinet claims, stands erect because 
he originally looked up from the plains to the mountains! The monkey on 
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the other hand is clearly the product of a very different environment -
the forest of the terti.ary period. Man and ape are separated by 
"plusieurs revolutions du globe". (57) 
We would be wrong, however, were we to conclude that Quinet is just 
stating that each age produced a different environment which influenced 
living creatures which in turn adapted themselves as well as they could 
to the new situation. He qualifies his argument as follows: 
C ... J j e ne pretends pas que le globe ai t en soi 
la faculte de donner son moule a l'argile vivante. 
Je pretends seulement que la partie reflechit Ie 
tout t ... J 1 'espece [ ••• J s'est ordonne sur le 
plan de l'univers renouvele.(58) 
Man's upright posture cannot satisfactorily be explained in terms of the 
influence of environment alone. A mysterious power, "la force qui a 
exhausse,les Alpes", is also responsible for man's erect stance.(59) 
This is a subject to which we shall have to return. 
Evolution in nature is not the result of chance variations: "(fa 
natureJr ne brise pas les formes capricieusement et impatiemment".(60) 
Quinet expresses a value judgment when he discerns in the evolutionary 
process "une force d'ascension vers le mieux que ne peut contrebalancer 
toute 1 'inertie de la nature mo.rte". (61) An acceptance of evolution does 
not lead to a denial of freedom. Quinet points out that while Darwin 
was correct to use Malthus in order to understand nature, there is no 
reason to conclude from this that the struggle of life is of itself an 
adequate explanation of human behaviour in history: 
[ ••• ] l'honme, par son travail, peut changer Ie 
monde, augmenter les choses, creer, pour ainsi 
dire, un ordre nouveau. Voila ce qui Ie dis-
tingue des populations vegetales ou animales. 
C ... J Hommes, nous protestons contre la dure 
loi de la bataille de la vie, OU Ie plus faible 
laisse infailliblement la place au plus fort, ou 
Ie vaincu a toujours tort, ou Ie progres se 
forme de l'extinction de l'inferieur par le 
superieur. (62) 
It is made quite plain that neither in nature nor in history is 
progress inevitable. Natural scientists are just as liable as historians 
to fall into the errors described in Philosophie de l'histoire de France. 
To interpret progress in nature or in history in terms of a linear 
mathematical progression leads to the justification of force and a 
passive submission to the world as it is. Progress is only brought about 
by effort: 
( ... J il faut un travail incessant de la creature 
sur elle-meme et sur son espece. Si ce travail 
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s'arrete, Ie mouvement et la vie pas sent a d'autres 
genres, c'est-a-dire a d'autres peuples, a d'autres 
races. [ ••• J Ne crois pas que tout peuple, quoi 
qu'il fasse, est toujours en progreso Cela n'est 
pas plus vrai des nations que des colonies de 
polypes. (63) 
The desire to point to analogies and to discern the presence of the 
same laws in nature and in history should not be taken to mean that the 
differences between nature and history are superficial. Man exists in 
an historical dimension unknown to animals: '~'homme seul a la faculte 
de se mouvoir, non-seulement dans I'espace mais dans Ie temps~.(64) 
Here is how Quinet defines that which is unique to man: 
C'est d'etre un mondehistorique, c'est de se 
metamorphoser avec Ie temps, non-seulement quant 
a l'individu mais aussi quctl.t a l'especej c'est 
de s'accroitre de generation en generation; c'est 
de secreter autour de soi une enveloppe sociaIe, 
historique, architecturale, un monde de traditions 
successives; en un mot, c'est d'avoir lui seul 
une histoire qui s'augmente, s'alimente de lui-
meme, quand pour tous les etres organises, il 
n'y a,il ne peut y avoir qu'une description.(65) 
This capacitY to bring about change is co-existent with human freedom. 
Men can, if they so desire, repudiate the past and resist the power of 
instinct. The possibility also exists that men may abandon the struggle 
to improve themselves. If they do so they sink back into the past and 
behave in a manner which is no longer truly human. Regression of this 
type is the source of evil: 
L'homme seul a la faculte de retourner en arr1ere, 
de tomber au-dessous de lui-meme, de redescendre 
les degres qu'il avait franchis. Par la, il 
confond l'ordre universel, il dement Ie plan qui 
se decouvre dans tout Ie reste. II cesse d'etre 
homme pour redevenir brute. Ce desordre, n'est-ce 
pas ce que nous appelons Ie mal? ( ••. 1 Chaque 
crime est un anachronisme sanglant.(661 
But while Quinet contrasts human freedom with the ordered world of 
nature he is never slow to bring nature and history together. He welcomes 
the theory of embryonic recapitulation developed by Serres and looked 
upon favourably by many including Darwin, Agassiz and Haeckel. Nature 
itself teaches man the necessity of effort and perseverance. Pity, com-
passion, even a degree of reflection exist among animals. The time has 
come to describe lila psychologie du regne animal avant l'homme".(67) 
Consciousness is not the exclusive property of man and man too must come 
to recognise the power of his own unconscious mind. Quinet compares the 
evolutionary process in nature and in history with a man awakening from 
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a deep sleep and passing from unconsciousness to consciousness. Evolution 
does not leave uS in the presence of nature "red in tooth and claw". The 
very theories which led others to despair come in Quinet's work to 
serve the cause of justice and order. The study of nature reinforces 
his belief in spirit, freedom and the individual: 
Je vois Ie travail incessant de siecle en siecle, 
pour faire jaillir uneintelligence libre. Tous 
les temps, tous les mondes y met tent la main. 
Autant de degrls pour monter jusqu'au sanctuaire 
de l'esprit.(68) 
Although this seems at first sight a confident assertion there are 
two aspects of Quinet's evolutionary theories which could be said to 
significantly restrict freedom. The first of these concerns his attitude 
towards the intermingling of races. In La Creation he tells us, in a 
manner reminiscent of Taine, that each race possesses "une faculte 
maitresse, un organe dominant", which lends it superiority in a particular 
sphere of human activity. (69) He nonetheless looks favourably upon the 
mixing of races and cites the United States as an illustration. (70) It 
rapidly becomes apparent, however, that what is meant by this is a 
mingling of peoples who belong to the same race.(71) This leads to a 
surprising conclusion. Quinet now believes that the Napoleonic Empire 
was destined to fail since it tried to unite peoples belonging to 
different racial groupings. (72) 
Yet the most significant differences which separate peoples are not 
so much racial as temporal. The history of mankind is envisaged as an 
embryo which passes through different stages. At a certain moment in 
this process a given form ceas~ to develop: 
L'histoire C ... ) n'est rien autre chose que Ie 
spectacle de ces formes organisees qui s'arretent, 
se fixent et se petrifient, l'umapres l'autre, 
sur Ie chemin du temps. (73) 
When viewed in this light the natives of Africa can be said to correspond 
to the Stone Age, modern Russia to fifteenth century Europe and 
Islam to the time of Moses. Religions, institutions and peoples are all 
capable of being understood in this fashion. The Papacy can conveniently 
be dismissed as a rare survivor of theocracy, a form of social organisation 
belonging firmly to the past. In some instances, the temporal gap is so 
great that as a result certain peoples stand irrevocably condemned by 
the march of history: 
Des peuples places a des degres absolument 
differents sur l'echelle du temps ne peuvent 
produire ensemble une forme nouvelle de societe. 
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Le moyen age, 1a ou i1 existe, ne peut, en restant 
moyen age, epouser l'homme moderne. Le Peau-Rouge 
d'Amerique ne peut epouser 1a societe ang1o-saxonne. 
( •• ~ L'intervalle de temps qui 1es separe est 
trop grand, 1es esprits trop distants pour que 
l'union soit feconde. [ .• J La nature ne consent 
pas a brouiller ses dates et a confondre ses epoques 
dans un anachronisme vivant. (74) 
Here we have another clear illustration of the extent to which 
Quinet's faith in freedom needs to be interpreted in relation to history. 
There is, however, a more disturbing aspect to La Creation. In chapter 
ten of the eleventh book we are told that mankind does not escape the 
consequences of the law of natural selection. At this point Quinet 
defends a position which is, to say the least, morally ambivalent in 
view of his reiterated rejection of any identification of might with 
right: 
Les petits Etats n'ont-ils pas lutte contre 
les grands, et ceux-ci entre eux, Jerusalem 
contre Baby10ne, l'Abyssine contre l'Egypte, 
1a Grece contre 1a Perse, 1a Sabine contre 
Rome, comme 1es varietes de 1a meme espece, 
jusqu'a ce que la moins douee ait ete 
absorbee ou supplantee par l'espece superieure?(75) 
The Russian revolutionary Tkachev commented upon these lines in an 
article which he wrote on La Creation. Quinet "an eternal worshipper 
of freedom and irreconcilable enemy of despotism" had been led astray 
by his acceptance of social Darwinism. Tkachev argued that the analogy 
between nature and history was both false and dangerous. Human society 
could not be explained by laws similar to the laws of nature. We might 
add that as in the case of intolerance, history, the vehicle of freedom ~ 
reveals itself to be capable in certain circumstances of oppressing the 
freedom of particular groups or individua1s.(76) 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Any discussion of Quinet's religious ideas after 1851 hinges upon 
the questions raised in La RevoZution. In Chapter Five we described how 
this work constituted a remarkable departure from his earlier position. 
When judged from the standpoint of the 1860's the Revolution was 
declared to have fai1ed.(l) It had not succeeded because it had not 
brought about a real religious transformation. But what did Quinet mean 
by this? When he discussed the civil war in the Vendee he made the 
following connnent: "£:.J 1e catholicisme n'aurait pu etre vaincu que 
par une autre forme du christianisme". (2) Many readers, with more than 
slight justification, concluded that he regretted that France had not 
become Protestant in 1789.(3) And yet elsewhere in La Revolution he 
states quite categorically that it was already too late in 1789 for France 
to reform her religion. In the light of this ambiguity we must ask 
what was Quinet's attitude to Protestantism, and to the Christian faith 
in general, at this time? 
One point is quite clear. Quinet, while attacking Catholicism. 
always distinguished between Christianity and the Roman Church. The 
same could not really be said of Miche1et. The 1868 preface to the 
His to ire de la Revolution fran~aise leaves the reader in no doubt as to 
the profoundly anti-Christian character of the Revolution. Quinet's 
interpretation of the Revolution as a failure in religious terms was 
unlikely to appeal to his friend. In fact it produced a split between 
them. (4) In a letter of 1865 Michelet challenged his friend's thesis: 
Je n' accepte pas C: .. J que le catholicisme n' eut 
pu etre vaincu que par une autre forme chretienne 
••• "La Revolution ne put s'appuyer d'aucune 
Eglise?" Mais pourquoi? Parce qu' elle etait 
une Eglise. (5) 
The point at issue is clarified in a subsequent letter: 
Sur 1a Revolution nous differons. En quoi? Sur-
tout en ce que je VOllS marquais en 1865, n'ayant 
1u qu'a moitie, dans mon ami tie passionnee. Vous 
avez sans doute conserve cette lettre. Elle 
parlait du cu1te de la Revolution, non chretien~ 
C'est le point capital. sans parler de nuances 
politiques. Ce11e-ci n'est pas moins que 1e 
Christianisme que vous gardez, que je supprime. 
L'epaisseuP du Christianisme~ rien de p1us~ rien 
de moins; a travers. nous nous entendons.( ) 
In reality divergences had appeared between the two thinkers at a 
much earlier date. 
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In Le Christianisme et la revolution frangaise Quinet had stressed 
the Christian nature of the Revolution: "Dans Ie vrai, l' espri t de la 
Revolution fran~aise est de s'identifier avec Ie principe du Chris-
tianisme". (7) Michelet' s Journal for June 3, 1845, already contained 
serious reservations: 
Mickiewicz, Quinet, Bouvet partent du vrai 
christianisme comme identique a la Revolution: 
danger de ramener, malgre l'interpretation 
philosophique, beaucoup d'idees au Moyen Age. e ... J Moi t ... J je montrerai que la Revolution 
a rehabilite l'antiquite et depasse i~finiment 
et l'antiquite et Ie christianisme.(8) 
We must be careful, however, to avoid drawing the conclusion that 
Quinet is saying the same thing in La RevoZution as in Le Christianisme 
et la revolution fran~aise simply on the grounds that in each case 
Miche1et discerned too much sympathy for Christianity. 
In fact La Revolution does not claim that the Revolution was 
identical with the Christian message. To be sure the birth of freedom 
in the Jeu de Paume is likened to the Christ child in the stable at 
Bethlehem. We would be unwise however to read too much significance 
into this comparison. In reality the Revolution is now more closely 
identified with the cause of philosophy than with religion. (9) In 
1789 the French people aspired to go beyond Christianity: 
Soit enthousiasme, soit audace, les Fran~ais 
avaient meprise taus les degres intermediaires 
du christianisme; ils avaient pretendu s'elancer 
du fond meme des superstitions romaines jusqu'a 
la possession de la verite nue, sans passer par 
aucune des tentatives de reforme ou d'autres 
nations s'etaient arretees. lIs ont voulu 
franchir d'un seul bond l'enceinte, non-
seulement du catholicisme, mais du christianisme. 
Dans ce gigantesque effort, l'intervalle s'etant 
trouve trap grand, ils ont manque la route. (10) 
Upon more than one occasion after 1851 a more critical evaluation of 
Christianity is apparent. (11) In a letter of 1852 Quinet expresses 
approval of Michelet's position on the question of grace: 
Combien vous avez raison de voir dans Ie 
christianisme Ie principe de la grace. C'est 
assurement Ie fond du dogme et Ie seul cote 
qui se soit montre dans l'histoire. Le 
principe de l'egalite a brille un moment dans 
l'Evangile, avec les legendes du fils du 
charpentier; mais ces legendes ont ete 
immediatement obscurcies par la theologie 
orientale; Ie principe de la grace est a la 
fois l'ame de l'Eglise et l'ame du moyen age 
qui se prolonge jusqu'a nos jours; on ne peut 
sortir de l'idee de la grace sacerdotale sans 
sortir du christianisme sacerdotal. Tous ceux 
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qui ont cherche l'ideal de l'egalite dans les 
legendes de l'Evangile, ont fait Ie contraire 
de l'Eglise; ils ont ete dans Ie sens des 
heretiques.ou des re~ol?ti?nnai{i~" ils ont 
voulu refa1re Ie chr1st1an1sme. 
Merlin l'Enahanteur provides further evidence. This work certainly 
abounds in Christian symbolism. Is Merlin the new Christ? He too has 
his Passion. He is imprisoned, denied by Jacques and mocked by the 
peoples whom he served. (13) The text however ,indicates that Merlin 
is no orthodox believer. Upon one occasion Merlin appears to have been 
converted to Christianity; the reader, however, is informed that the 
central character is in fact deluding himself. A similar example occurs 
later in the story. Merlin and Jacques witness the scene - already 
described in Fromethee-of the liberation of the Titan by two archangels. 
"lIs ne sont pas de rna legion", is the magician's connnent. Yet he 
qualifies this remark by adding "Nous allons tous au meme but". (14) 
This statement suggests that, as in the 1830's, Quinet is desirous to 
underline the unity of different faiths despite their formal differences. 
Perhaps even more significant in the context of the exile period is the 
wish in some way to reconcile a naive expression of religious faith with a 
much more philosophical perception of the divine: 
(jacques et Merli~ continue rent de s'exalter 
a l'envi. (. •• 1 D'extase en extase, tous deux 
se trouverent aux deux extremites opposees du 
monde intellectuel. Ils se repondaient sans se 
soucier de s'entendre. Mais, qu'importe? Leurs 
langues etaient disparatres, leurs coeurs se com-
prenaient parfai tement. [ ••• ] 
-
0 incomprehensible abime! 
- 0 vierge Marie! 
- 0 infini! 
-
0 Jesus. (15) 
Merlin's own faith is quite compatible with the exercise of reason 
and the intellectual faculties. He may differ from Jacques but we should 
not question the sincerity of his beliefs. No one, we are told, was less 
superstitious than Merlin: "Mais Ie mot de Dieu n'etait jamais prononce 
. 1'" . ,,(16) h devant lU1 sans emOUV01r. T e book shows that on fundamental 
religious matters Merlin is in agreement with the views held by Prester 
John. The latter is in charge of a monastery which is a visible 
representation of a tolerant syncretism. Within its walls prayers are 
spoken which combine invocations addressed to Brahma, Jehovah, Allah and 
Jesus. Yet Merlin's own faith transcends existing religions. Like 
Prester John, his God is the Deus Ignotus which cannot be identified with 
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the divinity worshipped by any of the transient faiths of history. (17) 
Jesus is but one enchanter among many. (18) None the less the presence 
of God continues to be felt. In his tomb, in death, Merlin is addressed 
by the Deus Absconditus. (19) 
But if MerLin cannot be said to attribute absolute value to Chris-
tianity there can be no doubt that in other works of this period Quinet 
calls for the adoption of Unitarianism. At first sight this is sur-
prising since in both Le Christianisme et la Revolution fran~aise and 
L'Enseignement du peupLe it had been clearly stated that the conversion 
of France to Protestantism was really out of the question. 
Quinet was in fact but one of a number of French intellectuals who 
expressed a sympathetic interest in Protestantism during and after the 
Second Empire. The reasons why Protestantism found favour were varied 
but a list of those interested includes Henri Martin, Carnot, Charton, 
Menard, Pelletan, Sand, Prevost-Paradol and Renan. Certainly those 
Frenchmen who interpreted the Christian message as the liberation of 
man were unlikely to feel any affection for the Catholicism of the 
sylLabus of Errors. Not unnaturally they turned to a form of Christianity 
which respected the claims of individual conscience. Here they felt 
was a faith which was compatible with their commitment to political 
liberalism. In some instances, however, praise for the Protestant faith 
sprang not so much from sincere religious convictions as from motives of 
political expediency. In this case the argument might be said to run 
as follows: if the masses find it too difficult to live life in accordance 
with a purely secular morality let them become Protestants since no 
reasonable person can deny the superiority of Protestantism Over 
Catholicism. 
Channing's brand of Unitarianism aroused extensive interest in France 
at this time. Laboulaye, About, and Quinet's friend Bataillard were 
among those who were involved. The response to Channing was not, however, 
one of uncritical approval. Renan, for example, praised the merits of the 
American but maintained important reservations. Proudhon, on the other 
hand, dismissed Channing with a reference to "une logomachie americaine". (20) 
That Quinet should have favoured Unitarianism is not surprising. He had 
after all much appreciated New England Transcenden~lism in its Emersonian 
form during the 1830's and 1840's. We should not, however, confuse his 
evident sympathy for Channing's ideas with an acceptance of the dogmatic 
postulates of organized Protestantism. Unitarianism after all began by 
opposing traditional forms of Calvinism and Emerson himself Soon discovered 
that unitarianism itself was a limiting force. 
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However, before we can draw any definite conclusions with regard to 
Quinet's "Protestantism" we need to pay attention to the manner in which 
he expressed his support for Unitarianism. The best example is to be 
found in the Lettre d Sue: 
C ... J s' i1 (1' uni tarisme) conserve une ombre 
de l'antiquite chretienne et s'il rassure par 
la l'esprit tremblant des peuples, de l'autre, 
il donne la main a la philosophie la plus 
hardie. En sorte qu'il semble tout prepare 
pour faire Ie pont sur lequel ils peuvent 
passer l'abime sans vertige, sans crainte de 
s'y perdre, ni desir de retourner en arriere. 
l'Unitarisme n'est rien autre chose que la 
profession de foi du Vicaire Savoyard qui a 
ete si longte~s l'ame de la revolution 
fran~aise. (21) 
The impact of these lines is unambiguous: Unitarianism is not 
presented as the solution to the spiritual needs of modern man. It is a 
possible bridge between Catholicism on the one hand and the templa sereqq 
of philosophy on the other. It would be idle to pretend that Quinet is 
saying the same things as Colani, Ed. de Pressensee, Ch. Secretan or 
-Albert Reville. His attitude towards Protestantism is a reflection of 
his interpretation of history. "Le Protestantisme", he writes, "appartient 
au monde moderne".(22) The contribution made by the Reformation 
cannot be doubted but in the present, Protestants have the status of allies. 
Unitarianism appears as a halfway~house between religion and philosophy 
and as such suitable for those unable to travel further. The conclusion 
of La RevoZution reUgieuse contains our author's message: "Sortez de la 
vieille Eglise, vous, vos femmes, vos enfants".(23) One obvious escape 
route is via "les formes les plus affranchies du christianisme".(24) 
For this reason Quinet looks favourably upon the introduction of the 
ideas of Channing into France. 
"La philosophie sera toujours Ie partage des aristocrates" wrote 
Flaubert.(25) Has Quinet come to believe something similar? He certainly 
makes the point that only the most courageous can live by philosophy 
alone. The majority, on the other hand, require some form of positive 
religion since otherwise they will fall back into the clutches of Rome. 
Les RBVoZutions d'Italie contained numerous examples of how Italian 
philosophers suffered because the masses remained hostile to freedom due 
to the influence of the Church. Yet it is unfair to accuse Quinet of 
renouncing his oft repeated hatred of the use of religion as a means of 
social control. This was something which he always repudiated. The fa~t. 
none the less, remains that Unitarianism has indeed the status of an 
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escape route. The best form of religion is that which comes closest to 
"la liberte philosophique". (26) Moreover. it is important to realise the 
extent to which the situation prevailing in France during the 1850's and 
1860's marks a continuation of the religious problems of the Revolution. 
The predicament of the French people after 1789 was fundamentally the 
same: 
II fal1ait que la philosophie transformat 
l'ancienne religion, ou que la philosophie 
devint el1e-meme la religion du peuple 
nouveau. t .. ::J Un systeme d'idees pures 
peut-il servir d'aliment a un peup1e? La 
verite toute nue, suppose qu'on l'eut 
trouve, peut-e11e veritab1ement suffire 
aux multitudes? Ce1a s'est-il vu ou se 
verra-t-il jamais.(27) 
In 1874 Frederic de Rougemont looked back over Quinet's works and 
commented perceptively upon the religious issues debated in La Revolution. 
It is interesting that de Rougemont, a Protestant, far from seeking to 
minimise the differences between Quinet's thought and Protestantism 
chooses to stress the change which has taken place in our author's wider 
evaluation of religion in relation to philosophy: 
[Ie protestantism~ n' est a ses yeux (de QuineiJ 
que la transition entre la foi et 1a raison, et 
sa pensee est qu'un peup1e peut etre renouve1e 
sans une foi nouvelle par 1a seule liberte. 
Erreur fatale qu'il avait autrefois rejetee et 
a 1aque1le it est revenu vers la fin de sa 
carriere. (28 
De Rougemont is correct. Quinet does make this very point: "II n'y a au 
monde que la liberte ou une foi nouvelle pour renouveler les hommes". (29) 
However, by making this assertion he complicates our understanding of 
what he means by a religious revolution. Upon numerous occasions we have 
seen how political revolutions are interpreted in relation to religious 
ideas, as the consequences of earlier religious revolutions. Neither 
have we lacked examples of how Quinet sought a religious transformation 
in the present. In Le Christianisme et la revolution fran~aise he had 
anticipated that a new Reformation would soon dawn. This preoccupation 
is not absent from his later work. In La Republique, for example, the 
question of how to prevent the sons of reactionaries from emulating their 
fathers elicits the following response: "Un dieu nouveau serait seul 
capable d' operer ce prodige". (30) Yet there is also evidence which 
substantiates de Rougemont's point. Freedom is the content of both 
religious and political revolutions; we are dealing with different modes of 
expression of the same reality: 
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Au tre1Z1eme siec1e, 1a liberte se montre avec les 
Albigeois ( ••• J Plus tard la liberte s'est appelee 
&eforme ( ••• ) Au dix-hui tieme (decle), la liberte 
prend la forme de la philosophie; elle ose paraitre 
sans deguisements, en 89, dans la politique C ... 1 
De noS jours, la liberte reparait. Les t ... ] hommes 
du passe l'appellent radicalisme~ et sous ce nom de 
guerre conspirent a l'aneantir.(~l) 
We may now turn to the wider question of the evolution of Quinet's 
thought after the Second Republic. We are immediately struck by a strong 
element of continuity. Freedom and individuality retain their dominant 
position; the power of mind or spirit is still considered to be paramount. 
There are, however, significant differences. One of these is evidently, 
the desire to emphasise the primacy of philosophy over religion. Of equal 
importance, however, is the interest in natural science which we find in 
La Creation and L'Esprit nouveau. These works contain a theory of myth 
and religion which differs markedly from that developed in Le Genie des 
reZigions. 
Quinet now believes that ancient myths and religions are to be under-
stood in relation to geology and natural history. When we examine myths 
what we discover is lila memoire transformee et Ie retentissement des 
epoques geologiques jusqu'a la fin de l'age pliocene". (32) The Greek 
myths have the status of a pre-scientific language which modern man must 
decode. What were the labours of Hercules but a mythical transposition of 
primitive man's struggle with prehistoric creatures? Aceording to 
L'Esprit nouveau the essence of primitive religion was fear. The animals 
which threatened human life were worshipped as divine. Who in 1875 could 
still hold to the theories of a Ballanche, a Schelling or a Creuzer 
concerning "la sagesse d'un peuple primitif,,?(33) Gone are Quinet's 
earlier speculations concerning the relationship between nature and the 
idea of God. We have entered the age of Max Muller and left behind the 
age of Schelling and Creuzer. In La Creation we learn how the Rig Veda 
contained the source of all subsequent developments in religion: 
( ••• ) incarnation, sacrifice, dieu enfant dans 
la creche des bergers, dieu descendu sur terre, 
fils de I 'homme, immortel chez les mortels, dieu 
triple en naissant. sauveur. mediateur, paci-
ficateur. si les langues occidentales sont 
renfermees en germe dans l'aryenne, les religions 
ne sont-elles pas aussi visible~ent enfermees 
dans ce premier culte du foyer. t34 ) 
According to Le Genie des reZigions it was the idea of God which in 
the final analysis determined all aspects of life and conduct within a 
given society. In La Creation, on the other hand, the emphasis is placed 
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differently so as to cast doubt upon the creative dynamism of the idea of 
God: 
Les dieux etant donnes, j'ai cherche ~ans 
Le Genie des reZigion~ a en deduire les 
hommes et les institutions. Le contraire 
peut egalement etre tente: les institutions 
etant posees et les hommes connus, en deduire 
les dieux. (35) 
Nevertheless Quinet's later thought does not necessarily mark a 
break with his earlier ideas, provided, that is, that we are willing to 
extend the scope of the idea of God so as to include the notion of God as 
a cosmic force identified in turn with love. 
The lectures of the 1840's had abounded in references to Spirit as a 
life giving power. Spirit found expression by acting through the minds 
of individuals, collective entities or "la conscience universe lIe du 
genre humain". (36) "L'Esprit" was the human spirit but only in so far 
as the latter struggled to participate in the divine life. In chapter 
four we suggested that during the 1840's Spirit in this sense corresponded 
to Quinet's idea of God. This is best illustrated by the following lines 
from the last lecture of L'UZtramontanisme: 
Esprit de grandeur et de force, Esprit d'avenir, 
qui n'es pas tout renferme dans Rome, mais qui 
vis aussi, qui ferrnentes a ce moment dans Ie 
coeur de toutes les races, qui debordes 
aujourd'hui, comme un fleuve apres les pluies 
d'automne, par dela toute forme connue, to ute 
Eglise particuliere, tout symbole ancien et 
nouveau C ... 1 apprends-nous, done t enfin, 
seulement a ne plus nous hair: (37) 
The correspondence of the 1850's reveals a persistent reluctance on 
Quinet's behalf to draw a sharp dividing line between the human and the 
divine. He refers for example to "la divinite de l'ame humaine" and 
also to "1 'esprit humain et divin qui rneut Ie monde depuis trois siecles".(3a 
Spirit, however, has ceased to be capitalised and it generally has the 
meaning of the human spirit acting in history rather than the presence of 
the Holy Spirit. On one level this modification could be explained in 
terms of a change in style: the tone appropriate to the "College pulpi ttl 
does not suit the isolated life of the exile. Yet this change is surely 
indicative of something deeper. 
In Chapter Five we pointed to the secularisation of Quinet's under-
standing of history, as witnessed in the article "Philosophie de 
1 'histoire de France". The lectures delivered at the College de France 
suggested that man knew God as the indwelling of spirit in the individual 
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soul. After 1851, however, we discern a movement away from a traditional, 
biblical vocabulary and style towards a perception of the guiding principle 
of nature and history in a more philosophical and scientific mode. (39) 
Perhaps we could put it like this: the idea of God suitable for modern man 
is neither the personal Creator, nor a deified humanity nor even the Spirit 
of the 1840's. It is the life force which is responsible for evolution in 
nature and progress in history and which in the final analysis guarantees 
the harmony of the universe. This cosmic principle is Reason; but it is 
also, and above all, Love.(40) 
Nowhere is the importance of love more evident than in Merlin 
l'Enchanteur. Merlin loves Viviane. She symbolises Spring, nature, 
beauty, while he is the offspring of a union between the devil and the 
pious Seraphine. Merlin grows up with a divided nature, experiencing 
within himself the conflicts between paganism and Christianity, spirit 
and matter, love and desire, past and future. The good which he does 
stems principally from his love for Viviane. Love is the source of justice, 
hope, sincerity and pity. Love stands firm in face of death. Merlin's 
magical powers have their source in his love. Knowledge without love is 
powerless: "Si je n' aimais pas, malgre ma science puisee aupres de Taliesin, 
je ne pourrais rien de plus que les autres". (41) 
The course of true love:does not, however, run smooth. Merlin and 
Viviane separate after a disagreement. Subsequently Viviane is tempted 
by the thought of death and Merlin loses his magic powers. Perhaps 
Merlin sought in Viviane a form of love which she was incapable of pro-
viding: "J'appe1ais retenue, saintete, virginite ce qui n'etait, chez 
, "1' , d" ,,(42) Me l' h toi, qu'1mposs1b1 1te a1IDer. r 1n, never t e most constant of 
God's creatures, is inclined to more terrestrial forms of passion. 
"Homme, j'aime a la maniere des honnnes" he declares. (43) The enchanter 
encounters a goodly number of earthly beauties but he comes to recognise 
that none can be the equal of Viviane. What could be more noble than 
to desire the impossible, to seek the ideal beauty of Viviane?(44) 
Earthly women are frail, fickle creatures in comparison. This Merlin 
learns to his cost. 
Merlin eventually decides to look again for Viviane. She represents 
a love which transcends the mutability of all things. However, he is 
unable to' find his beloved and he sinks into a despair worthy of Ahasverus. 
In addition, he loses the power to work his enchantments; he has become 
d' h ,,, H' h "l'enchanteur esenc ante. 1S t oughts turn to death since no hope of 
finding Viviane remains. Merlin, the friend of mankind, the defender of 
/ 
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the weak and the oppressed becomes a misanthrope. Finally, however, this 
unhappy period draws to a close and the loved ones are reunited and live 
together in a magic tower cut off from the rest of mankind. This tower 
is also Merlin's tomb and as such it is the symbol which dominates the 
latter half of the second volume. On One level this undoubtedly repre-
sents the fate of Quinet and his wife in exile ignored by a decadent 
world. Beyond this however, these pages constitute a meditation upon 
life, death and immortality. Love triumphs over death; and Formose, the 
child of Merlin and Viviane, is born in the tomb. Hope springs eternal; 
Eros overcomes Thanatos. In Merlin's words "Je me ris de la mort; elle 
est venue, et c'est moi qui 1 'ai enseveUe". (45) 
Merlin's religion is a religion of love. "C ... J tu crois a 1 'amour?" 
asks Satan. "C'est III rna foi", replies Merlin. (46) Love, however, needs 
to be tempered by wisdom. (47) Love is associated with all which Quinet 
reveres. In a just society love is the bond which unites ruler and 
ruled. Love alone is able to reconcile the claims of freedom with those 
of equality. Love is the source of hope. The religion of love is a faith 
which values the future. The poet becomes a prophet; "C ... ] l'avenir 
s' ecoule de mes levres" declares Merlin. (48) Love is the source of poetry. (49) 
It is the force which powers the creative imagination - we are shown Merlin 
in his tomb composing the great works of French literature subsequently 
copied by mere mortals. Art itself, according to L'Esprit nouveau, may 
be described as "une dependance du grand domaine de l' amour"" (50) 
But love cannot exist in the absence of freedom, and love itself 
serves as a liberating force. In Les Revolutions d'Italie, Quinet 
describes how a transformation of society was wrought by love and the 
art of the troubadours: 
Emancipation reelle de l'esclave par l'amour 
de celIe a laquelle il appartient, instinct 
avoue de fraternite sociale, egalite des ames, 
tout est contenue dans ces epousailles in-
visibles de la noble dame et de l'humble serf 
C ... J La femme moderne es t sortie de I' inertie 
palenne; elle a la premiere plonge ses regards 
sur l'abime des classes dechues. l51) 
Love is a regenerative force capable of transforming societies, 
nations and peoples. Even a Caliban, the meanest of creatures will 
respond to the message of love. Jacques Bonhomme too may be redeemed. 
He grows wise in the shadow of Merlin's tomb and at the close of the 
novel is about to marry - out of love of course - the daughter of 
Jonathan Ie Yankee. 
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But whilst the importance of love in Quinet's later thought is 
unquestionable our discussion thus far has begged the notoriously 
difficult question of how to define love. By "amour" does Quinet mean 
Epithemia, Eros, Philia or Agape? Even the most eminent modern scholars 
have failed to reach agreement on the true nature of the relationship 
between the Greek Eros and the Agape of the New Testament. Anders 
Nygren considered that the two concepts had little in common whereas 
Paul Tillich sought to unite them. (53) 
Quinet was fully aware of the role played by Platonism and 
Neoplatonism in the development of Christian thought. His own theory 
of love, however, has more in common with the Greek doctrine of Eros 
than with the Agape of the New Testament if we accept that the latter 
may be defined as "the redeeming love of God shown in his action of for-
giveness and redemption in Jesus Christ". (54) In Quinet's later works love 
has more the status of a cosmic force. This, however, is not to deny the 
existence of points of contact between the two conceptions. In the 
character of Merlin, for example, we find examples of how love takes the 
form of what might be termed a sacrificial, unselfish giving. (55) Love 
may itself be interpreted as an expression of spirit, of the ultimate 
power which sustains the universe. It is clear, however, that in Quinet's 
case human love is understood in relation to this general power rather 
than being understood as a participation in the love of God for man revealed 
and imparted in Jesus Christ. (56) 
Love is "Ie seul des anciens dieux qui vi ve encore comme au premier 
jour d'Uranus et de Saturne".(57) Human love is understood in relation 
to a general cosmic pattern wherein love is interpreted as the dynamic 
principle. Quinet stands within a tradition which runs from Parmenides 
and Plato to the Renaissance Platonists. Love is a cosmic principle, 
the creative power which dissipates chaos. Our attention is explicitly 
drawn to the similarities between this theory and certain aspects of 
Greek thought which we find in Hesiod's Theogony and in the Orphic 
cosmogony: 
Hesiode et les anciens etaient plus pres que 
no us de la verite, lorsqu'ils faisaient naitre 
les notions morales, non du calcul, mais de 
l'amour universel. Celui-ci, anterieur aux 
dieux, Ie plus beau des dieux immortels, 
etaient a leurs yeux Ie createur de toutes 
choses. ( •• :) Melee a chaque creature, cette 
force cosmogonique, ame et foyer de la vie 
universelle, n'est-elle pas devenue trop 
etrangere a nos conceptions scientifiques de 
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la vie? ( .• J Accordez-moi too J que ce qui a 
dissipe, a l'origine, le chaos, brise le premier 
oeuf du monde, produit et varie les especes, 
eveille la conscience individuelle, cree 
l'univers anime, evoque dans chaque etre Ie genie 
interieur, n'a pas ete une maladie ou une 
nevrose de la nature vivante.(58) 
Even in nature love cannot be explained exclusively in terms of 
desire. Animals and birds seek to mate with the most beautiful example 
of their species. But this is not merely the unconscious desire for the 
self-preservation of the species through its fittest members. Quinet 
argues that the discoveries of modern science have taught us to discern in 
sexual selection among animals and birds "la preoccupation du beau, 
et une sorte d'esthetique inconsciente".(59) Among human beings love is 
not just a quest for immortality through procreation. Two lovers aspire 
to wholeness, to unity but also to moral goodness. Their love accords 
them a liberation from time. They transcend the sufferings of the moment 
and enter into contact with a more profound reality. The purpose of love 
extends beyond the reproduction of the species. Love between a man and 
a woman implies their shared desire for the future to be better than the 
present. When two people choose one another as partners out of love 
"ils rentrent dans la loi universelle qui a cree le monde anime". (60) 
We might say that as Plato in the Symposium contrasts Diotima's 
theory of love with the views previously presented by Aristophanes so 
Quinet conceives of love as desire but more importantly as the love of 
beauty, wisdom, goodness and truth. Love, however, is active and creative 
rather than contemplative. Love is above all the power which sustains the 
cosmos and it is in relation to this force that we must understand man's 
moral sense and his idea of justice: 
Je crois aper~evoir [, ••• J que la Justice est nee' 
de l'amour et qu'il y en a un premier germe 
inconscient dans toute creature vivante. ( •• :) 
Je m'obstine a penser que la meme force qui 
tient les mondes en equilibre, descendue dans 
l'esprit de l'homme j y devient equite, justice, sentiment moral.(6l 
The moral order, therefore, like the natural order, is based upon 
love. For this reason to behave morally is not just to conform to the 
laws of a given society. It is to be in harmony with the order of 
nature. Morality is not a matter of self interest but of cosmic progress. 
Those who pursue the just course cannot by any means be assured of 
happiness or success but Quinet believes that we should not be downcast 
by the apparent victory of evil over good. Mankind may benefit ev~n if 
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the individual suffers. In this struggle man and nature are united; 
there exists "une force universelle cosmogonique qui soutient la verite 
dans 1 'honnne". (62) In his search for truth and sincerity man has· the 
support of "la force accumulee de toutes les veri tes inconscientes qui 
soutiennent l'univers". (63) 
Love may be identified with that force which Quinet refers to as 
"la Vl.e universelle". But what is this power? In La Creation there is 
no fiat lux no first cause, no creation ex nihilo. It is indeed difficult 
to speak of there ever having been a beginning in the Biblical sense: 
Ou sont les origines de 1a vie? elles reculent 
a mesure que nous croyons les saisir; elles 
semblent se confondre avec les origines du 
globe. Dans la premiere effluve de matiere, 
peut-etre se trouvaient deja l~s semences 
ardentes des etres a venir.(64) . 
In both La Creation and Merlin there is evidence to suggest that Quinet 
favoured the nebular hypothesis. Life is understood as a cosmic force: 
(la vie) n'a pas surgi a telle epoque, a telle 
couche du terrain; mais elle appartient a 
Or again: 
l'univers; elle est de nature cosmique. Semee 
dans les espaces du monde, recueillie dans les 
flancs des nebuleuses~ elle a voyage avec el1es 
de cieux en cieux.(65) 
La vie n'est pas limitee a un point de l'espace 
ou de la duree. [ ••• ] Ce n'est pas une planete 
seule qui l'a produite; un tel effort n'appartient 
pas a un corps celeste en particulier. Pour 
enfanter le premier vivant, il a fallu autre chose 
qu'un astre detache, morcele dans un coin limite 
de la nature. II a fallu l'effort de la nature 
entiere, je veux dire de toute la masse nebuleuse 
au plutot de l'univers. Le premi~r vivant a son 
premier ancetre dans l'infini.(66) 
In Chapter Four we suggested that Quinet's God might best be under-
stood in terms of the unfolding of a creative process. In the 1870's 
this still remains the case despite the fact that the cosmic power is now 
identified with love rather than with spirit. What is more, the key ideas 
of the 1840's - the value of change and creativity, the belief in immor-
tality, the urge to the future - all reappear in the later writings and 
hence serve to underline the continuity of Quinet's thought. 
"Je veux esperer contre toute esperance" cries Merlin. (67) Hope-
or would it be more accurate to say faith? - requires an act of heroism 
in the dispiriting circumstances of exile. But what is hope if not the 
affirmation of a belief in the future and in man's capacity to bring this 
future into being? "L'avenir" continues to be a word of crucial: importance 
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in Quinet's writings. Christ is "[leJ fils de l'avenir"; Quinet's God 
remains in one sense the infinite possibilities of the future. (68) But 
there can be no future without freedom. This point is well made in Les 
Esalaves. As far as the slaves and gladiators are concerned the very idea 
of the future has become deprived of all meaning. It is "un mot vide 
et trompeur". (69) The loss of liberty is accompanied by the loss of a 
correct perception of time. The gladiators live exclusively in and for 
the present. (70) The seeds of rebellion are sown when the all-important 
words "liberte" and "avenir" reach the ears of the slaves although they 
had in fact been spoken with the sale intention of stirring up the 
Plebeians. (71) 
But this theme of hope in the future leads us back to the central 
notion of love. What more concrete notion of hope could there be than 
the survival of Spartacus' son after his father's execution?(72) There 
is also Formose, the aptly named offspring of Merlin and Viviane who is 
born in the tomb of death. Furthermore we should not forget how in 
L'Esprit nouveau love between a man and a wonanis ,understood in relation 
to the creation of a better future for mankind. The potentiality of the 
future lies in the figure of the child. In fact Quinet's plans for 
educationJreform aim at much more than providing children with suitable 
instruction: "il s'agit de preparer celui qui doit guerir une societe 
assez malade pour se frapper elle-meme". The child embodies France's 
hope for the future: "L.·] c'est bien un sauveur, un mediateur qu'il faut 
elever dans chaque honnne, au Ie monde perit". (73) 
Quinet's later aesthetic theory is a further expression of this 
aspiration to the future. The artist continues the work,:of nature since 
the same force - love - operates in him as in the nature universe. Art 
is not an imitation of nature; art re-creates, perfects nature. (74) 
These ideas are by no means novel in Quinet's thought. During the 1830's 
he developed an aesthetic theory typical of metaphysical idealism. 
In La Creation, however, his aim is to reconcile his earlier ideas with 
an acceptance of evolutionary theory. In so doing he underlines more than 
ever before the prophetic nature of art. Art is envisaged as a revelation 
of the future: "[ •• :] l'art est Ie pressentiment des formes superieures 
qui dorment encore dans Ie sein des chases actuelles". (75) By transforming 
nature, the artist participates in the future: 
[ .. J l'homme par l'art, cherche, a son insu, a 
se placer d'avance dans Ie plan des oeuvres 
futures de la nature, a Ie penetrer, a Ie 
pressentir, Ie realiser. C ••• J Tout son art 
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n'est que la V1S1on d'une creature qui perce 
d'avance les mysteres des etres encore en-
veloppes dans les etres actuels. (76) 
Quinet does not respond warmly to the God of the Epicureans. The 
idea of "un Dieu eternellement oisif" holds no attraction for him. (77) 
He prefers to understand God as a cosmic power active in nature and in 
history. The presence of such a God does not, however, deprive man of 
responsibility. On the contrary, nature herself encourages us to act 
and to resist passivity: 
De quelque nom que tu me nommes, Isis, Cybele, 
Nature, Creation, je ne me repose a aucun 
moment de la duree dans une quietude inerte. 
Imi te-moi. 
Tout chez-moi est activite, mouvement, vie, 
ascension. Chaque espece lutte contre un 
obstacle, et ce travail est la condition de 
son progreso 
N'espere ~as, toi, seul avancer sans te 
mouvoir. ( 8) 
In the 1870's, as in the 1840's, Quinet considers life as a continuing 
process of self-transformation. History and heredity certainly weigh 
heavily upon the individual but, within certain limits, the individual 
can choose to create his own character. In the final analysis he can 
transcend the restrictions which the past places upon his freedom. "Je 
ne me sens Ie serf d' aucun temps", declares Quinet in L'Esprit nouveau. (79) 
Life is change and this means that we must not allow ourselves to 
be determined by our past. To copy the past is to imitate that which 
is terminated, that which is dead: "Qui se copie s' efface; qui ne se 
renouvelle pas se meurt". (80) Routine is mere repetition of the past and 
hence a denial of freedom, of the future. The free man will proceed 
otherwise: 
Ce que j'ai ete n'est point la regIe de ce que 
je peux etre; car chaque jour j'acquiers des 
forces que je n'avais pas. Je sens mon etre qui 
s'accroit. Je ne me reposerai pas oisivement 
sur ce que j'ai fait. Je travaillerai a 
developper l'infini aui est en moi comme dans 
la nature entiere.( 1) 
For the same reason Quinet is hostile to all narrow specialisation which 
stifles the creative spirit: 
Ne devenons pas les esclaves de nos oeuvres, 
de quelque nature qu'elles soient; sachons les 
oublier nous-memes, pour ne pas nous petrifier. 
La faculte qu'il importe de sauver la pr~mi~re 
est la faculte de croitre et de grandir. l82 ) 
Transformation and change involve suffering, perhaps even death. 
Quinet's works contain numerous examples of the sequence ~ife - death -
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rebirth. Society, the individual,art, nature, all are envisaged within 
the context of a process of self-transformation in which the cosmic 
force of universal life renews itself. Man, like all things, passe~ 
but, like all things, he is reborn. Death need no longer be feared: 
Qu'ai-je a craindre? Le sort de l'univers. Avec 
tout ce qui vit et respire, les mondes eux-memes 
se dissoudront pour renaitre. Leur existence a 
ses limites marquees. Les soleils s'eteindront 
pour se rallumer. Demanderai-je pour moi seul un 
privilege qu'ils n'ont pas? Non, j'accepterai 
Ie sort commuq a tollS les etres, vivre, mourir, 
pour revivre. ~83) 
On th~ evidence which we have examined thus far it wo~ld appear that 
a cosmic force, be it called love or universal life, is immanent in the 
universe. For this reason we are not surprised to encounter a reference 
to "Ie Verbe de la nature". (84) When Merlin tries to convert the devil he 
does not hand him the Bible. He produces instead "un extrait des prin-
cipaux philosophes de la Nature". (85) This, however, should not be taken 
to mean that Quinet is identifying empirical nature directly with God. 
Yet at the same time there is no theistic belief in a Being transcending 
nature. (86) Quinet does not repeat the clear-cut repudiation of 
pantheism which he had included in the preface to PPomethee. illn La 
Creation we find no discussion of divine freedom or of divine love for 
the world in the Biblical sense. At all events Quinet's willingness to 
identify creation as he understands it with Cybele and Isis is unambiguous 
in its implications. Should we conclude that Quinet has adopted the 
distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata &fter the manner 
of Spinoza and Giordano Bruno? There certainly are favourable references 
to the Dutch philosopher in Merlin. As far as Giordano Bruno is concerned 
we have only to open the relevant chapter of Les R... evolutions d'ItaZie. 
Here Giordano Bruno is presented as a worthy precursor of Hegel. He it 
was who recognised the true import of the Copernican revolution and 
consequently freed philosophy from religion: 
C ... J Giordano Bruno proc1ame I' egali te du 
ciel et de la terre. Si l'enfer et Ie paradis 
disparaissent, ou plutot s'ils se confondent, 
Ie Dieu n'est plus relegue dans un coin de la 
creation; il est partout, en toutes choses; il 
n'est plus exile a l'extremite de l'univers. Ne 
Ie che:chet8~as dans Ie firmament, il est en 
vous-meme. ) 
We cannot, however, state with certainty that Quinet now identifies 
God with infinite substance of which all finite beings are modes. He 
quite simply does not work out the relationship between love and 
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materiality 1n a satisfactory manner. Similarities certainly exist 
between his views and the Spinozist Deus sive natura but in the absence 
of cogent philosophical argument it would be unwise to carry them too 
far. 
But might not Quinet;a1so be said to be moving in the direction 
of the Bergson of L'Evolution creatrice? Both thinkers share a con-
ception of God as life, action and freedom, as a power not distinct from 
I 
the world. A well-knownpassage from L'EvoZution creatrice brings out 
I 
the similarities: 
Si, partout, c'est 1a meme espece d'action qui 
s'accomp1it, soit qu'el1e se defasse, soit qu'e11e 
tente de se refaire, j'exprime simp1ement cette 
similitude probable quand je parle d'un centre 
d'oll les mondes jai1liraient commes 1es fusees 
d'un immense bouquet.- pourvu qu'on ne donne pas 
ce centre pour une chose mais pour une continuite 
de jai1lissement. Dieu, ainsi defini, n'a rien du 
tout fait; i1 est vie incessante, action, 1iberte. 
La creation. ainsi con~ue. n'est pas un mystere, 
nous l'experimontons en nous des que nous 
agissons 1ibrement.(88) 
Both Quinet and Bergson respect the achievements of science whilst 
rejecting a narrow positivism; both assert the reality of spirit yet 
do not deny the reality of matter; both retain an element of fina1ism. 
Quinet, like Bergson, considers creation as a continuous process, a 
movement towards spirit and freedom which is also the emergence of 
cons ciousness. 
In conclusion let us pay tribute to the astonishing vitality of 
Quinet's mind and to the remarkable capacity with which he absorbed 
material from many different disciplines. He was always eager to branch 
out into new fields of enquiry and in this respect it can certainly be 
said that he practised what he preached. But whilst being receptive to 
new information and to new theories Quinet never failed to relate them 
to his own major interests and by so doing impress upon them his own 
personal stamp. 
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of frivolous, attractive objects. Under the Republic, however, 
woman has a religious task to fulfil: the regeneration of French 
society and the reconciliation of the conflicting forces within 
it. Cf. Le Christianisme et la revolution fran~aise~ pp. 100, 
125, and 133. See J. Calo, La Creation de ~ femme ohez Miohelet~ 
Paris, Nizet, 1975. 
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CONCLUSION 
When we look back over Quinet's works from the vantage point of 
L'Esprit nouveau we are immediately struck by an impression of unity. 
Although he has dealt with subjects which may seem to be of a disparate 
nature he has consistently approached them in relation to religion and 
history, freedom and individuality. History is the story of freedom but 
this in no way precludes the search for historical laws. Quite the 
reverse in fact.(l) Quinet wishes to see a pattern emerge which will 
render the whole movement of historical change intelligible. From the 
essays on Herder to L'Esprit nouveau he endeavours to understand an 
historical event within a wider framework which ultimately includes 
reference to the entire cosmos. He recognises the value of diversity 
but aspires to unity. His view of reality is organic and not mechanistic 
or deterministic. Reality is understood in relation to man's spiritual 
nature. Mankind and nature ultimately obey the same laws. Macrocosm 
and microcosm are united in general synthesis. There exists a governing 
principle which brings rational order to the universe. This power may be 
called by different names - God, the Absolute, Love, Spirit, the Idea, 
Universal Force - but its function as an ordering principle remains 
constant. 
The notions of order and harmony are of the greatest importance in 
Quinet's thought. The same principle is present in the organisation of 
the universe as in the moral life of the individual: II C: •• J la meme loi 
d' equilibre qui soutient les mondes, soutient dans I 'homme la veri te". (2) 
The order of the cosmos finds expression in man's apsirationito justice: 
"C. .. J ce qui est ordre, ponderation, equilibre, equivalence des forces 
dans la nature devient justice dans l'homme".(3) 
"Tout vous repond dans l'infini" writes Quinet in L'Esprit NouVeau. (4) 
Man is not cut off from the rest of creation; he is part of a greater 
whole. Nature, history, art and religion are all understood in relation to 
the central notion of harmony. We are left in no doubt as to the philo-
sophical tradition within which Quinet considers that he is working: 
La succession des etres n'est-elle pas ce que 
les modulations sont dans l'oeuvre du com-
posi teur? La nature module les etres, romme 
Ie musicien module les sons. G .. 1 quand 
[Ie musicien) fait, avec quelques notes, une 
oeuvre multiple, inepuisable, imperissable, je 
ne doute pas qu'il a suivi la meme methode que 
la nature creatrice dans la succession harmonieuse 
des etres. Ou a-t-il trouve cette loi? il ne sait; 
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elle est la, dit-il, en se frappant Ie front. 
Non, il se trompe. Elle est Ie principe des 
choses vivantes. Elle donne son rhythme non 
pas seulement au musicien, mais a tout l'univers 
vivant: voila l'harmonie des spheres qu'en-
tendait Pythagore.(5) 
According to La Creation man is a mixture of pride and humility. He feels 
justifiably proud when he looks back upon the evolutionary process in 
nature, that is upon" (les) etres anterieurs qui gravi tent obscurement 
vers lui". On the other hand he experiences humility when he turns his 
mind to the future and considers 'Ies) etres superieurs dont il porte en 
lui la substance". (6) In 1870, as in 1830, Quinet understands religion 
in relation to the two worlds of nature and history: 
La religion, comme la poesie, n'est souvent 
que la conscience de ces deux mondes; anciens 
rugissements de la nature en travail, 
sifflements des serpents diluviens qui ont 
trouve un dernier echo dans Ie coeur de 
l'homme, pressentiments caches de formes 
futures, encore enveloppees dans les formes 
du present. Comme l'homme a aujourd'hui la 
perception obscure des organisations pre-
cedentes qui grondent dans son sein, de 
meme les etres superieurs, dont Ie mond~ est 
eternellement en travail, auront la per-
ception distincte des conditions de vie 
anterieure, dans une conscience plus claire 
et moins troublee par Ie bruit du chaos. 
C'est la ce que veut dire cette foi a 
l'eternel Vivant, que rien en peut tarir; cri 
de toute creature; aspiration de to ute vie a 
une vie plus haute et plus complete.(7) 
In L'Esprit nouveau a new note of confidence is struck. The hope is 
expressed that with the aid of modern scientific knowledge man may at 
last be able to recreate a world of harmony such as he had known in ancient 
Greece. Man is the self-conscious expression of the life-force which 
sustains the universe. He need no longer feel isolated, estranged from 
nature. (8) It may yet be possible to establish a new relationship with 
the natural world: 
Qu'est-ce C .. :] qui vous empeche de jouir de ce 
don de l'univers que vous avez re~u comme les 
Crecs, renouvele, augmente de tout ce que les 
decouvertes ont ajoute a la vieille nature? (. .. J La fete des deux continue, plus 
belle qu'au temps des Olympiades.(9) 
But the more optimistic note of L'Esprit nouveau is not just a 
reflexion of Quinet's belief that man needs no longer feel isolated 
from nature. It would be more correct to say that he has at last 
become fully convinced that the world possesses genuine reality and is 
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not mere appearance. Doubt on this score had been a major source of the 
metaphysical unease present in Ahasverus. Was the universe real or was 
it just a dream? Was it an illusion, a trick played upon man by some 
malevolent power? Such were the questions that had earlier haunted 
Quinet. 
The theme of the relationship between appearance and reality often 
appears in Quinet's writings. (lO) We must, however, concentrate upon 
the central point at issue which is the question of thereaity of the 
external world. The problem, in essence, stems from the implications of 
Kant's critical philosophy. The German philosopher questioned man's 
capacity to attain knowledge concerning the nature of reality. In his 
view men had no faculty of intellectual intuition. Kant explained that 
that which we take to be reality is in fact the product of the ordering 
done by the a priori categories of the understanding. It followed from 
this that no ultimate reality could be found within experience. God and 
immortality were not, however, banished from Kant's philosophy but returned 
as postulates of the practical reason. Religious truths were rediscovered 
within the moral life which was interpreted as the expression of rational 
freedom. (11) There were many, however, who concluded, in the light of 
Kant's critical philosophy, that metaphysics was an impossibility. 
Post-Kantian Idealism sought to overcome these difficulties by 
postulating the existence of a higher unity immanent in nature and which 
united the noumenal and the phenomenal. According to Hegel the ultimate 
principle was Reason or Spirit, according to Fichte it was the transcen-
dental Ego and according to Schelling itwas the principle of absolute 
identity. For metaphysical Idealism in general reality was understood as 
11 the process of the self-expression ot self-manifestation of infinite 
thought or reason ll .(12) What is of prime interest to us here, however, is 
the apparently solipsistic aspect of Kant's critical philosophy. If the 
world is but the product o~ the human understanding does this mean that 
it has been relegated to the status of mere appearance? 
This is the argument which is put forward in La C~eation. Quinet 
explains that according to Kant the world did not exist as a thing in 
itself "mais seulement comme une apparence produite par notre entende-
ment". (13) This error was repeated by Hegel and by Schelling and also 
by Ecclecticism in France. It took its most extreme form, however, in 
the philosophy of Schopenhauer: 
Le monde n'est-i1 qu'une apparence produite par 
notre esprit? Ecoutez (Schopenhaue~ tirer 1a 
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consequence: Ie probleme du monde n'est reso1u 
que chez moi. Le monde n'est que par rna volonte. 
J'ai pu Ie faire, je puis Ie defaire a mon gre. 
Fantome que je promene a rna fantaisie, je l'ai 
evoque pour mon malheur; il depend de moi de Ie 
rep longer dans Ie neant. 
En effet, un univers complaisant qui n'est qu'une 
bulle de savon que nous lan¢ons dans l'air et qui 
s'evanouit a notre premier souffle, cela coupe 
court a toutes difficultes.(14) 
In fact Quinet's judgment of Schopenhauer is as unsatisfactory as 
is his assessment of Kant. (IS) Without any hesitation he portrays the 
post-Kantians as though they were subjective idealists claiming that we 
can only achieve a knowledge of our ideas. Consequently, all that he 
considers necessary to disprove such theories is to proclaim the discovery 
of the true extent of geological time: 
Nul oeil n'etait encore ouvert. [ .• J Ou 
etait Ie moi, pour se forger un non-moi dans 
Ie vide? Dir~z-vous que cet univers, dont 
nous touchons les ages successifs dans la 
pierre, n'existait pas, ne comptait pas, parce 
que vous y manquiez et qu'il ne pouvait 
etre sans vous, hors de vous?(16) 
To a great extent Quinet's later work testifies to a continuing 
preoccupation with 'the subjects with which he had been concerned earlier. 
He holds firm to his faith in the individual. In La Creation he makes 
the point that the initiative for progress lies with individuals rather 
than with the masses and in L'Esprit nouveau he reaffirms his belief in 
the historical Homer. He continues to place the highest value upon the 
individual personality although the personality itself is never adequately 
defined. This is perhaps understandable since the life of the personality 
could be said to reside in its capacity to reject its own past. Here 
once again, there are similarities with Bergson. Brehier describes a 
Bergsonian free act as "nouveaute, creation, depassement du donne, rupture 
de l'automatisme". Freedom in this sense cannot be explained as a choice 
between two alternatives. Freedom is inventive; "l'homme tend toujQurs, 
par la liberte, a depasser les limites de la condition humaine". (17) 
All of this strongly recalls Quinet. Race, milieu and moment might be said 
to constitute the conditions within which freedom takes place. Freedom 
transcends human limitations since in a truly free act the individual reaches 
out to the future, enters into contact with Being and participates in 
infinity. Therein also lies the metaphysical ground of religious 
revolutions. 
History continues to have meaning insofar as its content is freedom. 
But freedom is not something given; it must be fought for with ceaseless 
- 189 -
effort. (18) Time of itself is not a creative force. Even conscience, 
the divine spark in man, may become completely extinguished. But the 
awareness of the fragility of freedom which is evident after 1851 only 
serves to make Quinet defend the cause of liberty more strongly than 
ever. In the course of Phitosophie de t'histoire de France he reaffirms 
his beliefs in words which instantly recall his essay of 1827: 
Nous blamons Ie tiers etat toutes les fois qu'il 
reagit au moyen age contre l'accroissement du 
pouvoir absolu. Or cette idee permanente de 
justice, c'est la substance meme de l'histoire; 
cette resistance, c'est precisement celIe de l'ame; 
cette protestation, c'est Ie signe de la nature 
humaine, c'est la preuve qu'il s'agit ici d'etres 
raisonnables, non d'automates; c'est Ie germe de 
la liberte future. (19) 
Freedom lies at the heart of Quinet's political as well as his 
religious thought. His faith in liberty commands his espousal of the 
cause of Republican democracy. Freedom is inseparable from justice. 
Justice like freedom is an absolute. (20) The idea of justice allows 
Quinet to pass from the individual to the societal without sacrificing 
the dignity of the individual. He is not, however, a systematic 
political thinker and nowhere does he set out in great detail the 
particular freedoms which would need to be respected in a just society. 
Such a society, one assumes, would recognise that the individual is the 
highest manifestation of Spirit in the world. France is the collective 
entity which, ideally at least, is the embodiment of mankind's aspiration 
to freedom and justice.(2l) 
Although we must never forget the ambiguous nature of Quinet's 
position on the question of toleration of dissent, it is fair to say 
that in general he adopts an anti-authoritarian stance. In La Revolution 
he contrasts the Girondins with the Jacobins. The latter sought to impose 
authority from above by force. The Girondins, on the other hand, stood 
on the side of "la religion de la liberte". (22) They were the enemies 
of traditional forms of authority: "Le fond des Girondins etait de ne plus 
vouloir de mattre 11 aucun prix". (23) They were not wi thout fault but 
their elimination was an act which had the most grievous consequences. 
The Girondins represented "un organe necessaire de la Repub lique". (24) 
Hostility towards authority imposed from above joins with Quinet's 
belief in individual freedom to explain the antipathy which he feels 
to communism and socialism. Such systems deny the supreme value of 
individual conscience; they reduce the individual to the status of a mere 
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cog in a machine. Equality - if by that we mean an equal distribution 
of wealth and property - is deemed an illusion. Furthermore Quinet is 
adamant that man cannot be adequately explained in terms of political 
economy alone. 
Quinet's moral individualism looks back not only to the Reformation 
but also to the concept of the fundamental and inalienable rights of man 
so dear to the philosophers of the Enlightenment. There is much in his 
writings which recalls the broad tradition of Western liberalism: notably 
his defence of the individual against the power of the state and his 
acceptance of private property as an extension of the individual .. 
personality. (25) There is, however, an underlying tension in his thought 
between what is in many ways a liberal theory of the state and a belief 
in France as a collective entity developing dynamically in history and 
fulfilling a redemptive mission of essentially messianic proportions. 
Does this tension reflect the wider division between liberal and 
totalitarian democracy? J. L. Talmon has described how both types of 
democracy originated in the eighteenth century but subsequently diverged. 
Liberal democracy is associated with a pragmatic approach to politics, 
a belief in the minimum of coercion, a concern for the right not to 
conform. Totalitarian democracy also champions the cause of freedom 
but in this case men are willing to use coercion in order to force others 
to be free. Democracy of this type, remarks Talmon, develops a messianic 
quality which serves as a substitute for religious faith by providing 
a new secular morality conceived in social terms. (26) Quinet cannot be said 
to belong to either of these classifications but at the same time he has 
clear affinities with both. 
It is pointless, however, to discuss Quinet's political ideas without 
making constant and detailed reference to his religious thought. His 
Republicanism, like his patriotism, was essentially an expression of his 
deepest religious aspirations. Indeed the overtly religious note persists 
into his later political writings. This fact, however, only served to 
highlight the distance which separated him from the younger Republicans 
who reached maturity during the Second Empire. The idealism and high-
sounding phrases of the 1840's were not for them. In the context of 
the Third Republic the survivors of 1848 appeared wordy and out of 
date. (27) How was a man like Quinet to behave among Republicans who 
mocked the very idea of God? What was to be done if the supporters of 
educational reform confused his antic1ericalism with irreligion? 
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No' one was more aware than Quinet that religion could mean the 
oppression of men at the hands of a priestly caste. His own faith 
required the abandonment of traditional religious categories. In common 
with many progressive religious thinkers of his century he rejected 
the clear-cut division between heaven and earth and between life and 
immortality. (28) He offered a reinterpretation of religion which emphasised 
the presence of God in the world. Like Schleiermacher he believed that 
the miraculous was at one with the natural. History was divine revelation. 
Like Ritschl, he stressed the ethical content of religious experience. 
Religion implied action and a commitment to the social realisation of 
religious principles. Above all Quinet interpreted the relationship 
between God and the world in a manner which removed the gulf separating 
the human from the divine but without simultaneously deifying the human. 
Quinet's God is present within the world, within the individual, within 
conscience. The encounter between the divine and the human takes place 
within the spirit of the individual. As we saw in Chapter Three this 
led Quinet to draw his reader's attention to the humanity of Jesus in a 
manner surprising in the 1830's if not in the 1970's. 
To be religous is to participate actively and freely ~n the onward 
movement of Life or Spirit. Quinet's God of Love is incompatible with 
Schopenhauer's Will, Spencer's Unknowable or Hartmann's Unconscious. 
The moral order is reconcilable with the natural order since history, 
like nature, is the rational expression of a higher principle. In the 
final analysis Quinet is closer to A. N. Whitehead than to Haeckel, 
to Hamelin than to Comte. 
In Quinet's thought the religious problem is grounded in the 
predicament of the individual existant. Religion cannot be considered 
in isolation from the quest for unity and the search for harmony. But 
man does not turn to religion in order to seek cons6lation for his 
condition. To be religious is to be aware of the precariousness of 
existence and to strive to the limits of hum~possiblities. For Quinet 
there can be no conflict between science and religious belief. Religion 
is the expression of life, the manifestation of freedom, the trancen-
dance of death. Above all the religious impulse in man is identified 
with his quest for the future. Perhaps there is no more satisfactory 
way to sum up the central tenet of Quinet's faith than to quote Benjamin 
Constant: 
Borner l'homme au present qui ne lui suffit 
jamais, lui interdire cet elan vers l'avenir 
auquel I' insuffisance du present l' exci te ; 
c'est Ie frapper de mort. (29) , 
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NOTES 
(1) See in particular La Creation and the conclusion of Les Revolutions 
d'Italie. 
(2) L'Esprit nouveau, p. 62. 
(3) Ibid., p. 55. Quinet's argument suggests that freedom is ultimately 
compatible with order. This idea recalls the penultimate section of 
Hugo's Le Satyre. 
(4) L'Esprit nouveau, p. 345. 
(5) La creation, vol. 2, pp. 364-5. Cf. La Republique, p. 253. 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
La creation, voL 1" p. 104. Cf. pp. 103-5 where Quinet develops 
a parallel with Platonic theories of reminiscence and love. 
Ibid., pp. 105-6. 
It comes as no surprise therefore to encounter references to 
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius in Quinet's later work. 
Esprit nouveau, p. 7. The desire to develop an harmonious 
relationship with nature recalls Quinet's earlier use of the myth 
of America and also his wish to reconcile East and West. 
The relationship between appearance and the reality is in fact a 
major theme in Quinet's writings. People are not what they seem; 
their words do not correspond to their deeds. Ultimately reality 
corresponds to Being and appearance to death. In La Revolution 
(voL 2, p. 466) Quinet speaks of "1 'aversion eternelle de la mort 
contre la vie, du faux contre Ie. vrai", and in La Republique 
(p. 260) he writes as follows: "La mort est menteuse, la vie seul 
eS t sincere". 
Cf. La Revolution, vol. 2, pp. 562-3: "Les Allemands, dans la philo-
sophie, avaient detruit Ie principe de la certitude metaphysique; 
mais ils avaient laisse subsister la conscience morale sur laquelle 
ils pretendaient tout rebatir. D'autres gens sont venus; ils ont 
extirpe la conscience, et le monde s'est trouve dans Ie plus beau 
neant qui se verra jamais'.'. 
O:::ppleston, Ope cit., p. 19. 
La Creation, vol. 1, pp. 90-1. 
L'Esprit nouveau, p. 10. This image of the "bulle de savon" occurs 
upon a number of occasions. Cf. the "Intermede de la premiere 
j ournee" in Ahasverus. Cf. R. Bourgeoi s, L' Ironie romantique, 
Grenoble, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, 1974. 
See Quinet's Lettre sur Kant, Pagnerre, vol. 10. pp. 289-92. 
L'Esprit nouveau, p. 9. 
E. Brehier, "Liberte et metaphysique", Revue internationale de 
philosophie, 1939, pp. 4 and 5. 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
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In Merlin Quinet reiterates his view that a return to Eden, to a golden 
age in the past is an illusion. Even Eden, would not be commensurate 
with modern man's aspirations. But does not the myth of Greek 
civilisation function at least in part as a lost paradise? 
Philosophie de l'histoire de France~ p. 387. 
Cf. L'Enseignement du peuple: "Justice, verite, ordre abso1u, 
qu'est-ce que ce1a sinon 1a source eterne11e des idees divines, 
c'est-a-dire cette essence du bien sur 71equel se r~lent les moeurs 
de l'Etat? Ce Dieu de l'ordre, de 1a justice, ce geometre eterne1, 
qui descend par degres au fond des lois de tout peup1e police, 
n'est pas ce1ui qui plait aux castes sacerdota1es". (pp. 90-1.) 
Cf. Herzen's comments on Quinet's continuing faith in France recorded 
in My past and thoughts~ tr. Garnett, London, Chatto and Windus, 
1968, vol. 3, pp. 1490-92. 
La Revolution~ vol. 2, p. 75. 
Ibid., vol. 1, p. 463. 
Ibid., vol. 2, p. 19. 
Hence Quinet's admiration for the United States, a Protestant 
country which values the individual and respects private property. 
See J. L. Talmon, The O~igins of T~talitarian Democracy~ London, 
Sphere, 1970. 
See G. Chapman, The Third Republic of France~ London, Macmillan, 
1962, p. 18. 
In La Revolution and in L'Esprit nouveau Quinet reaffirms a belief 
in immortality in the same manner as in the 1840's. 
Quoted by P. Deguise, Ope cit., p. 228. 
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Wenderoth 0., Der junge Quinet und seine Ubersetzung von Herders "Ideen", 
in Romanische Forschungen~ 1908, vol. 22, pp. 310-398. 
Articles devoted largely to Quinet 
Adam Ch., "Edgar Quinet et 1es Roumains", Revue pedagogique, 1915, 
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